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Colonial agents played a central role in the early
relationship between England and the New England
settlements. Agents' missions forced the colonies to
devise a working definition of their political, legal and
cultural status with regard to England. Agents secured
charters and negotiated agreements which placed the
colonies on a lasting constitutional base, both in
transatlantic terms, and with respect to one another. The
Rhode Island towns recognised at an early date that they
needed English help if they were to resist annexation by
the other colonies: that support was maintained by
dispatching agents to successive English regimes.
This study uses evidence from both sides of the
Atlantic, analysing both the agency as an institution,
and its role in English Atlantic affairs. The first
generation agents were better organised and more
successful than students of later periods have allowed.
As first generation settlers with close personal ties to
England, the early agents also offer unique insights into
the attitudes and concerns of colonials when faced with
civil turmoil in their home country. In turn, England's
leaders held views about the colonies which are revealed
in their dealings with agents. The study of agents has
therefore allowed many seemingly unrelated strands in
transatlantic politics and society to be drawn together
and examined in a wider context.
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Preface
This study has its roots in a single question. How
did Rhode Island, alone among the smaller settlements of
southern New England, survive the seventeenth century
without being incorporated into either Massachusetts or
Connecticut? As is perhaps inevitable, the path from that
question to this dissertation has involved a number of
changes in focus, but the final product goes a long way
to answering the initial question, as well as addressing
several more.
It was clear from preliminary reading that Rhode
Island was always more willing to cooperate with
successive English governments than were the other
colonies, and following this avenue of enquiry led to the
first generation colonial agents. Their careers in turn
revealed much about the relationship between England and
the colonies, and not least the role of English authority
in solving colonial disputes.
This thesis is based on research supervised in
Edinburgh by Dr. Alan Day and Dr. Susan Hardman Moore.
Their help and encouragement is much appreciated, as is
that offered by their colleagues. In particular, Dr.
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones coordinated my tutoring work for
the History Department; Dr. Frances Dow introduced me to
the historiography of seventeenth-century England; Mr.
Owen Dudley Edwards offered some helpful criticism of a
seminar paper based on the final chapters of this work;
and Dr. Colin Nicholson made my study trips easier with
some timely information. I am grateful to them all.
Most of my research and writing was carried out in
Edinburgh, either at the University Library or the
National Library of Scotland. A number of other
institutions- in Scotland, England and the United States-
provided me with research facilities and made their
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resources available to me. Most are listed in the primary
sources bibliography at the end of this dissertation, but
others deserve thanks also: in particular, the Institute
of Historical Research and Senate House Library (both of
the University of London), Harvard's Widener Library and
Brown's Rockefeller and John Carter Brown Libraries. The
last of these gave me a travel grant which helped to make
possible a three-month stay in New England, while the
bulk of my research was funded by the Scottish Education
Department. The final stages of writing took place during
my tenure as Thorneycroft Fellow at Southampton
University. I wish to thank my colleagues in the Official
Publications Section of the Hartley Library for their
interest and encouragement.
The adaptation of primary material for the purposes
of this thesis involves the following standardisations.
Spelling has been modernised in quotations from sources,
except where there is no direct modern equivalent for a
word, but no alteration has been made to spelling in the
titles of seventeenth-century pamphlets: most of the
latter have not been quoted to their original length,
however. Dates have been left in the Julian calendar, as
in the original sources, although the year is taken to
begin on January 1 instead of March 25. Minor
biographical details of agents in the main text have not
been footnoted; source references are given in the
biographical appendix.
Writers have long sought ways of apologising for
errors and claiming full responsibility for them, and I
hope I may be forgiven for adopting a personal favourite
rather than producing anything original. Thomas Rotherham
condemned the activities of radical preachers in his
native Hertfordshire in A Den of Theeves Discovered,
(London, 1643). On page 94, he added two brief lines of
errata to his text before making the following plea:
"There may be some other mistakes, which I know the
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This study examines the careers of the first generation
of colonial agents from New England, and their influence
on successive governments in London. Agents provide the
human factor in much early contact between fledgling
colonies and the central authorities in England. The work
of agents often remains in the background in more general
studies of the colonies, but they were responsible for
much transatlantic communication at a governmental level.
It is in agents' work that the routine mechanics of
presenting the colonial case in England can be seen. Of
course, not all exchanges between colony and capital were
transmitted via agents: the chapters below describe a
range of instances in which agents were just part of a
far larger network of contact at both official and
personal level. Agents were nonetheless crucial to the
major constitutional developments of the first decades of
colonisation, and this study demonstrates that both the
internal politics of New England and the structures of
English colonial administration would have been slower to
develop in the absence of agents.
In particular, agents were able to secure the
constitutional position of Rhode Island. A major
achievement, of fundamental long-term significance to
New England as a whole, Rhode Island's survival in the
face of threats from Massachusetts, Plymouth and
Connecticut was engineered by agents who recognised the
role English regimes could be encouraged to play in
colonial affairs. To a large extent, the smaller
colonies in New England were dependent on support from
England if they were to resist the expansionism of their
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neighbours, and that support was, more often than not,
secured by the efforts of colonial agents.
Agents adopted many strategies and tactics in
pursuit of their aims, and thanks to these multifarious
activities they appear at various points in Atlantic
historiography. In general terms, they were responsible
for promoting and defending their colonies' interests in
London. Sometimes they directly petitioned the
authorities for specific decisions, or the granting of
legal documents like charters: at other times they
worked to defeat similar petitions of agents from rival
colonies. Agents published pamphlets to support their
claims, or to promote their colonies in more general
terms. They tried, sometimes successfully, to raise
funds for colonial causes such as education or religious
conversion.
This opening chapter will introduce the various
different sources and approaches used in drawing
conclusions about the work of agents, and place this
study in the wider context not only of agency
historiography, but of other schools of research also.
The fragmentation of historical study into a multitude
of small specialisations is a matter of some importance
to the profession as a whole, although given that
historians are neither omniscient nor immortal some
degree of specialisation would seem to be unavoidable.
This study of colonial agents touches upon a range of
issues which are far larger than the space accorded to
them in these pages, because agents themselves lived in
a wider world than many of their contemporaries.
Accordingly, there is more material in the following
chapters about English politics than might be found in
most works of colonial history, and more analysis of
internal New England affairs than is common in studies
of English colonial and imperial policy. Focusing on
agents allows many elements of the Atlantic scene to be
studied, and their interaction analysed.
The first generation agents have attracted much
2
attention, either individually as subjects of
biographies, or collectively in studies of the agency as
an institution. As leading founders of the New England
colonies, many agents have already been widely treated
in biographical work: some have been studied at regular
intervals since Cotton Mather compiled his Magnalia
Christi Americana in 1702, and the resulting books run
the full range from scholarly analysis to filiopietistic
hagiography. The present study will not add much to the
already well sketched biographical picture of many of
the agents, but their role in transatlantic affairs does
merit further consideration.1
Most studies of the colonial agency as an
institution have focused on the eighteenth century
rather than the seventeenth. Agents played an important
role in the great crisis of the Atlantic empire which
culminated in the revolt of the thirteen colonies.
Michael G. Kammen and Jack M. Sosin have come to
differing conclusions about the role of agents in the
deteriorating transatlantic relationship of the later
eighteenth century. Crudely, Kammen sees a gradual
decline in agents' influence while Sosin argues for a
more sudden breach in 1 7 7 4 . 2 An earlier imperial
upheaval, the Glorious Revolution of 1688, is often
taken as the point at which the institution of the
colonial agency became formalised. Most students of the
field have concentrated on the years from 1688 to 1776
as a period in which the agents were part of a mature,
1 The most important biographical sources- primary and
secondary- for these individuals are listed in Appendix
4 .
2 See Sosin, Agents and Merchants: British Colonial
Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution,
(1965); Kammen, review of same in WMQ 23 (1966): 492-495;
Kammen, A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British
Politics, and the American Revolution, (1968) .
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well-defined system of transatlantic communication.1
This present study moves back in time to the first
crisis to affect all of England's Atlantic settlements.
Between 1641 and 1663, the New England colonies sent a
total of fourteen men to England as agents. Between
them, these agents witnessed two civil wars, the
establishment of a republic and the ultimate restoration
of the Stuart monarchy. No part of the English world
escaped the political, military or economic consequences
of these conflicts. The rebellion against Charles I
forced many colonials, and particularly New Englanders,
to reassess their attitudes toward their home country.
Many returned to fight in the wars, and many more were
grateful for having left England when they did.
The last examination of New England's first
generation agents was produced by James J. Burns in
1935. In common with other regional studies, Burns
devoted only a small part (one-sixth) of his monograph
to the seventeenth century, preferring to deal with the
eighteenth and particularly the period immediately
preceding 1776. His discussion of the first generation
is also limited by his extrapolation of eighteenth-
century definitions into the earlier period. For
example, if royal provinces suffered from tensions
between governors and popular assemblies over the
selection of agents, it does not follow, as Burns
assumed, that the development of the agency in the
supposedly more democratic chartered colonies of the
seventeenth century was "smooth and undisturbed by
factional disputes."2
More seriously, Burns underestimated the
significance of agents in the early relationship between
1 Regional studies of the agency which use this time-span
include Ella Lonn, The Colonial Agents of the Southern
Colonies (1945); Edward P. Lilly, The Colonial Agents of
New York and New Jersey, (1936); James J. Burns, The
Colonial Agents of New England, (1935).
2 Burns, Colonial Agents, 2.
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England and the colonies. Burns' interest in the
political and commercial lobbying activities of later
agents led him to denigrate such issues as
the securing of charters and the defence of charter
rights, boundary questions, complaints of religious
minorities, requests for financial support for private
and public purposes, and for trading privileges...1
As will be shown, these were in fact the very questions
which had the greatest weight in the formative years of
the English Atlantic, and agents were central to the
airing of such matters before the English authorities.
It is worth briefly listing the agents and missions
studied in the chapters below, in order to establish the
chronological framework to the analysis which follows.
Massachusetts dispatched the first mission of the period
in 1641, when Thomas Weld, Hugh Peter and William
Hibbins went to England. In 1643, Roger Williams became
the first agent to represent the Rhode Island towns: he
travelled largely on his own initiative but had the
support of his own settlement at Providence and at least
some of the colonists on Aquidneck Island.2 The fourth
Narragansett Bay town, Shawomet, joined the process when
it sent Samuel Gorton, Randall Holden and John Greene to
England in 1646. As will be seen, the Gortonists' main
1 Burns, Colonial Agents, 23.
2 Nomenclature can be hazardous when dealing with
communities which changed over time, and anachronism is
a problem in southern New 'England. The following
conventions have been adopted for this study. 'Rhode
Island' is used as a collective term for the four main
settlements around Narragansett Bay, and is only used
when referring to the general geographic area or in
circumstances where all the towns can be treated as a
unit. More usually in the mid-seventeenth century, towns
acted independently or in pairs. Providence and Shawomet
made up the mainland half of the colony, with Portsmouth
and Newport being established on the island of
Aquidneck. Shawomet was renamed Warwick in the 1640s,
but to avoid confusion with the Earl of Warwick (the
Long Parliament's Governor in Chief of the American
Colonies) the town's Indian name has been used
throughout. Appendix 1 below contains a map of the
region.
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purpose was to attack Massachusetts, and that colony
responded by dispatching Edward Winslow to London late
in 1646. Winslow was also charged with launching a pre¬
emptive strike against the Bay Colony's dissident
Remonstrant faction, which sent William Vassall as agent
early in 1647.
The next, smaller flurry of agency activity came in
the early 1650s, after Aquidneck leader William
Coddington secured a Governor's Commission from the
English authorities in 1650. Coddington cannot be
considered an agent, because he acted almost entirely on
his own, and did not represent a colony or even a local
community. Still, some of his actions do reveal
experiences and lessons which had to be learned by
agents also, and, more importantly, he came into
conflict with long-serving Massachusetts agent Winslow.
The most valuable evidence generated by the Coddington
case comes from the agents sent to overthrow his
commission. In 1651, Aquidneck and the mainland towns
dispatched John Clarke and Roger Williams, respectively.
These agents also clashed with Winslow.
The rest of the 1650s were quiet years for the
colonial agency. Only one new mission was launched, when
John Leveret replaced Edward Winslow for Massachusetts
in 1655. Leveret served until 1660, and the second major
wave of agency activity began in the following year.
Connecticut sent the younger John Winthrop to London in
the summer of 1661, and Massachusetts dispatched Simon
Bradstreet and John Norton early in 1662. Rhode Island's
John Clarke, inactive in England for much of the
previous decade, was recommissioned in 1660 and clashed
with Winthrop during 1662 and 1663. All of this last
group of agents had returned to New England by 1664.
These men raised many questions in the course of
their work, and became involved in issues which were of
little consequence to most of their fellow colonists. As
well as causing some tension at the time, when colonial
leaders and agents found themselves having differing
6
perspectives, the wider activities of agents force
historians to consider a range of issues. The rest of
this introductory chapter will provide an overview of
the major questions and fields of study which surround
agency work in this period. In turn, these are the
internal struggles and development of the New England
colonies; the complex and fluid nature of English
politics, society and colonial administration in a time
of civil war and revolution; and recent attempts to view
these matters in a wider context than has previously
been the case, by considering the dominions of the
Stuart kings in their full geographical extent.
First, the New England colonies. If early colonial
agents have been neglected by historians, the same
certainly cannot be said of these northern settlements.
The region occupies a prominent place in the
historiography of colonial America, which has only been
partly balanced by an upsurge of interest in the
southern and island colonies since the 1970s. Of the
broad geographical areas into which the colonies are
often divided, New England did not attract the most
immigrants, nor was it the most economically productive
in terms of the cash crop criteria of mercantile theory.
Recent work argues that the New England settlements were
not even the most faithful transplantations of English
society, and that the fluid and transient structures of
the southern colonies were in some respects closer to
their English roots than were the ordered communities of
Massachusetts.1
1 The most important call for New England's role to be
reassessed is in Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness:
The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies
and the Formation of American Culture, (1988). John
Murrin criticises Greene's view that the Chesapeake was
eventually to become much closer to English society than
New England, arguing in particular that chattel slavery
had an overwhelming impact on the nature of southern
society. See Murrin, "The Irrelevance and Relevance of
Colonial New England", Reviews in American History, 18
(1990): 177-184.
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As a case study of the early decades of England's
transatlantic society, however, the New England colonies
offer some uniquely valuable lessons. Settlement in the
region had a significant religious element: many if not
most settlers had a wide range of reasons for travelling
to America, but social structures before and after
emigration demonstrate the prevalence of religious
assumptions and habits.1 Important in itself, New
England's spiritual aspect took on dramatic new
implications in the 1640s when the English Parliament
seized power from Charles I. England's new leaders were
no more united in questions of faith than they were
certain of how to prosecute the conflict with the king,
as the civil wars, political crises and religious
debates of the decade were to demonstrate. Nonetheless,
in the eyes of contemporaries and historians alike, the
successes of the Parliamentary cause seemed to herald a
potential transatlantic alliance between co¬
religionists .2
Assumptions made by both England and the colonies
regarding each other's church practices and attitudes
often coloured the transatlantic relationship, and New
England agents offer some telling lessons in the
obstacles confronting ecclesiastical agreement across
the ocean. In general, religious questions were more
1 The balance between religious and economic motives for
migration to New England has been the focus of much
debate. The most recent flurry of writing on the issue
stems from David Hackett Fischer's Albion's Seed, which
has been criticised by Virginia DeJohn Anderson, a long¬
standing advocate of the primacy of the religious
motive. See the Forum discussion on Fischer's book in
WMQ, 48 (1991): 224-308.
2 For example, Francis Bremer argues that New Englanders
were closely supportive of England's "Congregational
faction to which they were bound by old friendships as
well as by a common ideology." See Bremer, "The New
Haven Colony and Oliver Cromwell." Connecticut
Historical Society Bulletin 38 (1973): 65-72, 67. Much
of this support fell short of the help some English
leaders hoped for, however: for a more complete
discussion, see Chapter 5 below.
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likely to create tension than they were to promote
cooperation and understanding. Agents were necessarily
at the centre of such exchanges, and their role was
placed in even higher relief by their own religious
concerns. Half of the agents considered in this study
had a professional religious role, either as
Massachusetts ministers or as leaders of sectarian
groups in Rhode Island. This involvement made it
inevitable that the religious practices of the colonies
would be held up to scrutiny in England, and that agents
would be expected to defend their views.
Relations among the New England colonies are as
revealing as their wider ties across the ocean, and
again pose problems which were, if not unique to the
region, certainly unusual in their intensity. While most
of the emigrants of the 1630s went initially to
Massachusetts, their reactions to the region's
environment and to the social system adopted by the
Massachusetts leadership led many to found other
colonies. By the end of the 1630s a range of communities
had developed as offshoots of Massachusetts, in addition
to the settlement at Plymouth which had been in place
since 1620. Most of these new townships had sufficient
in common to gradually coalesce to form colonies, and
most of the region's colonies in turn joined to create
the Confederation of the United Colonies of New England
in 1643. The one striking exception is the collection of
communities around Narragansett Bay which ultimately
became Rhode Island.
Rhode Island owes its foundation to the more
dramatic disputes which rocked Massachusetts in the
1630s. Most of those who eventually settled in other New
England colonies left Massachusetts voluntarily because
they disliked the soil, or because they sought a more
contemplative spiritual environment than the fast
developing commercial ports of seaboard Massachusetts,
but Rhode Island's founders generally travelled to their
new homes under orders of banishment from the Boston
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authorities. The Antinomian crisis of 1636-38 led to the
settlement of Portsmouth which in turn divided to create
the other Aquidneck town, Newport. Earlier, Providence
had been founded by Massachusetts refugee Roger Williams
after a dispute over separation from the Church of
England. In 1642, the fourth Rhode Island town was
established at Shawomet by the followers of Samuel
Gorton. Most of Gorton's townsfolk had been banished
from at least one of the other New England colonies.
Inevitably, therefore, Rhode Island had an
unenviable reputation in the four surrounding colonies
of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth and New Haven.
Rhode Island, it was alleged, welcomed escaped convicts
from neighbouring colonies, tolerated drinking on the
Sabbath, provided a bad example to the local Indians and
was the vehicle for the dissemination of blasphemy and
heresy throughout the region. Leading Rhode Island
historian Carl Bridenbaugh sums up the traditional
outsider's view of the colony as one of a "misgoverned,
immoral, disjointed society of ignorant clowns harboring
blasphemous religious opinions."1
The differences between the mainstream New England
colonies and the place they called 'Rogue's Island' were
in fact less marked than might be thought. Bridenbaugh's
own studies indicate that the Aquidneck communities in
particular were just as well organised economically as
their larger neighbours. In religious terms, the Rhode
Island towns practised an unprecedented level of
toleration, and rejected the Bay Colony's practice of
allowing civil magistrates to act against dissenting
religious elements. This did not mean that Rhode
Islanders placed any less value on civil order than did
their neighbours, however. Equally, toleration did not
lead to any dilution in the intensity of individual
faiths. Rhode Islanders of whatever religion were as
vehement in their beliefs as any in Massachusetts; they
1 Carl Bridenbaugh, Fat Mutton and Liberty of Conscience,
(1974), 127.
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simply found it politically and socially expedient not
to silence those who thought differently.
Other similarities in outlook and attitude, this
time with regard to England, were central to the
activities of agents. Rhode Islanders and their
opponents alike recognised the power of chartered
authority derived from England. Agents all made similar
assumptions about their right to play whatever part they
wished in England's own affairs, and did not share the
view of some English commentators that the agents and
their colonies were already acting on one level as
outsiders. However much agents may have competed with
one another they still worked with much the same set of
assumptions, believing that English authority could help
preserve their own rights and privileges, while
diminishing those of their opponents.
There is one further, and very practical reason for
concentrating on New England agents in this period. They
are by far the largest group of agents from any
geographical area, and while agents from other colonies
appear occasionally in the following chapters,
opposition to Parliament on the part of the southern
colonies resulted in few missions from that region. New
England agents therefore offer a unique insight into the
transatlantic relationship between England and one of
its major colonial offshoots, and provide a body of
evidence which does not exist elsewhere.
The later chapters of this work draw much of their
evidence from sources in England, and deal in some
detail with the work of English committees and colonial
administrators. While attempting to see English society
in transatlantic terms, this study is nonetheless
dependent on a range of evidence which by its nature
only refers to one side of the ocean or the other. The
period under analysis has been extensively studied by
historians interested solely in the affairs of England,
who have made little reference to the nature or even the
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existence of American colonies. Given this, and taking
note of the fact that the mid-seventeenth century is
probably one of the most controversial periods in
English history, some attention needs to be given to
events in England.
One striking characteristic of the seventeenth
century in England is the quantity of polemical,
opinionated, abusive and insulting material which
emerged from the printing presses of Royalists,
Parliamentarians and innumerable other interested
groups: it is a measure of the controversy still caused
by these times that historians occasionally employ
similar weapons. As with other hard-fought issues, some
of the debate serves to obscure rather than reveal, and
this is nowhere more true than in the labelling applied
to events and to historiographical schools alike.
This study uses the relatively neutral term
"interregnum" to describe the years between the flight
of Charles I from London in 1642 and the restoration of
the monarchy eighteen years later. There are alternative
labels, which have become more or less fashionable over
time, depending on the wider views of the historians
concerned. Those who see the period as one of immense
political and social change driven by vocal radicals
refer to the English Revolution; those who see the more
strict and fundamentalist wing of English protestantism
as a central factor might prefer "Puritan Revolution";
interpreters of the 1640s as a baronial revolt might opt
for the much older label of "Great Rebellion".
Historians of the period are themselves slotted into
categories by their colleagues, whether whig, marxist,
revisionist or even, recently, post-revisionist. Small
wonder that one scholar has found his analysis "hovering
on the brink of terminological insanity."1
1 Glenn Burgess does much to clarify recent
interpretations in "On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early
Stuart Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s." HJ 33
(1990): 609-627, 616.
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The terms historians attach to events and to each
other might appear to be a somewhat trivial matter
relative to the events themselves, but behind such
academic conventions lie deep disagreements about the
nature and development of English society in the
seventeenth century. This present study examines English
affairs in some detail when relevant to the careers of
agents, but it cannot offer any major contribution to
these wider debates. Nonetheless, evidence is presented
in the following chapters which has a bearing on some
specific matters of interest, and comment can be passed
on questions which have attracted attention elsewhere.
One issue of particular concern to historians has
been the question of factional or party divisions in the
House of Commons. Agents had to direct their petitions
to some of the main protagonists in Parliament, and the
reaction of these men to colonial petitions can also
reveal wider political allegiances and activities. Most
recent comment owes a debt to J. H. Hexter, who
overhauled the nineteenth-century picture of a House
divided between conservative Presbyterians and radical
Independents by uncovering evidence of a moderate third
grouping and, more importantly, by arguing that most MPs
owed no allegiance whatever to anything that would be
recognisable as a modern political party.1 A large number
of historians have subsequently debated and refined
Hexter's work, and built up a wider picture of the
development of factions throughout the 1640s.2 It is
clear that alliances were fluid and often short-lived,
that religious and political considerations overlapped,
1 See Hexter, The Reign of King Pym, (1941).
2 Stephen Foster summarised and challenged much of the
1960s work in "The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised:
A Ghost Story for Historians." Past and Present 44
(1969): 52-75. Shortly after, two major monographs
analysed the activities of MPs in detail with particular
reference to those who went on to form the Rump
Parliament: see David Underdown, Pride's Purge; Politics
in the Puritan Revolution, (1971), Blair Worden, The
Rump Parliament 1648-1653, (1974) .
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and that the dramatic events of the decade forced men to
adopt certain stances at certain times which could bear
little relation to earlier or later behaviour.
The problems of trying to place individuals in
parties or factions have beset many historians. In his
study of the London churches in the interregnum, Tai Liu
attempts to reach a conclusion about those civic leaders
who were closely involved with the establishment of
Presbyterian church government in their parishes but who
carried on playing an active role following the victory
of the army and the Independents in 1647-8. In Liu's
words,
Were they truly religious Presbyterians? Or, should we
call them political Presbyterians or political
Independents? Or, to put it more bluntly, should we
conclude that these names were meaningless labels and
ought to be discarded in modern studies?1
Liu concludes that the classic factional divide between
Presbyterians and Independents is on one level rather
irrelevant, because most men had, in most situations, a
higher loyalty which would overcome any consideration of
faction. In this case, Liu argues that a general sense
of civic responsibility united Presbyterians and
Independents alike.
Evidence presented below indicates that a similar
sense of priority coloured politicians' actions when
dealing with colonial affairs. Chapter 6 examines in
some detail the possible motives and concerns of
England's leaders, and considers the claims of some
writers that there were recognisable common interests
between factions in England and colonial groups
represented by agents. This study concludes that such
links do not stand up to scrutiny: indeed, far from
forming transatlantic alliances, England's leaders
actively sought to distance themselves from the
factional squabbling of the colonies. The main priority
1 See Tai Lui, Puritan London, (1986), 205.
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of England's colonial administrators was stability,
first in England and then in England's wider
territories, and the internal disputes of the New
England settlements were anathema to such a goal.
Closely tied to the issue of faction is the
division between the two Houses of Parliament, and the
role of members of the House of Lords in the politics of
the 1640s has also been the source of some controversy.
The early 1990s have witnessed a spirited debate among
historians on both sides of the Atlantic based on
articles written by J.S.A. Adamson and Mark A.
Kishlansky. The first four rounds of the dispute, which
appeared in the Historical Journal and the Journal of
British Studies, are listed in the bibliography below:
later contributions from other historians have littered
the correspondence pages of the Times Literary
Supplement and various newspapers. To do justice to all
that here would be impossible, but, to summarise in
extremely simplistic terms, Adamson sees the peers (and
some individuals in particular) having a significant
role in many of the most important political activities
of the Long Parliament, while Kishlansky gives the Lords
a much more subdued part relative to members of the
Commons.
Given the minutiae of the arguments on both sides,
this study cannot hope to shed much light on the wider
role of peers in politics. It is notable, though, that
members of the House of Lords played a crucial part in
colonial administration during the 1640s. Chapter 6
presents evidence that peers remained active in colonial
affairs until late in the decade, and beyond the point
at which their influence is often believed to have
declined. Perhaps more importantly, the decisions of
Parliamentary leaders with respect to New England are
entirely consistent with views expressed in earlier
years by certain aristocratic colonial sponsors, and it
is clear that these individuals were instrumental in
steering the decisions of their colleagues.
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One important point about those individuals who
were prominent in Parliament in the 1640s is that they
also supervised administrative processes in the absence
of king and council. Government by the Long Parliament
in the 1640s saw a gradual increase and development of
Parliamentary powers, but far more sudden change was
forced by the execution of Charles I and the
establishment of the English republic in 1649. The
Commonwealth period, from 1649-1653, has attracted the
attention of historians for various reasons, not least a
desire to find out if such a superficially dramatic
shift was reinforced by any lasting changes beneath the
surface. One unusual approach is that of G. E. Aylmer,
who examines the bureaucratic structure of government in
the period, offering detailed analysis of the trend
toward government by committee and the increased use of
professional officials.1 Many others have looked at
political development from another perspective, with
studies of England's elected representatives. Work on
the Rump Parliament by Blair Worden has already been
mentioned, and the role of individuals in particular
crises and events has been brought to light in more
recent articles.2 The idea of a Republican foreign policy
has also attracted attention, along with the attendant
development of English naval power. In particular, the
circumstances surrounding the Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-54
cast light on the priorities and motives of the English
leadership when confronted by commercial competition
1 See Aylmer, The State's Servants: The Civil Service of
the English Republic 1649-1660, (1973) .
2 See Worden, The Rump Parliament; reactions by certain
politicians to events in Ireland are considered in Sarah
Barber, "Irish Undercurrents to the Politics of April
1653." Historical Research 65 (1992): 315-335.
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from the co-religionist Dutch.1
All of these questions affected the work of agents.
Committee government, and the importance of certain
individual committee members, dictated the approaches
adopted by agents. The wider concerns of English leaders
could frustrate agents pursuing a quick solution to
problems, but they also allowed agents to identify
figures likely to be sympathetic. The Dutch War is a
useful example, in that Rhode Island agents were able to
present their petitions in such a way as to appeal to
those leaders with particular interest in the conflict.
If England's civil wars and republican experiments
have attracted much attention from historians, it is
only recently that the same could be said for the return
of the monarchy in 1660. It is of course tempting for
historians to see the Restoration as a convenient and
even fitting conclusion to two decades of confusion and
upheaval, and a variation on that sentiment among
contemporaries goes part of the way to explaining why it
came about in the first place. Nonetheless, some notable
scholarship has demonstrated that the Restoration was
not the foregone conclusion that hindsight implies, and
that Charles II and his leading officials had to devote
much effort to consolidating the return of the monarchy.2
1 There have been regular if infrequent contributions to
the discussion of the Dutch war over the last few
decades: see Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study
of England and the Dutch Wars, (1957); J. E. Farnell,
"The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and
the London Merchant Community." Economic History Review
16 (1963-4): 439-454; Simon Groenweld, "The English
Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War 1640-
1652." HJ 30 (1987): 541-566. For a major contribution
to the period's naval history, see B.S. Capp, Cromwell's
Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648-1660,
(1989) .
2 Two important monographs published in the 1980s offer
new evidence and analysis in this neglected period. See
Ronald Hutton, The Restoration: A Political and
Religious History of England and Wales 1658-1667,
(1985); Paul Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the
Restoration of the Old Regime, 1661-1667, (1989).
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That politics in the early 1660s was at times no less
complex than in previous decades would not have been a
surprise to the agents of the period, who enjoyed some
success in their approaches to the new regime. Agents
from the smaller New England colonies offered
recognition of Charles II in exchange for new colonial
charters, and while they may have allowed themselves to
be manipulated by officials keen to isolate
Massachusetts, the results were mutually beneficial.
This brief survey of the English side of the
evidence has only scratched the surface of many
important issues, but it is important to stress that
just as England's troubles affected the lives of agents
and other colonists, so the handling of colonial issues
can reveal much about England itself. As well as this
wider influence, agents also contributed to the
development of mechanisms which were specifically
designed to deal with colonial questions, and it is to
colonial administration that the next section turns.
As has been noted, the organisation of government in
this period resulted in a distinct overlap between the
politics of England and the administration of England's
colonies, in large part because the same men were
prominent in both fields. There is even a continuity of
personnel over time with many of the leading figures
approached by agents in the 1640s remaining active on
colonial committees into the following decade. There
was, however, a sharp discontinuity of personnel between
the 1630s and the 1640s, and this is particularly
important because the same period saw little change in
the New England leadership. Senior figures in the
colonies had experienced some rather negative moves by
royal officials during the first decade of settlement,
and the resulting apprehension inevitably carried over
into the interregnum. Regardless of the plans of the new
Parliamentary leadership, the Bay Colony elite would
have remained suspicious until all possibility of
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interference from London had been removed. It is
important, therefore, to briefly consider the events
which were to colour some New England views of England
throughout the early decades of settlement.
As will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 2,
Massachusetts was always emphatic that it derived its
authority from its 1629 charter, and its relations with
successive English governments were conducted on that
basis. Throughout the interregnum, the colony vehemently
defended its charter and its right to cheose its own
leaders, even when there was little evidence that these
issues were being threatened. Such concern, which at
times verged on paranoia, stems in large part from the
activities of the English government in the mid-1630s,
and in particular the attempt by Archbishop William Laud
to have the Massachusetts charter withdrawn.
To the leaders of the Bay Colony, Archbishop Laud
was chief among those responsible for banishing English
preachers from their parishes and depriving them of
their licences to minister.1 Most of the Bay clergy had
either been formally censured before leaving England, or
saw such a development as imminent, and Laud's elevation
to the Archbishopric in 1 633 seemed the final
confirmation of England's fall into episcopal tyranny.
It is understandable therefore that Massachusetts
interpreted Laud's chairmanship of the Council for
Foreign Plantations in 1634 as a direct threat to the
colonial churches.
Laud, on the other hand, had reason to see the
migration to America as a challenge to his authority.
Once it had established its Congregational churches,
Massachusetts Bay seemed to offer high profile
opposition to Laud and Charles I on political and
1 For Laud's religious beliefs, see Nicholas Tyacke,
Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism c.1590-
1640, (1987). The most recent biography of Laud focuses
on his academic life and concludes that he was promoted
far beyond his abilities as a church administrator. See
Charles Carlton, Archbishop William Laud, (1987).
19
theological grounds alike. Earlier in his career,
Charles had witnessed his father's attempts to deal with
the problems of the Virginia Company. That company had
threatened to ruin a flourishing trade in tobacco
through corruption and incompetence, but the threat from
Massachusetts in the 1630s seemed even more fundamental.
Massachusetts made no secret of its attempts to
establish a purified church based on apostolic
principle. Men like John Winthrop and John Cotton denied
that their settlement was intent on separation from the
English church, but their contemporaries had no doubt
that the Congregational establishment in New England was
very different from the forms favoured by Charles'
Archbishop. While Laud attempted to reform the Church of
England, Massachusetts took several steps backward,
trying to recreate a more primitivist church which drew
more inspiration from the Old Testament than the New.1
Such a blatantly fundamentalist colony was the very
antithesis of the gradually expanding power of the
English monarchy in matters both spiritual and temporal.
Charles and Laud broke new constitutional and
administrative ground in their efforts to curb its
activities. In 1634, Charles established a new
Commission for Plantations, chaired by Laud. Laud's
Commission claimed jurisdiction over all the colonies
from 28 April 1634 until at least August 1641, but its
one serious intervention in colonial affairs was the
1 A recent exploration of the roots of the colonial
churches is offered by Theodore D. Bozeman, To Live
Ancient Lives: The Primitivist Dimension in Puritanism,
(1988). An important part of Bozeman's thesis is a
reconsideration of the "errand into the wilderness",
which may have been less of a motive for migration than
historians have believed. Bozeman argues that Perry
Miller's classic works on New England theology have been
misinterpreted and that it is dangerously anachronistic
to assume that the first Massachusetts settlers were on
a clearly defined 'errand'. See also Bozeman, "The
Puritans' 'Errand into the Wilderness' Reconsidered",
NEQ 59 (1986) : 232-251.
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attempt to recall the Massachusetts charter.1
Early in 1634, the Privy Council took the first
steps against Massachusetts, ordering that ships bound
for the colony be prevented from sailing pending an
examination of the charter. Many of those going to New
England, noted the Council, were "known to be ill
affected, and discontented, as well with the civil as
ecclesiastical government", with the result that the
region was already suffering "confusion and
disorder...especially in point of religion".2
Massachusetts was convinced that such actions, as well
as the establishment of the new Commission, heralded a
concerted effort to intervene in colonial affairs. The
colonial rumour mill produced various stories at this
time, including fears that a fleet carrying a new
Governor to Virginia was in fact bound for
Massachusetts.3
This particular threat proved to be a false alarm,
and Stuart innovation in the governance of the colonies
ground to a halt as domestic crises flared up in the
later 1630s. In the years to come, Massachusetts
demonstrated that it had learned two lessons from Laud's
attack on the charter. Fears of a Governor being sent
from England resurfaced continually throughout the
interregnum and beyond, and were not restricted to the
Bay Colony. Second, Massachusetts also realised that the
English authorities gave New England matters a very low
priority in the face of domestic troubles, and adopted a
policy of trying to delay and obstruct developments in
1 Charles M. Andrews argues that the central motive for
the establishment of Laud's commission was a desire to
curb the activities of Massachusetts, and that the other
colonies never held the same interest for Laud. See
Andrews, British Committees, Commissions and Councils of
Trade and Plantations, 1622-1675, (1908), 16. The
document which established Laud's Commission is in
Kavenagh, Foundations, 77-80.
2 Meeting of 21 February 1634, in Acts of the Privy-
Council, Colonial Series, 1613-1680, 199.
3 Winthrop, Journal, I: 135.
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the hope that England would be distracted from colonial
questions.
The Bay's tactics might well have worked had the
1630s proved to be a model for later decades. However,
while opposition to Massachusetts in the 1630s had come
from the English authorities and from vocal individuals,
the main thrust of criticism in the 1640s came from
other colonies, and especially Rhode Island. An
important consequence of this shift was that agents took
a much more active role in setting the agenda for the
colonial administrators of the interregnum. Agents
could, and did, ensure that New England remained
prominent before the relevant committees at times when
individual English leaders had more pressing concerns,
thus rendering the Bay Colony's chosen tactic less
effective.
Chapters 6 and 7 examine agents' activities before
the various committees and commissions of the
interregnum and Restoration respectively. Colonial
administration in this period has been studied before,
and with some success, although no attempt has been made
to produce a colonial version of G. E. Aylmer's
comprehensive analysis of domestic administration.1 Two
much older studies of the mechanisms of colonial
administration have recently been updated by some more
widely-ranging monographs, although a detailed analysis
of the role of individuals and committees in developing
early imperial policy in all the Atlantic regions would
be welcomed.2 This present study demonstrates that New
England agents had a complex relationship with
1 See Aylmer, The King's Servants: The Civil Service of
Charles I, 1625-1642, (1961); also The State's Servants.
2 See Charles M. Andrews, British Committees; Percy L.
Kaye, English Colonial Administration Under Lord
Clarendon 1660-1667, (1905); Jack M. Sosin, English
America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II:
Transatlantic Politics, Commerce and Kinship, (1980);
Robert M. Bliss, Revolution and Empire: English Politics
and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,
(1990).
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administrators, and that a wide range




Even in this brief introduction, it has become clear
that events in England and the colonies need to be
considered as part of one larger picture. At its
broadest, this is a study of transatlantic politics and
society, involving a variety of threads in what was
already a complex web of transactions, migrations and
communications. Despite the relatively short history of
English colonial settlement in North America, the
Atlantic was by the mid-seventeenth century a busy
thoroughfare, and growing settlements of English
colonists were to be found at various places around its
rim. There was nothing automatic or inevitable about the
place of the American colonies in the English body
politic, and there is a danger that twentieth-century
perceptions of these colonies may be coloured by
hindsight: the subsequent importance of the United
States does not necessarily mean that the original
settlements were of any great significance to
contemporaries. Evidence presented here indicates,
however, that some parts of England's Atlantic sphere of
influence were often prominent in the thinking of
leading figures in London for a number of different
reasons, and that the colonists themselves were capable
of being far more vocal than their numbers and situation
might suggest.
To stress that colonials had a place in English
politics and that England's leaders had influence in
colonial affairs is not particularly novel or
surprising, but it needs to be stressed all the same.
Historians have to set boundaries and parameters to what
they study, and this present work is no exception. The
danger is in setting boundaries which by their nature
distort the material enclosed within. Perhaps the
easiest way for this to be avoided is to reject
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geographical and cultural boundaries which would have
been incomprehensible to people living in the period
under study. Thus in an age when the inhabitants of
Boston, Massachusetts, considered themselves as English
as their peers in Boston, Lincolnshire, it seems
sensible to view both groups as component parts of a
larger picture. This study demonstrates that many first
generation colonials did not allow the Atlantic to
separate them from England's politics and culture, and
there is therefore no reason why historians should see
the ocean as a barrier either.
The recognition of New England's place in the wider
English world is becoming widespread thanks to some
major studies published since the 1970s. Many of the
most important of these have focused on the origins of
those settlers who travelled to America, and the extent
to which they maintained and adapted their English
habits and traditions. David Grayson Allen has noted
that "the conclusion that New England communities
continued the laws and customs of old England would
hardly seem arresting had not American historians argued
to the contrary for the past eighty years."1
Allen's comment alludes to the work of many
historians, not always students of the colonial period,
who have seen in the colonies the roots of American
exceptionalism. For various reasons such writers have
sought to separate colonists from English influence from
the very beginnings of settlement, and view migration as
a clean break with few continuing transatlantic
connections. There are in fact two issues here, although
all have a common theme. First, there is the question of
how much English culture survived the transatlantic
voyage, and whether colonists transferred their existing
societies more or less intact to America. Second is the
issue of persistent Englishness: did settlers maintain
1 Allen, In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and
the Transferral of English Local Law and Custom to
Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century, (1981), 4.
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ties with England and continue to have a recognisably
English society for decades to come, or did they rapidly
diverge from England in their social and political
practices?
Much work remains to be done on colonial attitudes
to England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
but recent studies have contributed to a model of the
English Atlantic which will help such further
investigations. One reviewer has commented that early
Americanists now consider themselves liberated from the
demands of patriotism and free to consider the colonial
period without having the weighty hindsight offered by
the later development of the continent on their
shoulders.1 Historians from other countries might never
have suffered that problem with regard to early European
America, but they doubtless had limits on their own
horizons caused by viewing the world from an imperial
perspective. Both groups may now be capable of seeing
the English Atlantic as "a transatlantic community in
which central and local forces, events both in England
and in the American colonies, interacted."2
Placing the colonies in a wider context might be
seen as a revival of the old "imperial school" of
historiography, but there are significant differences,
not least in the amount and nature of evidence unearthed
in the last few decades. Historians of the imperial
school examined the political origins and structures of
the colonies, placing much emphasis on a whiggish view
of gradual European expansion and progress in the New
World. Chief among such historians was Charles McLean
Andrews, who described the westward expansion of English
society and the beginnings of an organised Atlantic
empire in a four-volume work which served for some
1 See Joyce Appleby, "A Different Kind of Independence:
The Postwar Restructuring of the Historical Study of
Early America" VJMQ 50 (1993) : 245-267.
2 Such is the objective expressed in Sosin, English
America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II, 1.
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decades as the bible of colonial American studies.
Andrews developed some of the themes previously
identified by Herbert Osgood, but brought to the subject
an unprecedented knowledge of English sources. George
Louis Beer's work from the same period focused on trade
and commerce in the framework of an evolving mercantile
empire. While the label 'imperial' has been criticised
for its false implication that these authors ignored the
internal development of the colonies, administrative and
commercial questions were paramount to this generation
of historians.1
Even as Andrews wrote, though, some historians
believed that a shift in focus was necessary. Samuel
Eliot Morison praised Andrews' work as "the last word on
the institutional aspect of colonial settlements", but
argued that the field should now hear more from social
historians.2 Morison's hopes had to wait: for thirty
years after Andrews' work colonial history rarely
developed beyond what one reviewer calls "an attenuated
prelude to the American revolution".3 In the later 1960s,
however, there emerged a new school of research in the
period. Individual towns and settlements were examined
and issues such as family relations and social
organisation became more important than imperial
1 See Andrews, The Colonial Period in American History, 4
vols (1934-38); Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Seventeenth Century, 3 vols, (1904); Beer, The Origins
of the British Colonial System 1578-1660, (1933) and The
Commercial Policy of England Toward the American
Colonies, (1948). For an assessment of Andrews' career
and a discussion of the development of the 'imperial
school', see Richard R. Johnson, "Charles McLean Andrews
and the Invention of American Colonial History." WMQ 43
(1986): 519-541.
2 Morison, review of Andrews, Colonial Period in American
History, vol 1, in NEQ 7 (1934): 729-732.
3 Nicholas Canny, "The British Atlantic World: Working
Toward a Definition" Historical Journal 32 (1990): 479-
497.
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structures.1 During the 1970s, studies emerged of
cultural groups who had been largely ignored by earlier
historians: Indians, African slaves and indentured
servants were revealed to have played a significant role
in the development of the colonies.2
The latest phase of work in colonial America can
therefore be seen as an attempt to place detailed
examinations of the political and social life of the
colonies in the wider context of a transatlantic
culture, thus combining the most fruitful elements of
earlier approaches. The most influenc1al of recent
contributions to the field comes from David Hackett
Fischer, who combines detailed studies of pre-migration
England with the early years of settlement in four
regions of colonial America. His work is a comprehensive
synthesis of transatlantic evidence.3 Others have focused
on particular aspects of the wider English society,
whether in religion and church organisation, trade and
commerce, migration from one part of the Atlantic rim to
another, or the development of communications.4
In fact, the transatlantic nature of English
society has always been recognised by some writers.
Those concentrating on individual members of the first
1 Darrett B. Rutman surveys the numerous studies of
individual towns in "Assessing the Little Communities of
Early America." VJMQ 43 (1986): 163-178.
2 For example, two pioneering studies of previously
'invisible' aspects of colonial America are Edmund S.
Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal
of Colonial Virginia, (1975); Francis Jennings, The
Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant
of Conquest, (1975) .
3 Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in
America, (1989). Some of Fischer's critics were given a
platform in "Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in
America- A Symposium." WMQ 48 (1991): 224-308.
4 One valuable historiographical survey of these themes,
which goes far beyond the geographical limits suggested
by its title, is Ian K. Steele, "Empire of Migrants and
Consumers: Some Current Atlantic Approaches to the
History of Colonial Virginia" Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography 99 (1991): 487-512.
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generation realised that many colonists were either
unwilling or unable to separate themselves from the
affairs of their home country. Merchants had to maintain
trading contacts, religious enthusiasts kept in touch
with supporters and opponents alike, and men of science
and letters did not allow the Atlantic to come between
them and their peers throughout Europe.1 Historians of
religion considered the New England congregations in the
context of the English church, and a study of the first
great American religious schism opened up a new
interpretive framework by looking at the regional
English origins of the leading protagonists.2
Crucial as colonists' origins were, it is their
continuing relationship with their home country that
forms the framework for this study. It is important to
stress that the New England colonies maintained a range
of contacts with England, that colonial institutions
were affected both willingly and reluctantly by
developments in the home country, and that many
individuals crossed the Atlantic on numerous occasions
for a range of economic, political, official and
personal purposes.
The realisation that many people had transatlantic
careers, and that this phenomenon was by no means
restricted to the first generation, has led some
historians to consider the rate at which English and
other settlers came to think of themselves as
'American'. This is understandably a point of some
contention. One recent analysis concludes that "it took
a long time, at least a generation, for [the New England
1 Examples of such work- all from the 'gap' in Atlantic
studies in the mid-20th century- include Bernard Bailyn,
The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century,
(1955); Raymond P. Stearns, The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh
Peter 1598-1660r (1954); Richard S. Dunn, Puritans and
Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717,
(1962) .
2 See Emery Battis, Saints and Sectaries: Anne Hutchinson
and the Antinomian Controversy in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, (1962).
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settlers] to become in any intelligible sense
Americans", and that the "transformation was never quite
completed" in the first generation.1
It is not the purpose of this present study to seek
a definition of 'American'. In one important sense,
however, evidence presented in these pages demonstrates
that the New England colonists were very slow to
consider themselves different from those contemporaries
who had never left England. To be sure, agents had a
range of experiences which London-based friends and
opponents did not have but the same is true of all those
who travelled anywhere in this period. Anyone who lived
for a time in, say, Scotland or Ireland faced various
dangers and inconveniences in transit, experienced
surprising new cultural activities and in many cases
found the natives less than comprehensible: it is hard
to suggest, however, that the traveller in question
would have felt like an alien when he returned to the
metropolis. It is important to stress that agents in the
mid-seventeenth century did not consider themselves as
the diplomatic representatives of a foreign power, but
rather as English subjects operating in their own
capital petitioning their own government.
This study therefore adds to the large amount of
material becoming available on the workings of England's
Atlantic society. In using evidence offered by the
careers of colonial agents, it presents a new perspective
on transatlantic contact both at a personal and official
level. Agents' work reveals much about governmental
processes in the colonies and also about the mechanisms
of English colonial administration: analysis of the
workings of committees in the latter field sheds new
light on the role of individuals and the interaction of
factions. As well as offering an overdue examination of
the New England agency in its formative years, this study
will contribute to various wider fields also.
1 See Andrew Delbanco, The Puritan Ordeal, (1989), 9.
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Agents and the Search for Colonial Legitimacy
The New England colonies sent agents to England as part
of a quest for authority, legitimacy and stability. The
lack of these things in the early decades of settlement
led to tensions and disagreements between the colonies
and England, as well as to disputes among and within the
colonies themselves. This is not to say that the New
England settlements were in any way anarchic, but rather
that despite careful planning and various attempts to
build a working authority, the colonies failed to
establish governmental structures which were capable of
solving every new problem which emerged.
Such a failure is hardly unexpected in fledgling
colonies, and it took several decades for all the
region's settlements to develop mature constitutional
arrangements. Often, the first step in this process was
to secure the documents which were the single most
obvious expression of a colony's legitimacy with respect
to England. The most enduring of these took the form of
royal charters or land grants from the directors of
colonising companies, but agents also acquired a range of
other decrees from successive English regimes.
Having such concrete English authority for a
settlement offered colonists various advantages, but it
also imposed some practical problems and wider
responsibilities. Colonies realised early that English
governments did not distribute charters on their own
initiative, and that representatives would have to be
sent to put the colonial case in London. This suggestion
that agents might be dispatched tended to bring attitudes
toward the home country itself into sharp focus. In
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Massachusetts, many settlers were slow to decide how
separate from England they wished to be, with the result
that questions of agents, transatlantic contact, and
English involvement in colonial government were an
enduring source of unease and tension.
However difficult colonial attitudes to England
could be, it is worth stressing that most New England
disputes in this period were solved in New England. In
particular, very few crises which affected a single
colony resulted in a mission to England, because other
means of redress were usually available to the parties
concerned. Social and political institutions at local or
colony level were, in the great majority of cases,
effective enough to make transatlantic agencies a measure
of last resort.
Conflicts between different colonies tended to reach
the point of last resort more often, however, and most
agency missions were dispatched to establish the rights
of one settlement with respect to another, as well as
with regard to England. Higher authority was available to
most New England colonies in the shape of the
Confederation of the United Colonies, but Rhode Island,
the colony most likely to suffer from external
interference, was not a member. When the one settlement
which regularly needed recourse to a higher power was
deliberately excluded from the mechanisms of colonial
problem-solving, missions to England became inevitable.
This chapter surveys the constitutional position of
the various New England colonies in relation to England,
and also with regard to each other. It then considers
those problems, both within and between colonies, which
could not be resolved by the original governmental and
social establishment of New England, and which
necessitated the development of the colonial agency.
Most agency missions were concerned, if only in part,
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with the legal and constitutional basis of colonial
settlement in relation to England. England's colonies
were always clearly recognisable as English, and their
structures and foundations were logical developments of
English forms. Apart from the distances involved,
settlements in America did not differ much from local
government in England in terms of their relationship with
the royal authority. English communities had a long
historical dependence on royal documents which conferred
borough or county status, and which served as the
authority for the collective actions of local leaders. In
the seventeenth century, England's rulers found that
their subjects wished to establish communities further
afield than had previously been the case, but familiar
mechanisms could be readily adapted to the task. Indeed,
given the nature of communications in the seventeenth
century, some subjects of Charles I who lived in far
corners of the British Isles may have seemed more remote
than those across the Atlantic.
The colonial charter was therefore the fundamental
instrument of legitimacy in the English Atlantic. All the
major New England colonies either had a charter before
they were even established in America, or tried to
acquire one during the first decades of settlement.
Charters and a range of less formal expressions of
authority from English governments could overcome many of
the problems which colonists encountered in their
dealings with one another and with outside forces.
Initially, Massachusetts had the only formal charter in
the region, and regularly invoked the document as the
basis on which it acted against Indians and dissident
Englishmen alike. As the period progressed, the smaller
colonies gained charters in turn and clung to them with
similar determination.
The Massachusetts charter, granted by Charles I in
1629, remained the reference point for constitutional
thinking in New England throughout much of the
seventeenth century. It was not in itself a radically new
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document, except in one specific area which will be
discussed below. For the most part, the charter
provisions were adapted from earlier documents and
stemmed from established precedents. The process by which
the Massachusetts Bay Company acquired its charter
demonstrates the priorities and concerns of the group,
and in particular its determination to place the
enterprise on as firm a legal footing as possible. In
addition, the attitude of the early Bay Company planners
toward the charter continued to influence later
transatlantic contacts, including those handled by
agents.
Crucially, the colony's claims to self-government
during this period were based on the charter and not on a
rejection of it. Stressing their colony's charter rights
was to become second nature to Massachusetts agents. The
charter was a further addition to the pantheon of texts
and traditions which opponents of Stuart rule could
invoke to defend themselves against what they saw as an
arbitrary royal regime. Few of those who feared and
condemned Stuart political and religious thinking were
contemptuous of English constitutional tradition in
itself, and opposition to the regime was more often than
not based on the belief that it was the king, or perhaps
only his counsellors, who acted in violation of the law.
During the political upheavals of the 1640s disparate
factions in all parts of the English world regularly
proclaimed their loyalty to England's laws and customs at
the same time as they were actively fighting against
England's monarch. In this respect the New England
colonists carried with them a great weight of
constitutional baggage, and the legal and documentary
framework for their new settlements became a tool with
which to resist their opponents in the same way that
older texts like Magna Carta inspired factions in England
itself.
The acquisition of the Massachusetts charter was the
culmination of an enterprise begun in 1620, when James I
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gave the Plymouth Company rights to America from the
fortieth to the forty-eighth parallel. The Plymouth
Company then granted various rights to prospective
leaders of the Massachusetts venture who in turn appealed
to Charles to have this grant confirmed and strengthened
into the form of a royal charter. The charter contained
explicit territorial limits, and prescribed in some
detail the processes of government for the colony. It
also granted rights to all the area's natural resources
with the standard condition that the royal purse would be
granted one-fifth of all gold and silver discovered.1
The Massachusetts Company was determined to secure a
royal charter. While the colony could have been
established on the basis of the Plymouth Company grant,
the new settlers preferred to launch their expedition
with the maximum possible measure of governmental
legitimacy. The gentry families who led the venture never
intended to slink off to the new world from Holland as
the Pilgrim settlers had done a decade before, and the
royal charter helped them to persuade waverers that the
Massachusetts colony had safe and firm foundations.
Equally useful was the charter's well-known lack of
a prescribed English location for the Company's meetings.
There was nothing in the charter to stop the
Massachusetts settlers moving their entire authority base
to America, and the opportunity of increased political
influence in a largely autonomous colony was another
incentive for the doubtful. Even the elder John Winthrop,
the colony's first governor, may have joined the
expedition in part because he saw his social and
political position declining in England and hoped for
better things as a founder of the Bay Colony.2 By virtue
of the charter, the Bay leadership could claim
administrative autonomy: "liberty and power was granted
1 The Massachusetts Charter is printed in a number of
sources: probably the most widely available is English
Historical Documents IX: 72-84.
2 See Edmund Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma, (1958), 42-3.
34
to us to live under the government of a governor and
magistrates of our own choosing, and under laws of our
own making".1
Charters could also have some very negative aspects,
however, in that they offered a colony's opponents a
convenient focus for their allegations. Like many legal
documents, the Massachusetts charter was open to a degree
of interpretation and prone to selective quotation. Rhode
Island agents often argued that Massachusetts was
exceeding the authority and powers of its charter, and
such charges inevitably carried the implication that the
Bay Colony was defying English law. However extensive the
powers of self-government granted by a charter, it
remained a product of English law, and might be revoked
by similar means. One of the central priorities of
Massachusetts agents was the defence of their charter
against English leaders who might be influenced by such
arguments when presented by agents from other colonies.
The Bay leaders feared that any of the successive English
governments of this period might recall the charter in
the courts and impose a Governor on the colony from
England.
Roger Williams, founding leader of the Rhode Island
settlements, was virulent in his opposition to the
Massachusetts charter. Williams began his New England
career as a minister in Massachusetts, where he concluded
that the Bay Colony had no right to the land it occupied
under its charter. Williams questioned the scriptural
justification for the land-granting powers of English
kings. Fundamentally linked to this idea was Williams'
belief that English colonies would only have legitimate
title to their chartered territory if the necessary land
1 See Massachusetts General Court to Parliament, 1651,
printed in Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony
and Province of Massachusetts Bay, Lawrence S. Mayo, ed.,
(1936), vol. 1: 429.
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was fairly purchased from the Indians.1 Once in Rhode
Island, Williams diligently bought the land on which
Providence was built from the local Indian leaders, and
helped other refugees to buy the island of Aquidneck
shortly afterward.
Even Williams, however, knew that some form of
constitutional legitimacy was necessary for the good
conduct of government, and served as an agent twice in
pursuit of English authority for Rhode Island.
Importantly, though, the empowering document sought by
Williams in his 1643/4 mission was quite different from
that held by Massachusetts. Williams' patent included
territorial boundaries, but stressed that these were
already occupied either by the Rhode Island settlers or
by the Narragansett Indians. Much simpler in form than
the Massachusetts charter, the patent authorised the
establishment of civil governments obeying the laws and
customs of England, in territory already purchased from
the Indians. Williams' patent gave Rhode Island legal
status in England without suggesting that the colony's
lands were a gift from a divinely ordained king.2
Williams' decision that a charter of some kind was
necessary stemmed in large part from the hostile
attitudes of neighbouring colonies. Massachusetts in
particular believed that the Narragansett towns had no
constitutional legitimacy, nor any right to exercise
powers of government. In part, this stemmed from the
willingness of the Rhode Island settlements to welcome
victims of the legal systems of the United Colonies, a
policy which the Bay considered a challenge to its own
1 Glenn LaFantasie argues that Williams' opposition to the
charter stemmed more from theology than practical concern
for the rights of Indians. Even so, Williams' stance on
the land issue had serious political implications:
Francis Jennings notes that Massachusetts used control of
land rights as a means of strengthening its central
government under the charter. See LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 14-15; Jennings, Invasion of America,
140 .
2 The 14 March 1644 Patent is printed in RI Rec I: 143-6.
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chartered authority. There was also a lengthy debate
between the Bay and New Plymouth over whether one of them
should claim the Narragansett territory for itself. All
such concerns boiled down to the frequent allegation made
by Massachusetts that the township of Providence and its
allies had "no authority for civil government".1
After Williams returned with his new patent in 1644,
Rhode Island rarely missed an opportunity to remind
opposing colonies of the powers it derived from England.
In 1645, Rhode Islanders used their new-found status to
rebuff a Bay Colony attempt to intimidate the
Narragansett communities into ceding their lands and
living under Massachusetts law. The settlers noted that
they and Massachusetts both derived authority from the
same "mother state", and that England's leaders would no
more tolerate violations of the new Rhode Island patent
than they would breaches of the Bay charter. Later, in
1649, the Shawomet settlers reminded the United Colonies
of the 1646 order from the English government that their
township was not to be harassed.2
The other New England colonies, less concerned with
threats from their neighbours, were never as anxious as
Rhode Island to seek English approval for their
settlements. New Haven and Connecticut both planned
missions to England in the 1640s, but after initial
reverses did not pursue the question. New Haven
considered the problem in 1644, and went so far as to
send an agent to seek a patent from the Long Parliament:
the unfortunate agent, Thomas Gregson, was lost at sea.3
1 Williams to Major John Mason and Governor Thomas Prince,
22 June 1670, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 612.
2 Letter from Providence Plantations to Massachusetts, 9
August 1645, in Mass Archives, 2: 6; Note of United
Colonies meeting 31 July 1649, in Hazard, State Papers,
II: 135. The activities of the Shawomet men in London are
examined in Chapter 6 below.
3 NH Rec I: 149, II: 519. For Gregson's loss see Mary
Jones, Congregational Commonwealth: Connecticut, 1636-
1662, (1968), 161.
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The following year Connecticut asked George Fenwick to
seek an extension to the territory contained in the
Saybrook patent, in an attempt to revise the ill-defined
boundaries of the Connecticut Valley settlements.1 Fenwick
had been intending to return to England anyway, and
quickly became embroiled in English domestic affairs.
Despite his inaction, Connecticut made no attempt to
follow up the plan.
Both Connecticut and New Haven felt more secure
constitutionally than Rhode Island in large part because
they were members of the Confederation of the United
Colonies of New England. Rhode Island was excluded from
membership, and came to view the United Colonies as a
threat rather than a source of colonial authority. On
several occasions over the years, different parts of
Rhode Island asked to be admitted to the ranks of the
United Colonies and called for assistance against
belligerent Indians even more frequently. The response to
the latter requests, the Shawomet settlers complained,
was usually "let the Indians destroy them."2 For
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven and Plymouth,
however, the United Colonies became a source of authority
and problem solving. Although the Bay Colony was by far
the strongest economic and military force in the region,
each colony was represented by two commissioners, and the
smaller settlements were not always willing to follow
Massachusetts.3
1 Conn Rec I: 128.
2 See Shawomet to Massachusetts, 22 August 1661, in Mass
Archives, 2: 20-1.
3 One negative view of the United Colonies is that of
Francis Jennings, who sees the organisation as a vehicle
designed to further the territorial aims of Massachusetts
while curbing Connecticut's expansionism- the Bay Colony
had no wish to see Connecticut grow to be a powerful
rival. Jennings slightly overestimates the dominance of
Massachusetts, though. For example, Connecticut and New
Haven were able to follow a more aggressive policy
against the Dutch in New Netherland than the Bay Colony
would have liked in the early 1650s. See Jennings,
Invasion of America, 260, 265.
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The main argument offered by the colonies for
joining in confederation was the developing turmoil in
England in the early 1640s. England's civil war meant
that the colonies were "hindered from that humble way of
seeking advice or reaping those comfortable fruits of
protection which at other times we might well expect."1
For the rest of the interregnum, the Confederation served
as a higher authority for those settlements which
belonged to it. The Confederation's legitimacy,
questioned constantly by Rhode Island, lost even its own
justification as civil war gave way to more stable
government in England. The formation of the United
Colonies could only be explained away for as long as
successive regimes in England were likely to be
transitory. Even then, Rhode Island frequently criticised
its neighbours for creating the Confederation without
permission from England. Agent John Clarke was urged to
stress that the Narragansett towns had never been tainted
by membership of the United Colonies and were loyal only
to the English government, "not being subject to any
others in matter of our civil state."2
The Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 threatened an
upheaval of the constitutional framework of the English
colonies. The Bay's royal charter was only as valid as
the new King wished it to be, and Rhode Island's
Parliamentary patent had little recognisable value at
all. Massachusetts recalled with unease that the last
decade of Stuart rule, in the 1630s, had seen incessant
lobbying against the Bay Colony by its opponents in
England. No sooner was Charles II crowned than many of
these old enemies began once more to call for the
revocation of the Massachusetts charter. Twenty years
1 The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies are
printed in William Bradford, History of Plymouth
Plantation 1606-1646, ed. William T. Davis (1908), 382-
388 .
2 See Rhode Island to John Clarke, 5 November 1658, in
John Callender, The Early History of Rhode Island, (repr.
1971), 236.
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without royal government had led Massachusetts to
consider itself a free state, argued former colonist
Samuel Maverick. "For so many years", he informed Lord
Chancellor Clarendon, the colony's leaders "styled
themselves a state and Commonwealth and never owned His
Majesty's sovereignty over them until they saw there was
no avoiding of it."1
In the face of such criticisms, sections of
Massachusetts society believed their charter to be in
danger unless the colony formally proclaimed Charles II.
The Bay leadership was unsure of the new circumstances
facing it, and reverted to inertia: anxious colonists
petitioned the General Court for a full acknowledgement
of Charles' authority, arguing that this was the only
course likely to preserve the "ancient liberties" of the
colony.2 When the General Court finally acted, it based
its approach, once again, on an unshakeable commitment to
the charter. The Bay's agency mission to England in 1662
was intended as a formal expression of respect for the
new King and nothing more. In particular, agents Simon
Bradstreet and John Norton were forbidden from taking
part in any negotiations which might alter the terms of
the charter.3
The other New England colonies were equally
concerned by the Restoration, but for different reasons.
Whatever the arguments over the application of the Bay
Charter, at least Massachusetts could claim in England
that they owed their authority to a royal charter.
Assuming Charles II could be persuaded to maintain the
charter intact, the Bay would be in a uniquely powerful
constitutional position. To Rhode Island, however, the
1 See Maverick to Clarendon, [June? 1662], in NYHS
Collections, II (1869) : 37.
2 Petition to General Court of Massachusetts, 19 June
1661, in Mass Archives, 106: 36.
3 The agents' instructions are in Hutchinson Papers, II:
76. The divisions within Massachusetts over the choice
and dispatch of agents in 1661 are considered in Chapter
4 below.
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Restoration was a variation on an old theme. The colony
was familiar with the practice of sending agents to every
new English regime for backing and approval. As a result
of this experience, Rhode Island recognised that the
Restoration offered an opportunity for lasting
formalisation of New England's constitutional status.
The importance of constitutional precedent is never
more clear than in the approaches made to the restored
monarchy by the smaller New England colonies. Just as
Massachusetts always fell back on its charter when
threatened, Rhode Island sought to make use of the
precedent established by the 1644 patent when petitioning
Charles II. Some selective rewriting of history was
necessary, and the brazen nature of the doctoring serves
to emphasise the importance agents placed on acquiring
some form of legitimate background before petitioning for
a new charter. The patent was described as having been
granted "in the name of the King and Parliament of
England", and "by the most potent and royal power".1 This,
despite the fact that Charles I had been engaged in a
civil war with his Parliament for two years when the
patent was issued. To imply, as agent John Clarke did,
that the patent was the result of a petition to the new
King's "royal father" was a risky tactic.2 As such it
demonstrates just how necessary visible precedents were
considered to be.
Connecticut's John Winthrop was just as familiar
with the use of strained precedent as John Clarke. Like
the Rhode Island agent, Winthrop based his appeal for a
charter on a document dating from the reign of Charles I.
When he reached London, Winthrop tried unsuccessfully to
locate a copy of an original grant from the New England
Council of 1637, relating to southern Connecticut.
Unperturbed by the lack of evidence, Winthrop petitioned
1 The patent is thus described in the colony's commission
to agent John Clarke, 18 October 1660, RI Rec I: 433-4.
2 Clarke to Charles II, 29 January 1662, PRO, COl/15, 4:
ff 7-8.
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Charles II for a charter with generous territorial
boundaries, claiming to derive them from the old patent.
The original and a duplicate of that document had,
according to the agent, been lost in a fire and a
shipwreck respectively. Winthrop was at pains to stress
in his petition to Charles II that the 1637 patent dated
from the twelfth year of the reign of Charles I.1
Connecticut was, in general, content to base its new
charter on the Massachusetts model. Winthrop was
commissioned to seek a document that included "all the
rights, privileges, authority and immunities that are
granted in the Massachusetts Colony's Patent."2 Although
the Connecticut settlers had not always been on close
terms with Massachusetts, this was much more of a reason
for adopting the powers of the Bay charter than it was
for rejecting them. With its boundaries and authority
formalised in the same terms as those of Massachusetts,
Connecticut could approach any conflict as an equal.
Connecticut owed the rapid advancement of its
constitutional position to Winthrop's vision and effort,
but the other smaller members of the United Colonies were
largely caught unawares at the Restoration. Governor
Prince of Plymouth sent an unsuccessful petition to
Charles II via John Winthrop.3 Only when royal
commissioners arrived in New England in the mid-1660s did
Plymouth seriously address the problem of its status with
regard to the English crown.4 The New Haven colonists
also hoped that Winthrop would negotiate on their behalf
during his Restoration mission, but his new Connecticut
charter swallowed New Haven rather than establishing it
1 Petition of John Winthrop, in Rawlinson MSS A175: 109.
2 Conn Rec I: 580.
3 Robert Black, The Younger John Winthrop, (1966): 214.
4 The separatism which characterised Plymouth's religious
establishment easily influenced the colony's political
outlook, although in the 1620s it had actively maintained
contact with England. See Harry Ward, Statism in Plymouth
Colony, (1973).
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as a chartered colony in its own right.1
The smaller members of the United Colonies
approached the restored monarchy with some naivete and
mixed success, but both Rhode Island and Massachusetts
proved that they had learned from the troubles of the
interregnum. Questions of authority and legitimacy were
the staple fare of Rhode Island's agents by the time of
the Restoration, and Massachusetts also tended to see
constitutional issues lurking behind even the most
mundane of transatlantic contacts. Concern over their
constitutional position had contrasting effects of the
leadership of these two colonies, leading to pragmatism
in Rhode Island and paranoia in Massachusetts.
Inevitably, such attitudes came to a head when successive
agency missions were being planned and executed.
Planning a mission to England forced colonial leaders to
address some potentially uncomfortable issues. Clearly,
the dispatch of an agent in itself implied a failure to
reach a solution in the colonies. In some cases, such
failure was due to insurmountable obstacles or enemy
action and carried no stigma, but in others there was a
clear sense that sending an agent was a shameful
admission of defeat. In the first generation, when every
settler had an immediate personal tie with England, the
formal relationship between colony and home country could
have implications at all levels of colonial society. Such
soul-searching was most pronounced in Massachusetts,
which remained ambivalent about English influence
throughout this period and beyond. This section considers
the dispatch of the first Massachusetts agency in some
detail, and very briefly examines two others: all reveal
the complex repercussions which could stem from the
1 New Haven's failure to acquire constitutional security
is contrasted with Rhode Island's success in chapter 7
below.
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debate over the need for a mission.
Massachusetts sent its first mission to England in
1641 to deal with an economic and political crisis. While
the aims of the mission were largely straightforward, its
organisation and subseguent progress encapsulate the
tensions and doubts which assailed the Bay Colony at the
beginning of its second decade. In addition, the
circumstances surrounding the agency set the tone for
later missions: many of the experiences- good and bad- of
later Massachusetts agents stemmed from lessons learned
or ignored in the aftermath of the 1641 mission. Sending
agents to England had the inevitable effect of
concentrating colonists' minds on their own attitudes to
the home country, and the lack of consensus on the latter
issue is starkly revealed by the controversy surrounding
the Bay's first mission.
Whether or not Massachusetts needed to send agents
to England in 1641 was part of a far wider question of
how close the colony should be to the home country's
practices in economics, religion and politics alike. The
elder Winthrop and his closest allies always struggled
against the tendency toward religious separatism in the
colony, which was encouraged in some quarters by physical
separation from England.1 Perhaps more worrying was the
tendency of religious separatism to breed a range of
related ideas about continuing ties with England. After
all, if Massachusetts could only be spiritually pure if
it renounced the English church, how could contact with
England's wider society and economy be maintained without
danger?
The Bay Colony faced a number of outbreaks of such
thinking during the sixteen-thirties, often related to
the activities of Roger Williams and John Endecott in
Salem. Williams' exile to the Narragansett Bay in 1635
reduced the direct effect he could have on Massachusetts
1 Edmund Morgan identifies this as the central concern of
Winthrop's leadership. See The Puritan Dilemma, esp.
Chapters 9 and 13.
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settlers, but Endecott, as will be seen, remained a vocal
and influential separatist all his life. Endecott had led
the Company's advance party to New England in 1628, and
his relations with the settlers who arrived two years
later were occasionally tempestuous. One of his most
dramatic gestures was the iconoclastic removal of the
cross from the Massachusetts flag, at a time when many
feared the imminent intervention in the colony's affairs
by Archbishop Laud's Council.1
The next major disagreement between Endecott and the
colonial leadership concerned the first agency mission,
and it is no coincidence that the dispute arose at a time
when the continuing dependence of Massachusetts on
England was embarrassingly clear. For as long as the
colonial economy remained buoyant in the 1630s, such
wider implications rarely surfaced, but the full effect
of the Bay's ongoing need for transatlantic contacts was
brought home sharply at the beginning of the next decade.
Prosperity had been largely due to the steady stream of
new immigrants who came to the colony, keeping the
economy growing with their imported savings and their
need for housing, seeds, equipment, livestock and all the
other necessities of a predominantly rural society.
Massachusetts maintained its expansion in agricultural
production throughout the 1630s, and surpluses were
swallowed by the demands of new settlers. The proceeds
were either used to finance further expansion, or to buy
hardware and consumer goods shipped from England.
Clearly, though, this state of affairs was only
sustainable if immigration continued unchecked, and in
1639 the number of new arrivals slowed dramatically. By
1641, the Massachusetts leadership was fully aware of the
1 See Francis J. Bremer,
Puritan Iconoclasm in the
22, esp. 6-7.
"Endecott and the Red Cross:
New World", JAS 24 (1990): 5-
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onset of a major crisis.1
The elder John Winthrop was in no doubt that
prospective immigrants were staying in England because of
events there, rather than any failure on the part of the
colony. Winthrop was well informed of developments in
England and believed that colonial affairs were fatally
vulnerable to changing circumstances across the Atlantic.
He recorded in his Journal the situation in the summer of
1641.
The parliament of England setting upon a general
reformation both of church and state, the Earl of
Strafford being beheaded, and the archbishop (our great
enemy) and many others of the great officers and judges,
bishops and others, imprisoned and called to account,
this caused all men to stay in England in expectation of
a new world, so as few coming to us, all foreign
commodities grew scarce, and our own of no price. Corn
would buy nothing... and many gone out of the country, so
as no man could pay his debts, nor the merchants make
return into England for their commodities, which
occasioned many there to speak evil of us.2
Rumours of impending upheaval in England had been
depressing the colonial economy for some months before
Winthrop wrote. The General Court had heard in October
1640 that "many men in the plantation are in debt, and
there is not money sufficient to discharge the same". The
Court attempted to impose wage controls, urging that
servants, labourers and workmen "should be content to
abate their wages according to the fall of the
commodities". Colonists were later banned from using
wheat as a barter item, because the authorities were
desperate to find an export market and bring in much
needed revenue: while wheat might not be as lucrative as
the tobacco of the Chesapeake colonies, it was the
nearest New Englanders could find to a cash crop.3
1 The Bay Colony's troubles are discussed in Darrett B.
Rutman, "Governor Winthrop's Garden Crop: The
Significance of Agriculture in the Early Commerce of
Massachusetts Bay", WMQ 20 (1963): 396-415.
2 Winthrop, Journal II: 31.
3 Mass Rec I: 307, 326, 337.
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Winthrop worried about the effect of such problems
on the Bay's domestic economy and society, but he was
also aware that bleak economic news could only confirm
the doubts which some leading Englishmen already had
about New England. Many of the most influential sponsors
and backers of colonies were frustrated with the
inability of the northern colonies to develop viable
export commodities and generate profits for investors. As
early as the mid-1630s the prominent colonial sponsor
Viscount Saye and Sele began encouraging New Englanders
to travel south to assist in the settlement of Providence
Island in the Caribbean. John Humphrey, a Massachusetts
colonist and former deputy-governor of the Bay Company,
planned to move to the island colony in 1640 and tried to
persuade others to travel with him.1
The slump of 1641 threatened to turn doubts among
leading Englishmen into a wholesale write-off of New
England's prospects. Winthrop believed that Massachusetts
could only restore its reputation and the confidence of
its supporters by having an effective voice in England.
This view was not shared by all his fellow leaders,
though, and settlers fell into mutual recrimination over
who should be blamed for the crisis. Sending an agent to
negotiate directly with England's leaders seemed an
obvious course of action to some colonists, but the
colony leadership was divided over who should serve as
agent, and indeed whether one should go at all. After a
decade in America, the disagreements over the first
Massachusetts agency went to the heart of the Bay
Colony's sense of its own purpose.
Winthrop's own account of the arguments within the
colony reflects the careful steps which he had to take in
1 Lord Saye was a keen supporter of various colonising
projects in America, as well as a leading figure in the
House of Lords during the 1640s. A more detailed
examination of his activities appears in Chapter 6 below.
See Lord Saye to John Winthrop, 9 July 1640, in Winthrop
Papers IV: 263-267; Winthrop, Journal II: 11.
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order to ensure the dispatch of a mission.1 According to
Winthrop, the first suggestion that a mission should be
contemplated came not from the colony but from some
sympathisers in England. This proposal was rejected by
the General Court. However, the Massachusetts Court of
Assistants was meeting at the time, and
advising with some of the elders about some course to
serve the providence of God, in making use the present
opportunity of a ship of our own being ready bound for
England, it was thought fit to send some chosen men in
her with commission to negotiate for us, as occasion
should be offered, both in furthering the work of
reformation of the churches...and to satisfy our
countrymen of the true cause why our engagements there
have not been satisfied this year...and also to seek out
some way, by procuring cotton from the West Indies, or
other means that might be lawful, and not dishonourable
to the gospel for our present supply of clothing, etc.,
for the country was like to afford enough for food....2
Winthrop's account is the work of an accomplished and
subtle propagandist, although he may also have been
trying to persuade himself of the propriety of the action
to be taken. He denies any hint that the mission was a
concession to the English authorities, even to the point
of noting that the agents intended to sail on a Bay
Colony ship. In addition, religious motives for the
mission are given prominence, before turning to the
economic reasons. Even here, the priority is to negotiate
with creditors rather than beg for assistance in more
general terms, and the final admission that the colony is








no shortage of food.1
Even Winthrop could not persuade all the colonists
that the agents were travelling to "serve the providence
of God". John Endecott wrote to Winthrop in February
1641, having consulted Salem's other notables, Emmanuel
Downing and William Hathorne.2 Salem's minister, Hugh
Peter, was one of the agents chosen by the court:
Endecott objected to this choice, but more importantly he
was also opposed to the mission itself.3 While Winthrop
records that Endecott was primarily concerned with
Peter's role, the Salem leader's own account places far
more stress on wider questions and some of his comments
reveal a deep unease that the Bay Colony was betraying
its original aims.
Endecott believed that economic concerns were the
primary motive for the proposed mission, and that the
causes of the Bay's problems could easily be found much
closer at hand than London. Surely, argued Endecott, the
scarcity of money in the Bay was due to previous over¬
indulgence in "wines and liquors, and English provisions
of diet and unnecessary bravery in apparel: all which
tends to the scandal of religion and poverty". Endecott
concluded by asking whether "there will not be more peace
unto us and blessing upon us in a patient waiting upon
1 How valid is Winthrop's Journal as a historical source?
Richard Dunn argues that it provides a detailed and often
candid account of the conflicts within Massachusetts,
because Winthrop was convinced of his own righteousness
and wished to expose the 'errors' of his opponents in
full. This is certainly true of his accounts of major
religious schisms. Still, Winthrop's account of the
colony's first mission indicates that he was capable of
adjusting less clear-cut evidence to his advantage also.
See Dunn, "John Winthrop writes his Journal", WMQ (1984):
185-212.
2 Endecott, Downing and Hathorne were the three leading
figures in Salem, and were generally rivals for local
power and influence. See Richard P. Gildrie, Salem,
Massachusetts, 1623-1683: A Covenant Community, (1975),
91.
3 For the debate over the choice of individual agents, see
the following chapter.
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God, than in a (seeming at least) distrust of His
providence.nl
Endecott's separatist voice was not one which
Winthrop wanted to hear, because it reminded him of the
compromises which he deemed essential to the survival of
the Bay Colony. Endecott's opinions continually troubled
the consciences of the Bay leadership, because he
rejected the convenient fiction favoured by other leaders
that crossing the ocean had not been a de facto
separation from England and its church.2 The furore over
the 1641 mission was just the latest manifestation of
Endecott's belief that the Bay Colony was moving too
slowly away from England and toward a new reformed
society.
The debate over the dispatch of the agents draws
attention to the doubts and loss of confidence which
crept into the initially united and committed Bay Colony
as the first decade of settlement came to an end. The
1641 mission was dispatched over Endecott's objections,
but was not a final victory for those settlers who
believed that the English dimension to colonial problems
could not be ignored. Massachusetts remained divided
throughout the interregnum over the extent to which it
should try to survive in its own brand of splendid
isolation.
The Bay Colony was once again on the defensive in
the mid-1640s when it considered its second mission, and
again when planning its fourth agency shortly after the
Restoration. The details of both these missions are
examined in more detail below, but it is worth noting
1 John Endecott to John Winthrop, [ca. February 1641], in
Winthrop Papers IV: 314-15. Agent Hugh Peter himself
recalled long afterward that the mission was largely
economic, with the agents having been sent "to mediate
for ease in Customs and Excise; the country being poor,
and a tender plant." See Peter, A Dying Fatherrs Legacy,
(1661), 102.
2 See Morgan, Puritan Dilemma, 103, 119; Gildrie, Salem,
Massachusetts, 7.
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here the similarities between them and the 1641
expedition. Proposals that agents be sent always provoked
thoughts on the part of the colony leadership about the
role and nature of the colony, and how these could be
defended before English critics.
The 1646/7 mission, dispatched in the wake of severe
criticism of Massachusetts on both sides of the Atlantic,
caused various colonial leaders to try to define the Bay
Colony's mission in America. Samuel Symonds had a
crusading image of the colony as being in the vanguard of
a reformation which would encompass all of England's
people. Symonds told the elder Winthrop that he saw
Massachusetts as a refuge for the persecuted, a
rendezvous for English expeditions to the West Indies,
and a training ground for godly soldiers and sailors who
might be "employed against that blasphemous city". Had
Symonds spoken only of soldiers, his words might be
regarded as metaphorical: there are numerous examples of
military metaphors in descriptions of the godly which
should not be taken literally. The specific mention of
sailors is a strong implication, however, that Symonds
believed the colony should provide real military and
naval support for English expeditions against the
Catholic powers.1
Such millenarian views of New England's destiny
required an element of English involvement in the
region's affairs, and other colonial leaders feared that
England would expect to call upon colonists to help in
English conflicts. Official statements accompanying the
1646 mission stressed the work which had to be done in
the colonies, in converting Indians and establishing
secure plantations, and deliberately toned down
suggestions that New England could offer any assistance
to the English Parliament. At this point, and again in
1661, charter rights and the humble wishes of pious
colonists represented the official priorities of
1 See Symonds to Winthrop, 6 January 1647, in Winthrop
Papers, IV: 126.
Massachusetts, and the voices of those who would have
liked to take a more active part in the wider concerns of
England's developing commercial and territorial empire
were kept in the background.
Doubts and uncertainties continued to surround the
Bay Colony's relations with England throughout this
period and beyond. As the political structures of the
colony became more developed, divisions over the
transatlantic relationship were an important part of
factional disputes. By the time of the 1661 mission,
there were clearly identifiable groups of leading
colonists on both sides of the issue, and their
respective thinking dominated the debate over the agency.
One common theme in most Massachusetts disagreements
over agency missions was that opponents of missions were
generally part of the legitimate political process.
Massachusetts faced a range of vocal dissidents and
rebels in its early decades, and many are considered in
this study, but opposition to agencies was of a different
nature altogether. Leading figures in the colony,
including members of governing bodies, opposed the 1662
mission, and it is clear that guestions raised by the
dispatch of agents struck fundamental chords. The Bay
Colony was never able to write opponents of missions off
as heretics and fanatics, however often such an approach
could be used with other dissenters. It would be too
simplistic to credit the colonial agency with a key role
in defining what was legitimate opposition to colonial
authorities and what was not, but attitudes to England,
as manifested in the debate over agents, certainly played
their part.
The first two sections of this chapter have considered
vital issues of importance to the colonial leadership,
and to any colonist concerned about transatlantic
relations on a wide scale. Still, the immediate causes of
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most agencies were less abstract, however much they may
have been intertwined with wider questions. Most missions
were provoked by the relations of colonies and colonists
to one another, rather than the ties between colonies and
England. This section considers conflicts within
colonies, which were frequent and traumatic, but which
led to relatively few missions to England.
The first Massachusetts mission, discussed above,
displays some characteristics which were to emerge as
important factors in later agencies. Most notable is the
question of localism. The strain between John Endecott
and John Winthrop over the 1641 mission was in part
symptomatic of a more widespread tension between town and
colony government. While Endecott had political and
theological differences with the mainstream colonial
elite, his town of Salem had also been in dispute with
the General Court over Roger Williams' appointment as
minister. Historians differ over this point: Edmund
Morgan sees the dispute as being centred on Williams'
separatism, but the deeper question of land tenure is
explored by Francis Jennings. There is widespread
agreement that the General Court effectively blackmailed
Salem by threatening not to grant the town land if it
supported Williams.1
All the New England colonies had internal disputes
in the early decades of settlement. The Rhode Island
towns have the most dramatic reputation for in-fighting,
factional divisiveness and a general inability to agree
on a suitable role for a central colony government, but
none of the other colonies escaped such conflicts.
Religious dissent was a common thread in the ranks of the
United Colonies, with individuals and larger
congregations alike falling foul of the central
authorities. Sometimes communities united in their
grievances against other sections of colonial society,
and such incidents were caused by both religious and
1 See Morgan, Puritan Dilemma, 119-128; Jennings, Invasion
of America, 138-142.
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political disagreements. A belief in the right of
individual towns and congregations to govern their own
affairs was deeply rooted in the English background of
the colonists, and internal disputes often owed much to
the sense of local identity maintained by the settlers.
In the early years of Massachusetts settlement the colony
towns retained strong local loyalties despite their
physical proximity to one another. Boston itself may have
dominated the colony economically but the colony
leadership as a whole was reluctant to allow political
power to rest with those magistrates who lived in the
' capital' .1
In the United Colonies, only once did an internal
dispute lead to a mission to England, when the
Massachusetts Remonstrants took their petition to London
in 1647. Importantly, that conflict was not one of the
many examples of close-knit local communities standing
against central authority, nor did the dissidents have
clearly religious motives. The dispute over the
Remonstrance was unusual in leading to an agency, and as
such it offers an insight into those problem-solving
options available to other colonists which were denied to
Robert Child and his followers.
Many of the conflicts of early New England have
been studied in detail by historians, who have focused on
the political and social instability caused by vocal
dissenters, and the often drastic means by which colonial
authorities quietened their opponents. From the viewpoint
of this study, though, rather different questions need to
be asked. Dramatic as they were, most of New England's
internal disputes were nonetheless solved, one way or
another, in the colonies. New England may not consciously
1 T.H. Breen traces conflict between local and colony
government from the 1632 Watertown taxation dispute
onward, concluding that all the major disputes of the
1640s "were sparked by the conflict between local and
colony-wide interests." See Breen's pioneering
examination of colonial and English localism, "Persistent
Localism: English Social Change and the Shaping of New
England Institutions." WMQ 32 (1975): 3-28.
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have set out to solve disputes, but the relative lack of
missions to England demonstrates that safety valves and
solutions did exist which satisfied most people.
What, then, were the main characteristics of some of
these disputes, and how were they resolved? The Bay
Colony's most famous split was the Antinomian crisis of
1637/38. This schism in the town and church of Boston
resulted in the exile of many of the most prominent
colonists. It did not result in an appeal to the English
authorities, however, despite the fact that many of those
involved returned to England in the aftermath of the
conflict. Two of Anne Hutchinson's closest supporters,
the younger Sir Henry Vane and Richard Hutchinson, were
among those who remigrated, but neither they nor the
group as a whole made any attempt to appeal against the
actions of the General Court in banishing them from their
homes.1
There are a number of reasons for this behaviour,
some of which have their roots in England, some in the
colonies. First, England was hostile territory for
advocates of Congregationalist church policy in the
1630s, and any petitioning member of the Hutchinson
faction would have had short shrift from Archbishop
Laud's Commission for Foreign Plantations. The
Antinomians had all come from England less than a decade
before the crisis in Boston, and could hardly have
forgotten the religious temper of their home country.
Indeed, England presented an even less appealing prospect
in 1638 than it had prior to the migration of 1630,
because it was only after the beginning of the
Massachusetts venture that Archbishop Laud reached the
height of his powers. Unpleasant memories of the
1 Vane, as will be seen below, played a central role in
helping Rhode Island agents in the 1640s. The most
detailed study of the individuals involved in the case is
Emery Battis, Saints and Sectaries: Anne Hutchinson and
the Antinomian Controversy in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, (1962); key documents are collected in David D.
Hall, ed., The Antinomian Controversy, 1636-1638: A
Documentary History, (2nd edn. 1990).
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authorities' attitudes were rekindled by the experiences
of some New Englanders who had returned to England
earlier in the 1630s. Plymouth settler and future agent
Edward Winslow was jailed in 1634 for unlicensed
preaching in New England, an act which he claimed he
performed out of necessity in the absence of a qualified
minister.1
More importantly, though, the Antinomians had
potentially fruitful options open to them elsewhere in
New England. A casual look at the list of destinations of
those who left Massachusetts might imply a panicky
scattering, but in fact the variety is a reflection of
the options available to the dissidents. Onward movement
from Massachusetts was still fairly straightforward in
the late 1630s, with the Narragansett region and Long
Island offering prime land outside the jurisdiction of
the Bay Colony. The Antinomians simply took the principle
that had brought them to Massachusetts one step further:
just as they had moved away from England, so they could
move away from the Bay Colony. The Hutchinson-Coddington
migration to the Narragansett Bay, for example, was not a
blind dash into an unknown wasteland, but rather followed
a careful examination of the region's promising natural
resources.2 Other exiles headed north for New Hampshire,
and while many of these turned south again after their
first winter, their continuing migration is itself a
measure of the freedom of movement open to them.
Dramatic though the Antinomian crisis undoubtedly
was, it was far from being the only division to create a
crisis in one of the New England colonies. While
Massachusetts had a sufficiently developed local
1 See Winslow's petition to the Lords of the Council,
1634, in MHS Proceedings (1860-62): 131-34.
2 Carl Bridenbaugh considers the settlement of Aquidneck
"an agricultural-commercial experiment that had been
thoughtfully and minutely planned in advance at Boston
and adequately financed by men.who were thoroughly
familiar with the management of estates." See
Bridenbaugh, Fat Mutton, 22.
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political system to make the Antinomian dispute into a
clash between the establishment and a vocal minority,
elsewhere in New England schisms divided towns and
communities into virtually equal parts. While there were
those in the Bay who could gather sufficient political
strength to expel the Antinomians after full legal
proceedings, in smaller communities neither side in a
dispute could necessarily wield authority over the other.
In such circumstances parts of the community would leave
and found a new* township, without attracting the sort of
attention the Antinomians have had from contemporaries
and historians alike. In Connecticut for example, the
town of Wethersfield fragmented repeatedly in the 1640s,
with groups leaving to form new congregations elsewhere.1
As the 1640s progressed, however, two major changes
affected the prospects of minority factions in the New
England colonies. The rise of Parliamentary authority in
England made appeals to that quarter seem more likely to
be heard. In addition, the mass migration of the previous
decade had led to a realisation that there was a limited
supply of habitable coastal land in New England. More
seriously, there was an ever shrinking amount of land not
yet claimed by one or another of the established
colonies. The increase in agency activity in the 1640s
reflects the tendency for those in dispute to find a way
of defending their settlements rather than moving them
elsewhere.
Despite this, the dispatch of an agent to seek
redress for an internal dispute remained very much an
exception in the United Colonies. It is therefore useful
to compare the one example of a Massachusetts faction
which sent an agent with a near-contemporary case for
which a solution was found in the colonies: respectively,
these were the dispute over the Remonstrance of 1646, and
the Hingham militia case.
The Hingham dispute demonstrates the tensions
1 See Paul Lucas, Valley of Discord, (1976), 41-2.
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between central and local government in early
Massachusetts. The town of Hingham elected Lt. Anthony
Eames to the captaincy of its train band in 1645, only to
change its mind and choose another local man, Bozone
Allen, instead. Local control over the election of
militia officers was, by the mid- 1 64 0s, a well
established and cherished part of the authority of the
Massachusetts towns. In this case, however, Eames won the
support of the colony magistrates, and after a war of
words which included the attempted impeachment of then
Deputy Governor John Winthrop, the leaders of the Hingham
community were fined a total of £100.1
The case of the Remonstrants was different in a
number of ways. The men involved take their name from the
Remonstrance which they presented to the Massachusetts
General Court in May 1646. A range of concerns appear in
this document, from the continuing financial problems of
the colony to the restrictive nature of Bay Colony church
policy. In particular, the petitioners complained that
the Bay churches refused communion to all settlers except
those who could meet unduly strict standards, and that
many prosperous and law-abiding citizens were as a result
disfranchised by the colony's freemanship rules. The
General Court's response was to levy heavy fines on the
leading complainants, and imprison those thought to be
about to launch a mission to England. In the end, the
Remonstrance was carried to London by one of the
petitioners, John Fowle, and William Vassall, who had a
long record of opposition to the Massachusetts
authorities.2
1 For a summary of the events in the militia case, see
Robert Wall, Massachusetts Bay: The Crucial Decade,
(1972), chapter 3.
2 The activities of the Remonstrants are noted in Wall,
Massachusetts Bay, 165-186; George L. Kitteredge, "Dr.
Robert Child the Remonstrant." Publications of the
Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 21 (1919): 1-146. The
Remonstrance itself is printed in Hutchinson Papers I:
188-196.
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William Vassall was a common factor in both of the
cases under consideration here. Although settled in
Plymouth colony, he had helped organise the Hingham
defendants' case, as he would that of the Remonstrants.
His decision to go to England in the latter instance was
influenced by the fact that by the mid-1640s the English
situation was becoming more favourable to New England
petitioners: agents from Massachusetts and Rhode Island
had already achieved some successes. Nonetheless, the
Hinghamites had not been prepared to send Vassall or
anyone else to England. There are in fact significant
differences between the circumstances in which the two
groups of petitioners found themselves, which go some way
to explaining why different communities came to varying
decisions over the need for a mission to England.
The reasons why the militia case became an issue in
the first place, and also why it did not result in the
dispatch of an agent to England, are to be found in the
traditional practices of the Hingham people. David
Grayson Allen's study of the effects on local politics
and society of the migration of communities from England
to the colonies reveals that the region around Hingham,
Norfolk, had some unusual characteristics which were
maintained by the families who left to form the new
settlement of Hingham, Massachusetts.1 Allen argues that
both Hinghams were characterised by a stronger than
average sense of town identity. This stemmed from the
combination of a lack of local manorial control in Old
Hingham, and a strongly oligarchic, family-based pattern
of town leadership.2
The strong sense of "townsmanship" demonstrated by
the Hingham leadership offers a reason why they felt
1 Allen, In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and
the Transferral of English Local Law and Custom to
Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century, (1981),
Chapter 3. Allen's concern is not with the militia case,
and any errors in the application of his conclusions to
the present context are not his responsibility.
2 Allen, In English Ways, 71, 68.
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perfectly justified in changing their minds over the
captaincy, and why they responded vehemently when the
central colony government objected to that choice.
Equally, though, the close-knit community would provide
support for the leadership regardless of the outcome of
the militia case. Whatever the fines and censure heaped
on the leaders of Hingham by the General Court, they
could be sure of retaining their positions of local
authority.
The contrast with the position of the Remonstrants
could hardly be more marked. The men who signed the
Remonstrance of 1646 were not part of a loyal community,
or even a single social or religious grouping. The seven
signatories included Robert Child, a medical doctor and
scientist; Thomas Fowle and David Yale, who were both
merchants; Thomas Burton, a lawyer; Samuel Maverick, a
long-time opponent of Massachusetts who was in the region
before the Winthrop-led settlement; John Dand, an ageing
grocer; and John Smith, who had recently moved to Rhode
Island but returned to Boston to participate in the
dispute. Only Burton had clear Presbyterian religious
convictions, Maverick was an Anglican, and Fowle and Yale
were Congregationalists who believed in religious
toleration.1 Their only real unifying idea was that
Massachusetts was acting in violation of English law and
that the restrictive oligarchy running the colony was
harming the economic and political progress of the
settlement. The Remonstrants certainly could not claim
the sort of local power-base and sympathy commanded by
the Hingham leadership, and when their petition was
condemned by the General Court they had no loyal
constituency to fall back on for support. In such
1 For biographical sketches of the Remonstrants, see Wall,
Massachusetts Bay, 235-239. The significance of the
merchants' participation is noted by Bernard Bailyn, who
argues that merchants were generally excluded from the
political process in early Massachusetts. See Bailyn, New
England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, (1955),
107 .
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circumstances the dispatch of an agent to England was the
only hope of keeping the issue alive.
For disaffected groups in Massachusetts, therefore,
there were often various options available before a
mission to England had to be considered. This was also
true for some of the developing settlements around the
Narragansett Bay. The difference was that in these towns,
which would after a difficult period unite to form Rhode
Island, the possibility of a colonial solution tended to
disappear much more quickly, forcing a mission to
England.
The most serious crisis of the period stemmed from
William Coddington's claim to be Governor of Aquidneck
Island, and both Coddington and his opponents sought help
in London. As in Massachusetts, though, there was also a
range of other disputes which did not acquire a
transatlantic dimension. Even these tended to be more
serious than the Bay Colony's squabbles, because various
groups of Narragansett settlers at one time or another
appealed to other New England colonies for help against
their neighbours. Such opportunistic alliances often had
severe implications for the stability of the region in
the longer term and contributed to the need for most of
the agencies of this period. In this section, however,
the particular internal problems of the Rhode Island
towns need to be considered.
By the early 1640s four major groups of Rhode
Islanders had significantly different ideas about the
direction in which the colony should move. Newport and
Portsmouth were united under the leadership of William
Coddington. Coddington's regime had been unpopular in the
late 1630s, and would be so again, but Aquidneck was from
an early date the most economically advanced part of the
Narragansett region, and politically the best organised.
Providence was the largest of the mainland settlements,
but was itself divided between a majority which generally
looked to Roger Williams for leadership, and a minority
faction from Pawtuxet, led by the Arnold family. The
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fourth element in the equation was the growing community
at Shawomet which followed Samuel Gorton, both
spiritually and politically.
The internal problems of the Rhode Island towns in
the later 1640s are a telling demonstration that colonial
charters could not in themselves solve the problems of
fledgling settlements. The 1644 Patent acquired by Roger
Williams gave the Narragansett towns legal standing, but
only the colonists themselves could translate the model
into a working political entity. They were slow to do so,
and the fragile union which they created in 1647 did not
survive into the next decade. When Rhode Islanders
appealed to England again in 1651, the fact that the two
main parts of the colony could not cooperate over sending
an agent is a fitting conclusion to more than a decade of
political failure in the region.
The key to the inability of the 1644 Patent to unite
the Rhode Island groups lies with the character and
ambitions of William Coddington. Coddington looms large
over the early history of Rhode Island, and his career is
central to understanding the fragmented nature of the
colony in its first decades.1 It is not an easy career to
understand, because it contains some contradictions and a
number of strangely obvious mistakes. On the other hand,
the troubles of the 1650s cannot be blamed exclusively on
Coddington: other Rhode Islanders failed to find ways of
accommodating Coddington's aims in a manner which would
have saved them all much trouble in the longer term.
Coddington led the group of Antinomians who left
Boston to settle on Aquidneck in 1638 in the wake of the
Hutchinson crisis. He had been a magistrate in
Massachusetts, and was a wealthy merchant who had clear
ideas about the economic potential of the Narragansett
Bay. In short, Coddington was a valuable asset to a group
1 There is no recent biography of William Coddington.
Treatments include Henry E. Turner, William Coddington in
Rhode Island Colonial Affairs, (1878); Emily Coddington
Williams, William Coddington of Rhode Island: A Sketch,
(1941).
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of settlers seeking leadership, and outshone his fellow
refugees in terms of political experience and motivation.1
Unfortunately, nobody believed in Coddington's
abilities as a leader more strongly than Coddington
himself. The dominant consideration in all of
Coddington's actions was the maintenance of his social
and political position. Some of his thinking is revealed
by his actions in the later stages of the Antinomian
crisis which split Boston in 1637/8. Coddington was among
the closest of Anne Hutchinson's supporters, but some
leaders of the Bay Colony, including the elder Winthrop,
believed that he could be brought back into the fold.2
Coddington was certainly unsure of the prospect of moving
south to the Narragansett Bay, having a lot to lose by
leaving Boston. Before the Antinomian crisis, he had been
Treasurer of the Bay Colony, and was also prominent in
government at town level in Boston. Ending up on the
losing side of the Hutchinson dispute was certain to
postpone (at the very least) any further advancement in
colonial office. By contrast, the Aquidneck settlers were
willing to appoint Coddington 'judge', effectively making
him chief executive of the new colony. Coddington's
affection for political power is well demonstrated in the
course of the later 1640s and 1650s, and there is every
reason to believe that he preferred the certainty of high
office on Aquidneck to the possibility of political
oblivion in Boston. Another factor encouraging Coddington
to move was the potential of the Narragansett Bay as an
1 Coddington's wealth is revealed by the sale of some his
Boston property for £1300 when he left for Aquidneck; he
was also the highest ranking political figure in the Bay
to join the Rhode Island settlers. See Edward West, "New
Interpretations of the Records of the Island of Rhode
Island." RIHS Collections 32 (1939): 107-115.
2 Emery Battis places Coddington in the core group of the
Hutchinson movement. See Battis, Saints and Sectaries,
229-30.
63
agricultural and mercantile centre.1
It rapidly became clear to the settlers on Aquidneck
that Coddington intended to exercise a control over the
new colony which did not differ notably from the powers
claimed by their erstwhile leaders in Massachusetts.
Within a year of the establishment of Portsmouth, a split
with Anne Hutchinson signalled the beginning of
Coddington's gradual alienation from the rest of the
Narragansett setters, and established some of the
grievances which would divide the colony's factions for
almost a quarter of a century. Coddington, who still had
more than half of the Aquidneck settlers on his side,
left Portsmouth to establish Newport at the south end of
the island. The details of the splits on Aquidneck are
not central to this study: it is sufficient to note that
Coddington waited patiently until Hutchinson's family
moved to Long Island, and then rapidly regained much of
his old power over the whole island.2
Once back in control, a series of incidents began to
persuade Coddington that close political contact with the
mainland settlers could only result in the decline of his
own influence and power. In 1639 he clashed directly for
the first time with the recently arrived Samuel Gorton,
and banished him from Aquidneck as a disturbing
influence. As will be seen in the next section,
persecuting Gorton was likely to make Coddington many
friends on the mainland, but neither he nor they thought
to build on this. Instead, Coddington saw Gorton
1 Negotiations between the Antinomians and the Indians who
controlled Aquidneck were conducted by Randall Holden,
who later became a leading Gortonist. See RI Rec I: 45,
47. Carl Bridenbaugh argues that Coddington was "the
foremost stockman- agriculturalist in fact- in all New
England". See Bridenbaugh, Fat Mutton and Liberty of
Conscience, (1974), 19.
2 Theodore Bozeman contrasts Coddington's role in dividing
the colony with Roger Williams' attempts to unite it;
this is borne out by Coddington's affection for personal
power and Williams' tendency to avoid it. See Bozeman
"Religious Liberty and the Problem of Order in Early
Rhode Island." NEQ 45 (1972): 48-9.
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establish a new settlement at Shawomet with the approval
of Providence, and concluded that any contact with the
mainland would inevitably involve some compromise with
the despised Gortonists.
Even more seriously, Roger Williams' 1644 Patent
contained some ominous clauses for Coddington. The Patent
considered the English settlements in the Narragansett
region as one entity: while Newport, Portsmouth and
Providence were named in the document, powers of
government were conferred to the "Incorporation of
Providence Plantations" as a whole. The form of
government was left to the choice of a majority of the
settlers, and by the time an attempt was made by
representatives of the towns to establish a union in
1647, Coddington's worst fears seemed to be realised. Not
only would each of the three original towns have an equal
part in the government of the colony, but Gorton's
Shawomet was admitted to full membership.
Perhaps the other Narragansett settlers could have
kept Coddington on board by offering him the Presidency
of the new union. This would not have been outrageous. Of
the most notable alternatives, Samuel Gorton was absent
in England in 1647, and Roger Williams was always
reluctant to accept political office.1 However, the colony
appointed John Coggeshall in the first year, and only
chose Coddington in 1648. By that time it was too late:
Coddington had already broken with the new colony and had
begun to seek support elsewhere for a new, independent
colony of Aquidneck, with himself as Governor.
Importantly, Coddington did not immediately go to
England but rather approached the United Colonies.
Relying on his continuing contacts with John Winthrop and
other Massachusetts leaders, he hoped to find a solution
to the problem in the colonies. Coddington and his
1 Williams devoted the years between his two agency
missions to developing his trading post and played little
part in public affairs. See Samuel Brockunier, Roger
Williams: the Irrepressible Democrat, (1940), 185.
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supporter Alexander Partridge travelled to the
Commissioners meeting at Plymouth in September 1648, and
requested that Aquidneck be granted membership of the
United Colonies.1 The Commissioners called Coddington's
bluff, and invited Aquidneck to submit itself to
Plymouth's jurisdiction instead: this was clearly little
improvement on having Aquidneck be part of the new
Narragansett colony.
Despite the Commissioners' rejection of his terms,
Coddington's appeal to the United Colonies was in itself
guaranteed to unite the Rhode Islanders against him.
Having alienated his fellow colonists and failed in his
bid for equal membership of the United Colonies,
Coddington sailed for England to seek support there. In
October 1650, he was granted a commission as Governor of
Aquidneck, and the following year returned to Rhode
Island to try to enforce his new found authority.
It was this commission from the English government
which finally persuaded the Narragansett colonists that
they needed a voice of their own across the Atlantic if
they were to solve the continuing problems surrounding
Coddington's role in Rhode Island affairs. It soon
emerged that Coddington had little support in the colony,
and he left for Massachusetts when this became obvious.
Nonetheless, Coddington's de facto resignation did not
encourage the colonists to simply ignore the matter. In
part, the dispatch of agents may be a measure of respect
for the English authorities, and a general reluctance to
risk the displeasure of the Council of State. Many
colonists believed that they had benefited from the
contacts established with England's leaders by Roger
Williams and the Gortonists, and did not wish to
jeopardise such links in the future. In addition, there
were more immediate practical reasons. As Governor of
Aquidneck, Coddington might have tried once more to
become a member of the United Colonies, and Rhode
1 See Plymouth Rec IX: 110.
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Islanders hoped to overthrow his authority before he was
able to persuade Massachusetts to give him military
assistance.
Even when facing the potential chaos created by
Coddington's actions, though, the Narragansett settlers
failed to agree on anything except their opposition to
Aquidneck's new Governor. Such was the suspicion and
mistrust between the two halves of the colony that even
the goodwill generated by the 1647 union was insufficient
to make the Rhode Island towns pool resources following
Coddington's return with his Governorship in 1651. Both
the mainland and island towns sent an agent of their own,
and disagreements over the exact aims of each mission
continued to haunt agents Williams and Clarke.
While Coddington's activities therefore gave rise to
two of Rhode Island's agencies, he cannot be held solely
responsible for the colony's problems. His acquisition of
an English commission was the element which set this
dispute above all others, but even after Coddington left
Rhode Island in 1652, the mainland and island towns found
it hard to work together. Providence settler Robert
Williams appealed for an end to the on-going "wilful and
unprofitable strifings and contentions' between the
towns, but had no immediate success.1 The fact remains,
though, that none of Rhode Island's other internal crises
provoked a mission to England. Such intense localism
might not have been such a problem for the settlers if
they had not faced persistent interference in their
internal affairs by Massachusetts. It was the continuing
involvement of outside elements in Rhode Island that
created the greatest need for agents, and it is to these
issues that the next section turns.
If Rhode Islanders lacked the safety nets available to
1 See Williams to town of Portsmouth, 15 March 1653, in
John Hay Library, MSS Rhode Island collection.
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some elements in Massachusetts, disputes among the
Narragansett Bay communities also had other
characteristics which made them inherently more serious.
Most Rhode Island troubles had an external element, and
the first three decades of the colony's history are
marked by malevolent meddling from outside, most often
from Massachusetts. Worse still, the Bay Colony had a
number of sympathisers in Rhode Island who were always
willing to create difficulties for those trying to
establish a stable government incorporating all four
towns. Massachusetts was keen to encourage such
divisions, because they helped disguise its wider efforts
to annex the Narragansett region.
Rhode Island faced threats from various quarters.
The Narragansett region was home to some of the United
Colonies' worst fears, and also offered some tantalising
opportunities. The area was of great natural value, with
good soil and safe harbours. Unfortunately for
Massachusetts and its supporters, the resident population
consisted of the powerful Narragansett tribe, and what
was perceived to be a motley assortment of heretics and
refugees from Bay Colony justice. This population, Indian
and English alike, posed a range of problems for the more
orthodox colonies, and suffered repeated attempts in the
1640s to evict them. This section considers the tensions
between the United Colonies and the Rhode Island
inhabitants, and the frequent decisions of the latter to
seek help from England.
By the beginning of the 1640s the United Colonies
had eliminated the Pequot Indians of southern Connecticut
as a military force and were poised to move against the
Narragansett. The Indian dimension is important to this
story, for a number of reasons. First, the Narragansett
were a numerous and militarily powerful people. The
question of population has long been part of the
anthropological debate over the nature of Indian society,
but the exact figures, even if they were available, are
in fact less important than the English perception of
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Narragansett strength. The English colonies had gained a
good impression of the tribe when they employed them as
allies in the Pequot War, and saw them as a significant
force. Five hundred Narragansett helped in the sack of
the Mystic river village in May 1637. Later, after
alliances had shifted, the tribe sent twice that number
to attack the Bay's Mohegan ally Uncas in the spring of
1645.1
Almost as threatening as their military capability
was the Narragansett's understanding of the political and
diplomatic tensions of the New England colonies. Initial
English settlement around the Narragansett Bay was
closely monitored by tribal leaders. Roger Williams
negotiated with the Indians for the purchase of the land
which became Providence, and also acted as an
intermediary between the Narragansett and the next wave
of refugees, who bought Aquidneck in 1638. Williams made
an effort to learn the Narragansett language and
understand the tribal culture during his early years in
Rhode Island, and the Indians recognised him as a useful
intermediary between themselves and the more hostile
settlers of Massachusetts. Williams helped forge the
alliance between the Bay Colony and the Narragansett
against the latter's old enemy, the Pequot. In the
aftermath of that conflict, the Narragansett began to
doubt whether their alliance with the Bay was safe and
sensible, but Williams continued to be useful to them as
an interpreter and mediator. The Indians were also well
aware that the English settlers were by no means united,
and their willingness to work with the dissident
communities of Rhode Island against the orthodox colonies
demonstrates a political sophistication which caught




Just as the Pequot had stood in the way of English
expansion south from Connecticut, so the Narragansett
occupied equally desirable territory. The quality of the
land on the islands and western shore of Narragansett Bay
escaped neither the Rhode Island settlers nor their
erstwhile governors in Massachusetts. As has been noted,
the members of the Hutchinson faction who left the Bay
Colony in 1638 were well aware of the potential of their
destination. The settlers of Aquidneck Island did not
leave Boston to cower in the wilderness, but rather took
full advantage of the natural resources suddenly
available to them. The successes of the Aquidneck
settlers were visible from an early date, and the
mainland followed the island's pattern of economic
growth, albeit much more slowly. By the late 1650s, the
tract of land known as the Narragansett Country was
settled by competing groups of Rhode Islanders and
speculators from Massachusetts and Connecticut alike. In
particular, members of the Atherton Company claimed title
to much of the region's prime land after conducting a
number of illicit deals with Indians. Rhode Island
claimed the same territory under the terms of its 1644
patent, and had a variety of treaties of its own with
local Indians. The Narragansett Country emerged as a
central issue in the Restoration, when Rhode Island agent
John Clarke opposed a Connecticut attempt to annex the
region.2
As well as economic potential, the Narragansett
region offered important strategic benefits to whoever
controlled it, and Massachusetts feared that it could
1 Sidney James argues that "it is quite realistic to think
of the colony of Rhode Island as in part a product of
Narragansett Indian policy." James, Colonial Rhode
Island: A History, (1975), 8. Williams' role as a
mediator is explored in the editorial note "Indian
affairs and the Threat of War, 1645", in LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 220-224.
2 See Chapter 7, below.
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easily fall to a hostile power. In 1644 the elder John
Winthrop warned his fellow colonists against being too
hostile toward the Aquidneck settlers, lest the latter
seek the support of the Dutch at New Amsterdam. Early in
the following decade, William Arnold wrote to
Massachusetts noting that the Narragansett Bay would
"serve for an inroad to let in forces to over-run the
whole country" if the English republic decided to act
against New England.1
Such a naval strike would be deeply worrying, but
Massachusetts was even more concerned by the thought that
Rhode Islanders might actually welcome the sort of
invasion described by Arnold. Rhode Island was widely
regarded asfsource of disruption over all New England. It
was a haven for "fugitives and such as are guilty of
capital crimes and other misdemeanours", according to a
complaint from Connecticut in 1651. Earlier, New Haven
had censured one of its colonists for sedition, and noted
without surprise that the woman concerned had connections
with Rhode Island. The United Colonies considered Rhode
Island to be a threat both to internal stability and also
to their image in England. Trying to solve the former
problem by persecution only exacerbated the latter,
however, because the more the United Colonies tried to
stamp out dissent in New England, the more likely it was
that agents would be sent to England.
Some of the most revealing instances of the overlap
between Rhode Island's internal disputes and the wider
concerns of the United Colonies are to be found in the
long-running conflict between Samuel Gorton and
Massachusetts. Gorton's clash with William Coddington on
Aquidneck has already been mentioned, and it was this
which forced the Gortonists to settle on the mainland.
Once there, they became embroiled in what was potentially
an even more serious conflict, because it ultimately
brought Gorton into direct confrontation with
1 See Winthrop, Journal II: 175; Arnold to Massachusetts,
1 September 1651, in Hutchinson Papers, I: 267-268.
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Massachusetts. William Arnold's faction in the small
settlement of Pawtuxet saw its position threatened by the
arrival of the Gortonists. The Arnolds voluntarily placed
themselves under the authority of Massachusetts in 1641
in the hope that the Bay Colony would remove the
Gortonists and leave the northwest shore of Narragansett
Bay available for occupation by themselves and their
supporters.1
Such splits in the ranks of the Narragansett
settlements were anathema to Roger Williams. Williams had
himself been exasperated by Gorton, complaining that the
latter was "bewitching and bemadding poor Providence"
with his preaching of radical theology. Importantly,
though, Williams refrained from signing a letter sent by
some of the Providence settlers which complained to
Massachusetts that Gorton was a threat to civil order.
His subsequent disagreements with the Pawtuxet faction
indicate that he recognised the dangerous possibility of
external intervention which lay along such a path.2
As far as Gorton was concerned, the dispute with the
Arnold faction and the subsequent conflict with the
Massachusetts authorities was just the latest in a series
of troubles which took on ever more dangerous aspects.
Gorton's problems are an extreme example, but the
reasoning behind his mission in 1645 offers a clear
indication of the point at which all avenues of progress
in the New World were perceived to have closed and
redress was sought in England.
Gorton knew the methods and attitudes of the United
Colonies better than most Rhode Islanders, having been on
the wrong side of the authorities in Massachusetts and
1 William Arnold's letter to Massachusetts condemning
Gorton as a "railing and turbulent person" was printed by
Edward Winslow during the latter's English campaign
against Gorton. See Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, (1647),
59-62.
2 See Williams to John Winthrop, 8 March 1640/41, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 215; Providence to
Massachusetts, 17 November 1641, in Mass Archives, 2: 2.
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Plymouth for most of his early years in New England.1
Gorton arrived in Boston in March 1637, but was not
involved in the Antinomian dispute. After witnessing at
first hand the actions taken by the Massachusetts
authorities against religious dissidents, though, Gorton
moved quickly to New Plymouth. He was for a time welcomed
by the separatist colony, but became involved in a court
case in which one of his servants was charged with
various disruptive activities. In Gorton's view, the
charges stemmed from the single allegation that she had
smiled during a church sermon. Gorton chose to speak on
the woman's behalf, and ultimately took the case to the
point where he called into question the legitimacy of the
Plymouth legal process. He and his family were banished
in December 1638, and the dispute over Gorton's servant
was probably an excuse to rid the colony of a man who had
started to practise the sort of unofficial ministry
developed by Anne Hutchinson in Massachusetts.2 It is
certainly true that the relatively trivial legal reasons
for acting against Gorton at this point- and later- bear
little relation to the severity of the punishments
imposed upon him. Early in his New England career,
therefore, Gorton saw how the colonies could use their
civil laws to enforce religious conformity, and gradually
came to the conclusion that English law and government
would have to be involved in combating the activities of
Massachusetts and its allies.
Given this background, Gorton must have been aware
that the Arnold faction's submission to Massachusetts
made direct conflict with the Bay Colony likely, if not
1 The summary which follows is based on accounts of
Gorton's activities offered by Sidney James, Colonial
Rhode Island: A History; and in greater detail by Kenneth
W. Porter, "Samuell Gorton: New England Firebrand" NEQ 7
(1934): 405-444; Phillip Gura, A Glimpse of Sionrs Glory,
(1984), 277-282. Many original letters from Gorton's
disputes are printed in his own Simplicities Defence,
(1646) .
2 Porter, "Samuell Gorton", 411.
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inevitable. In the event, Massachusetts received pleas
for help from two groups: junior Indian leaders who
disagreed with Narragansett sachem Miantonomi's sale of
Shawomet to the Gortonists complained to the Bay Colony
also. The Bay ordered the Gortonists to come to trial in
Boston, and received in reply a vitriolic letter
addressed to the 'Idol General', in which the
Massachusetts authorities were labelled friends of Judas
Iscariot and murderers of Anne Hutchinson. In September
1643, the Bay sent troops to arrest nine Gortonists, who
were then sentenced to work in irons before being exiled
from Massachusetts and banned from returning to Shawomet.1
The spectacle of a community of vocal heretics
prospering in the Narragansett country under English
protection presented a serious problem for the Bay
Colony. The Gortonists were different from the other
groups which had left Massachusetts in the 1630s. William
Coddington's Aquidneck settlers, once established in
their new home, were happy to continue trade links and
correspondence with their northern neighbours. Even Roger
Williams, who had questioned the very legality of
Massachusetts in the early 1630s, maintained a courteous
dialogue with his former opponents in the years which
followed.
Not so Gorton. The most worrying part of the Gorton
problem was that he and his followers persisted in
spreading sedition regardless of where they were or how
severely they were being punished. When the Gortonists
were in prison in Massachusetts after being evicted from
their settlement, the hard line adopted by the
magistrates did not meet with universal approval among
the citizens of the Bay. Even from their captivity, the
Gortonists were able to instil doubts in the minds of the
locals. One of the advantages of Winthrop's Journal as a
source is that the author's prejudices often led him to
1 Agent Winslow presented the 'Idol General' letter to the
English authorities as evidence of the Gortonists
subversion; see Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, 28-36.
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reveal information which in his eyes was highly critical
of his enemies, but which may also cast light on the
truth. In this case, Winthrop noted that the Gortonists
were eventually banished from Massachusetts, because they
were able to "corrupt some of our people, especially the
women, by their heresies."1
Winthrop mentions this in order to condemn the
Gortonists as raving disturbers of the peace, but it also
indicates, of course, that a worrying number of people
were willing to listen to what the Gortonists had to say.
In addition, Winthrop was particularly haunted by the
spectre of another subversive female threat following in
the footsteps of Anne Hutchinson.2 John Endecott
complained that there were people in Salem who were
"taken with Gorton's opinions."3 It is unlikely that the
Gortonists were simply preaching radical theology,
although that would have been bad enough. The sect and
its leader were noted for their belief that the secular
order in New England, as well as Massachusetts
Congregationalism, was corrupt and oppressive, having
been vocal in this opinion in Plymouth and Aquidneck. The
implications of all this were serious for the Bay Colony
leadership, which was not sure enough of its own position
to ignore the establishment of an English-supported
community of religious and political dissenters on its
southern border, expressing the sort of beliefs which
evidently had some attraction for a section of the
Massachusetts populace.
After their release from Massachusetts, therefore,
1 Winthrop, Journal II: 149.
2 Hutchinson herself was another dissident who never
reconciled herself to the Bay, or to Coddington's
collaborationist approach on Aquidneck. Mary Jane Lewis
has suggested that Hutchinson's refusal to conform led
the Bay Colony to order her execution, which was
subsequently disguised by John Winthrop as a random
killing by Indians. See Lewis, "A Sweet Sacrifice: Civil
War in New England." PhD, SUNY Binghamton (1986).
3 See Endecott to John Winthrop, sr., 22 April 1644, in
Winthrop Papers IV: 456.
75
the Gortonists were under no illusions that the Bay would
leave them alone for long. A possible solution was
suggested to the Shawomet settlers in the summer of 1644,
when Roger Williams returned to Rhode Island with his
parliamentary patent. This was the first real evidence in
Rhode Island that England had a parliamentary authority
which was sufficiently in control to issue such documents
to petitioners, and as such probably gave Gorton
considerable encouragement. It must be remembered that
Gorton was a relatively late emigrant, unlike most of the
leaders of New England, and had witnessed a wave of
persecution in England in the early 1630s which had not
begun when Winthrop's followers arrived in America.
However frequently he asserted his determination to
appeal to the English authorities, Gorton may well have
been apprehensive about returning to London. After his
narrow escape from execution at the hands of the Bay
authorities, Gorton decided that the situation in New
England was desperate enough, and English circumstances
promising enough, to make his long-threatened appeal to
England a viable option. In 1645 Gorton, Randall Holden
and John Greene sailed for England from New Amsterdam.
The cumulative effect of the events of 1646 on the
leaders of the Bay Colony was dramatic. As noted above,
the Remonstrance was presented in May, and the
magistrates spent much of the summer working on a
response. At this time also, the activities of Gorton and
his fellow agents in England began to worry the leaders
of the United Colonies. In June, Plymouth magistrate
Edward Winslow passed on news of the activities of the
Gortonists in England to John Winthrop. Winslow urged the
Massachusetts governor to be "better prepared (at least
to stave off prejudice against your government in the
committee of Parliament) in regard of the petitioners",
and noted also that a number of other dissidents were
preparing their cases.1 In August, Theophilus Eaton wrote
1 Winslow to Winthrop 30 June 1646, in Winthrop Papers V:
87.
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to Winthrop from New Haven in August, asking the Bay
leader to keep him informed of the results of Gorton's
mission: "It will be an exercise to us all", wrote Eaton,
"if he returns with victory".1
Some Massachusetts settlers were less apprehensive
about Gorton's activities, and viewed the controversy as
an opportunity to expose the dissidents' 'errors' before
the English public. According to William Pynchon,
Gorton's actions would "open his infamy to the world",
and "clear the justice of New England to the Parliament
more than anything that man could have devised by that
time the answer is returned."2 Pynchon's belief that the
English government would inevitably support the Bay once
they had heard Gorton's heretical views was based on a
serious misconception of the English situation in the
mid-1640s, and was not shared by the majority of the
colonial leadership. As the summer of 1646 progressed,
John Winthrop and the Massachusetts authorities began to
feel the pressure being exerted on them from many fronts.
They also knew that their own actions over the preceding
decade had led the colony far enough away from the norms
of English government to make reliance on goodwill from
home a very risky strategy.
Matters came to a head in September, when Gorton's
fellow agent Randall Holden arrived in Massachusetts,
carrying with him not only a free-conduct pass from the
English authorities, but also a letter giving a
preliminary judgement on the Gortonists' petition. This
letter was categorical in its insistence that
Massachusetts was acting outwith the bounds of its
charter, and that the Bay Colony should immediately
desist from interfering with the Shawomet settlers.3 For a
1 Eaton to Winthrop 6 August 1646, in Winthrop Papers V:
95.
2 Pynchon to John Winthrop 7 July 1646, in Winthrop Papers
V: 92.
3 Warwick Commission to Massachusetts, 15 May 1646 in
Winthrop, Journal II: 292-3.
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small group of religious sectarians to gain such a
decision against the flagship of New England colonisation
did not augur well for Massachusetts, and some counter
had to be made.
The internal and external threats which surfaced in
1646 persuaded Massachusetts to send Edward Winslow to
England. Much of the thinking behind this mission
survives, primarily in the writings of John Winthrop and
of the agent himself. One of the agent's priorities was
to put a stop to the succession of protests being lodged
against the Bay Colony in England. Winslow lost no time
in making his appeal to the parliamentary commissioners,
urging them to consider
how destructive it will prove to the well-being of our
plantations and proceedings there, (who by God's blessing
are growing up into a nation) here to answer to the
complaints of such malignant spirits as shall there be
censured by authority, it being three thousand miles
distant, so far as will undo any to come for justice,
utterly disabling them to prove the equity of their
cause, unless their estate be very great.1
Winslow cleverly side-stepped the real issues by focusing
on the cost and inconvenience of having to answer
criticisms at transatlantic distances. His tone reflects
the wider themes of the Bay Colony's appeal, suggesting
that the godly settlers of Massachusetts are doing their
best in their humble manner to establish their new
communities, and should not be deflected from that task
by the activities of malcontents like Gorton. Some of the
Bay leadership may even have believed this picture,
although the preparations for Winslow's mission imply
rather less innocent thinking.
John Winthrop records in his Journal the formal
commission given to Winslow to approach the English
authorities and defend the charter rights of the Bay
Colony, but he also lists another set of instructions for
the agent which reveal those areas of policy in which
1 Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, Epistle Dedicatory (n.p.).
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Massachusetts was consciously at variance with opinion
and practice in England. The magistrates anticipated that
their colony might be accused of having an arbitrary
government, and of wanting to extend its boundaries. In
addition, the whole question of allegiance to England
clearly troubled the Bay leadership. Winslow's
instructions were clear, however. He was to stress
repeatedly that the colony intended to maintain its
charter-derived right of "absolute power of government",
and make no concession to any attempts to bring the
settlement's laws and practices into line with those of
England.1 Winslow was sent to England by a colonial
leadership which had gone to considerable effort to build
up political and economic power and was determined not to
allow any diminution of its new-found authority.
After the return of the first Rhode Island agents,
therefore, the process of transatlantic appeals began to
acquire its own momentum. As well as long-standing
grievances, constitutional worries and economic problems,
the results of previous missions came to be numbered
among the factors influencing the dispatch of new agents.
Agents went to England throughout this period without
ever being really sure of what they would encounter in
their home country. Changes of government, as well as
pressing concerns both in Parliament and on the
battlefields of the civil war, combined to make the
achievements- if any- of an agent impossible to predict.
Particularly in the years after 1642, when English
Parliamentarians began to issue orders to their New World
brethren, colonial leaders paid considerable attention to
the results of their own previous missions and those of
their opponents when deciding future action.
Had Gorton's petition been rejected by the English
1 Winthrop, Journal II: 314-315.
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authorities, forcing him to stay in England or move to,
say, Long Island, the reasons for Edward Winslow's
mission would have been dramatically reduced in number
and significance. Equally, with Gorton absent, William
Coddington would have faced less opposition in Rhode
Island and might have decided that his appeal to England
for increased personal authority was unnecessary: Rhode
Island might have been united without the two 1651
missions. Clearly, this is speculative, but the success
and failure of colonial agents did have considerable
repercussions for their own communities and for the wider
history of New England. With the affairs and interests of
every colony so closely interconnected, the actions of
colonial agents came to be a prime reason for the
dispatch of future missions.
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3
The Agents: A Portrait
Once the colonial leadership had overcome the doubts and
disagreements examined in the last chapter, and decided
that a mission to England was necessary, the next step
was to appoint an agent. This part of the process was in
some cases the most difficult. Agents had to be suitable
representatives in the eyes of the colonial authorities,
and also had to impress England's leaders. The English
background, colonial activities and religious beliefs of
an individual could all have an effect on his standing
in the colony, and matters were complicated by the
realisation that England itself might judge these
factors by different standards. In a time of
ecclesiastical and political upheaval, colonists rightly
believed that the messenger could be as important as the
message, and choosing an agent was therefore a matter of
some gravity.
The selection of agents posed two main problems for
colonies. First, agents had to be sufficiently
influential and trustworthy to perform their missions
but not so valuable that they were indispensable to the
everyday governance of the colony itself. Agents all
came from the ruling groups of colonial society: the
record is clear that all were leading figures in their
communities before being appointed agents. They were
not, however, at the very top of the hierarchy at the
time of their missions, and colonies were generally
successful in reaching a balanced solution to the
problem of indispensability.
Second, colonies had to select agents who were
appropriate for the particular situation. As has been
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seen, most missions had broadly constitutional
undercurrents, but circumstances and priorities could
change dramatically from mission to mission. Equally
important was the background of change in England.
Agents had to be qualified to deal with the task at hand
and also command the sort of authority which would
elicit a favourable response from England's leaders,
whoever they might be. Most agents had proven records of
representing their colonies, either on previous missions
to England or (more usually) on diplomatic expeditions
elsewhere in the colonies. Nonetheless, such experience
was not considered as valuable as general leadership
qualities.
Some of the difficulties caused by the debate over
missions themselves spilled over into the discussion
about agents. Factionalism and localism played their
part in the selection of agents, with central
authorities having to be careful not to alienate local
interests through the choice of an agent. Colonies
generally learned to be diplomatic, but there are also
cases in which compromise candidates were chosen.
Although no mission failed because of this, the tendency
of colonies to follow easy options could store up
trouble for the future.
Colonies were greatly helped in agent selection by
the strong opinions held by some potential agents. Many
agents actively volunteered for their missions because
their presence in London would also allow them to
participate in English affairs. At the same time, some
of the most powerful and influential colonials refused
to be considered as agents. The motives of both these
groups may have been more selfish than community
oriented, but they helped ensure that agency missions
did not leave gaps in the uppermost echelons of colonial
government, and that colonies rarely had to force men
into becoming unwilling and possibly uncommitted agents.
Those men who volunteered for missions help make
the point that New England's agents often had broadly
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ranging careers and interests which mirror the
transatlantic nature of the agency as an institution.
For most agents in the mid-seventeenth century, working
for their colony was only part of a much more diverse
set of concerns that spanned the ocean. In addition, the
experiences of agents in England indicate that they had
a lot in common with one another, despite the conflicts
between and within their respective colonies. As time
went on, however, it was possible for men with
superficially similar early careers to have radically
different views about the state of colonial society, and
competing agents in England were no exception.
The debate over agent selection typifies some wider
characteristics of settlement in New England and the
development of the region's social and political
institutions. There were not enough agents in the first
generation for them to be statistically significant, but
they do demonstrate in microcosm some important
features. One point to emerge from this study is that
colonies had similar attitudes toward leadership and
their choice of those who would represent them in
England. The origins of the northern colonies, first in
a relatively small geographical, social and religious
section of English society, and then at the point of
primary migration in Massachusetts, ensured that all the
region's settlements inherited some uniform approaches.
It is indicative of the ambiguities of colonial
relations in the region that settlements which were
bitterly opposed to one another chose their
representatives in a broadly similar manner, with
generally comparable priorities.
The most important compromise in agent selection centred
on the problem of indispensabi1ity. On the one hand,
there was the potential loss of an individual's services
to the everyday running of the colony, while on the
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other was the possible benefit to be gained from using
his skills in the colony's interest in London. The main
difficulty was that, logically enough, those who made
good agents would probably also make good colony
officers. Leading men could be trusted with the concerns
of the colonial elite, and might also command some
respect in England, but such figures were probably
already serving in the colonial government either at
legislative or executive level. Any sensible fledgling
colony was bound to try to maintain or even expand its
pool of experienced, trusted statesmen, and could not
lightly send its best and brightest across the Atlantic
on lengthy missions. Clearly, some balance had to be
reached: colonies had to find men who were in the upper
echelons of colonial government and society but, for one
reason or another, were not considered indispensable.
At first glance, the New England colonies seem
spoilt for choice when trying to recruit agents.
Massachusetts in particular had no shortage of leading
figures with experience of life in England and, by the
time of the first mission, more than a decade of
colonial service as well. The Bay Colony settlers had
elected leaders before they left for America and later
formed a variety of colony-wide and local institutions.
Later offshoot colonies organised representative
assemblies of their own, and the region as a whole
boasted rather more educated men with some social
standing than was the norm in the American colonies. In
addition, all first generation settlers who made the
Atlantic crossing as adults had some knowledge of
English affairs, and those who had been merchants,
lawyers or ministers were often very knowledgeable
indeed. Leading New England settlers were likely to
emigrate in family and community units, but not all
members of any given family or social circle would cross
the Atlantic: most colonists left a range of contacts
behind them. Ministers left aristocratic patrons,
members of old congregations and episcopal opponents in
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England; the region's merchants maintained links with
business partners, creditors and debtors; many people in
the colonies tried to keep in touch with members of
their extended families.
Before examining why only a small percentage of
these people were ever considered as agents, some
qualifications need to be made. There is the ever-
present problem of negative evidence: just because a
person was never named as a candidate does not mean that
the person was unsuitable. He may simply have been
overlooked. In addition, while some professions are well
represented among agents, it cannot be assumed that
every member of that profession was a potential agent.
Some generalisations can nevertheless be made about the
first generation agents, as long as it is remembered
that the agency was not in itself a well-defined
profession with set membership qualifications.
The most important general characteristic shared by
the agents is that they were all members of the elite
from which the rest of the colonial office-holders were
also chosen. The first generation agents were all born
and educated in England, and either held positions of
influence prior to emigration, or emerged as leaders of
their new communities shortly after arriving in America.
There are various measures of this status, some of which
will be considered below.
Although the agents are an unreliably small sample,
their English origins fit well with more general trends
in the New England population. While the colonies
attracted settlers from most parts of England, ruling
elites tended to have more closely limited regional
origins. The early coastal counties of Massachusetts
were led by emigrants from the eastern counties of
England, and it is no surprise that they were usually
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represented by agents of similar origin.1 Of course,
colonial leaders did not deliberately seek out agents
who had come from specific English regions: the pattern
of regional origins is instead a reflection of the fact
that colonies generally chose agents from the ranks of
their leading citizens.
Most Massachusetts agents came from those English
regions which contributed most to the Great Migration.
Simon Bradstreet and John Leveret came from
Lincolnshire, Thomas Weld from Suffolk, and John Norton
from Hertfordshire. Hugh Peter was born in Cornwall, but
lived and worked in Essex. Connecticut's John Winthrop,
jr., came from Suffolk. Rhode Island agents John Greene
and Randall Holden both came from Wiltshire, which
contributed a large number of settlers who subsequently
moved on from Massachusetts to Connecticut and Rhode
Island. Some agents came from places rarely associated
with New England: Plymouth settler (and Massachusetts
agent) Edward Winslow was born in Worcestershire and
Rhode Island's Samuel Gorton in Lancashire. Even these
men lived in London- the clearing-house of much American
emigration- before leaving England, as did Rhode
Island's founder Roger Williams.
Leadership could of course manifest itself in
various forms in early New England, and agents represent
two main strands and also two which were less common.
All will be considered in more detail below, but in
summary they are: holders of civil office at either
colony, local or inter-colony level; ministers and
religious leaders, whether of the established church or
of dissenting sects; military officers; and, finally,
holders of economic influence such as merchants. Some
agents could claim authority by virtue of more than one
of these, and some thought needs to be given to which,
1 David Fischer considers the numerical importance of
eastern settlers in early Massachusetts, and argues that
their political and cultural influence was even more
significant. See Fischer, Albion''s Seed, 31-36.
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if any, was the most important consideration in such
cases.
First, agents who were chosen from the ranks of
civil officeholders. As has been suggested, all the
colonies had to face the problem of choosing agents from
their leading figures without dangerously weakening the
colony, and their final choices reflect the priorities
of early colonial government. Not all colonies, however,
suffered from exactly the same constraints. The smaller
settlements tended to be reliant on a very small number
of leaders, and this is especially true of the Rhode
Island towns and other fringe communities formed by
followers of a particular religious leader.
Massachusetts, on the other hand, had more people to
chose from but tended to suffer from factional and
localist disagreements.
Some of the Bay Colony's disputes over the dispatch
of missions have already been considered, but despite
the sometimes strained circumstances surrounding the
agency, Massachusetts always succeeded in reaching a
compromise between political seniority and
indispensability in its choice of agents. No Governor or
Deputy Governor travelled to England in this period, and
although agents were experienced political figures, they
were not selected from the very top grades of the
Massachusetts government. Agents usually only gained
promotion to the uppermost offices after they returned
from their missions. William Hibbins, for example, was a
leading figure in the Boston Town Council from 1639
onward, and was usually listed second only to the elder
John Winthrop in Council meeting attendance lists in the
early 1640s.1 However, Hibbins' election to colony-wide
office had to wait until after he returned from England
in 1642. Twenty years later, colony magistrate Simon
Bradstreet became the highest ranking of all the Bay
1 Lists of meeting attendances are given in Robert F.
Seybolt, Town Officials of Colonial Boston 1634-1775,
(1939) .
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Colony's agents. Bradstreet went on to be Governor of
Massachusetts in the 1670s, as did his predecessor in
the agency John Leveret, but both men only reached this
pinnacle of colonial government in the years following
their missions.
The clearest demonstration of the indispensability
problem- and the cleverest solution to it- is found in
the Bay Colony's 1646 mission. The situation in 1646 was
traumatic for the Massachusetts leadership, with Samuel
Gorton lobbying the English government and the dissident
Remonstrants threatening to add a further voice to the
Bay's critics across the ocean. Matters seemed so
serious that a section of the colony hierarchy believed
that only their most distinguished leaders would command
sufficient respect to influence the English authorities.
The elder Winthrop was warned of the Gortonists'
activities in England by, among others, Plymouth settler
Edward Winslow. Winslow kept himself well informed of
events in both England and in the rest of the colonies,
and believed that the Bay Colony could not rely on
sympathisers in England to present its case. The
Gortonists were having a powerful influence on England's
leaders, argued Winslow, and the matter was "of such
consequence if well weighed as your ablest men may not
escape it".1 This view had supporters in Massachusetts.
One of the elders attending the General Court meeting in
November 1646 suggested that a churchman and a senior
magistrate should go to England: the court chose John
Norton, teacher at the church in Ipswich, and Governor
John Winthrop, sr.2
However much support there was at the General Court
for the idea that very senior figures should serve as
agents, the suggestion that Winthrop himself might go to
England caused widespread alarm. There had already been
1 Winslow to John Winthrop, sr., 30 June 1646, in
Winthrop Papers V: 87.
2 The General Court proceedings are described in
Winthrop, Journal, II: 295.
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calls from England for him to return and lend his
support to the Parliamentary cause. Even a short
departure from the colony might panic some settlers into
believing that the leadership had lost confidence in the
settlement, thus encouraging them to leave also. William
Pynchon had observed shortly before the Court meeting
that some of those already returning to England were men
whom "the land can ill spare without a shaking ague: the
pillars of the land seem to tremble."1
Pynchon's words seem hyperbolic, but they reflect
the crisis of confidence which both stemmed from and
contributed to the large scale remigration to England
which emerged as a serious problem in the 1640s.2 The
first Massachusetts agents had tried to play down the
significance of remigration by offering some
explanations for the large number of people abandoning
the Bay Colony. Many had never intended to stay long in
the new world, they argued, and some were deterred by
the moral nature of colonial society. Ironically, agents
Weld and Peter had become part of the problem by 1646,
and the Bay was very conscious of the fact that two of
its first three agents had remained in England to
support Parliament. Winthrop and Norton might not
voluntarily have followed the example set by Peter and
Weld, but colonists feared that events in England could
take such a turn as to give them little choice.
Winthrop himself was reluctant to undertake the
mission, for various reasons. According to his own
account, he was concerned about his advancing age, and
it is true that at fifty-eight he would have been the
oldest of all Massachusetts agents. Probably more
important was Winthrop's political position: he had only
recently been re-elected Governor following the Hingham
dispute, and may have feared further attempts to remove
1 William Pynchon to John Winthrop, sr., 27 October 1646,
in Winthrop Papers, V: 114.
2 Remigration will be considered in more detail in
Chapter 5.
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him from office if he accepted even a short mission to
England.1
Given Winthrop's reluctance, it is likely that he
personally argued that Edward Winslow be chosen for the
mission in his place: Winthrop certainly favoured
Winslow's appointment and considered him a strong
bulwark of orthodoxy in Plymouth Colony, which itself
seemed increasingly buffeted by heresy. In other ways,
too, Winslow offered Massachusetts the ideal solution to
its predicament. He was a man of considerable standing
in government, as a magistrate and one of the original
Commissioners of the United Colonies. However, he did
all these things as a freeman of New Plymouth, and not
of Massachusetts. The Bay Colony therefore got an agent
with an impressive governmental background without
causing a gap in the ranks of its own elite.
The Rhode Island towns faced the same
indispensabi1ity question, although some of the
attendant difficulties were of a rather different
nature. In the first place, the Narragansett communities
recognised early that sending leading figures to England
was necessary for survival, and did not share the Bay
Colony's insecurity about remigration and demonstrations
of 'weakness' on the part of the authorities. Still,
Rhode Island had a much less organised political
structure throughout most of this period, and this made
leadership an even more cherished commodity. Very few
men could claim a broad authority over any of the
Narragansett settlements, let alone an alliance of them.
Rhode Island agents were, like their Bay Colony
counterparts, slightly adrift from the uppermost ranks
of government. In large part their selection was
dictated by the way in which political structures
developed in the colony. Individual towns were always
determined to maintain their own powers and authority,
and this made them unwilling to send their leaders on
1 See Winthrop, Journal II: 295.
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missions. Only if a given mission was clearly necessary
to their own town might local leaders travel to England.
By the same token, anyone who could be trusted to
represent the towns in alliance was probably not
involved in the everyday governance of any one of them.
Roger Williams, Rhode Island's first agent, was
probably the only Narragansett settler of the first
generation to command near universal respect from his
fellow colonists. This was due to the sympathy generated
by his exile from the Bay Colony, his determination to
establish the township at Providence, and the assistance
he offered in the 1630s to most of the other major
groups who wished to settle in the region. The
Antinomian refugees who founded the Aquidneck towns were
particularly grateful for Williams' ability to negotiate
with local Indians.
Williams' role as a political leader in his own
town of Providence was always ambiguous, however, and he
was by no means typical of the rest of the mainland
leadership in this period. He is one of the few examples
of a leader who lacked many of the usual qualifications
of social status and relative wealth.1 Spending much of
his time at his trading post in the Narragansett
Country, Williams was never as closely involved with the
day-to-day affairs of Providence as might be inferred
from his high historiographical profile.
1 Most Providence town officers were older and wealthier
than the average settler, although Robert Brunkow argues
that the town electorate did not hesitate to remove men
from this elite who proved to be ineffective. In
general, the Rhode Island towns were governed by men of
"property, maturity and experience". See Robert Brunkow,
"Office Holding in Providence, RI 1646-1686: A
Quantitative Analysis." WMQ 37 (1980): 243. Leadership
is an area in which Rhode Island retained a broad
similarity with its neighbouring colonies. David Fischer
concludes that "age, estate and reputation... defined a
ranking system that persisted for many generations" in
Massachusetts. See Fischer, Albion's Seed, 180. Stephen
Foster also notes the standards of financial and social
respectability required of political leadership in Their
Solitary Way: The Puritan Social Ethic in the First
Century of Settlement in New England, (1971), 69-70.
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By the time of his missions to England, Williams
was able to stand a little above the suspicious localism
of the Rhode Island towns, acting more as a spiritual
leader and a source of sound advice in times of trouble
between the towns or with external forces. A good
example of this is a letter written to the town of
Providence in 1651, in which Williams made a number of
suggestions as to the action to be taken by the town in
settling the affairs of the deceased and protecting the
interests of orphans and widows.1 Williams also sought to
defuse tensions between the Gortonists and their
neighbours, despite his own clear aversion to Gorton's
activities.
It was this slight detachment from the various town
governments that made Williams a useful agent. He
undertook his first mission in 1643 largely on his own
initiative, and was certainly never formally
commissioned by any of the Narragansett settlements. The
welcoming reception accorded to him upon his return with
the 1644 patent indicates that he had the support of a
good number of the colonists, however, and the mainland
towns subsequently made repeated requests that he serve
as an agent again the later 1640s.
The other Narragansett agents were dispatched by
individual communities, in circumstances of serious
crisis. In 1645, the Shawomet settlers saw Samuel
Gorton's agency as their last hope of regaining their
township, and six years later John Clarke was dispatched
by the Aquidneck towns in the wake of unrest caused by
William Coddington. Again, both cases demonstrate that
problems in the Narragansett towns were on a different
scale from those experienced by Massachusetts. Gorton
and his followers had to weigh up the relative value of
individuals serving in England or America against a
background of violence and enforced exile. With the
Shawomet settlers scattered and living in various parts
1 See Williams to Providence, 22 January 1651, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 328-331.
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of the region among sympathetic English settlers and
Indians alike, the community decided that not only
Gorton, but also two of its other leading men should
appeal on their behalf to England. John Greene and
Randall Holden accompanied Gorton. Holden had penned
some of Shawomet's most defiant letters to the Bay
Colony while Greene kept the settlers together after
most of the other notable figures were arrested and
taken to Boston in 1643. That three of their most
important figures should be allowed to go to England is
a measure of the Gortonists' desperation, and their
conviction that all avenues of redress in New England
had been exhausted.
The Aquidneck towns faced a slightly less serious
crisis when they sent John Clarke to London in 1651, and
in this case the most powerful of the towns' leaders
stayed in America. Clarke combined his Baptist preaching
with political office, and had been Colony Treasurer
under the abortive unification of the Narragansett towns
in 1647. However, the united colony which had appointed
Clarke to the Treasurer's post effectively ceased to
exist when William Coddington tried to enforce his newly
acquired Governorship on Aquidneck. The island towns
each had an elected leadership at the time, but neither
town proposed sending any of its councillors to England.
An assembly of Newport settlers took the lead in
ordering its six-man council to remain in office, while
choosing a seventh man (Clarke) to serve as agent.1
The pattern of choosing agents who were not quite
at the top of the colonial hierarchy does not apply in
Connecticut, but even here the general rule that an
agent should be more valuable to the colony in London
than in America holds true. Having elected the younger
John Winthrop governor for the first time in 1657,
1 The Newport order is printed in Isaac Backus, History
of New England with Particular Reference to the
Denomination of Christians called Baptistsr (1777), vol
I: 274.
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Connecticut changed its laws in 1659 to enable it to
keep re-electing him annually thereafter.1 Winthrop led
the colony's most successful expansionist manoeuvres in
the early 1660s, when New Haven was annexed and large
parts of Long Island and Rhode Island coveted also.
Winthrop's own involvement in these plans, combined with
a persistent homesickness for England, made him insist
that he represent the colony personally in 1661.2
In Winthrop's case the potential benefit of the
mission clearly outweighed the damage likely from the
temporary loss of a leading figure, although the reasons
were rather the reverse of those discussed in Rhode
Island's case. Connecticut in the early 1660s was a
confident community largely free from internal or
external threats, and did not require the sort of daily
crisis-management which seemed so common elsewhere.
While the top leadership in Massachusetts and the Rhode
Island towns nervously contemplated the implications of
a new English regime and continuing internal tensions,
Connecticut's governor was free to move onto the
offensive in London.
Although the circumstances surrounding all of the
above missions are rather different, at the particular
time when the mission became necessary the agents were
all less important to their communities as leaders than
they were as agents. This was not necessarily the case
before, or after, the mission in question, but was
certainly true at the crucial moment.
Important as political figures were, the New England
colonies frequently turned to their ecclesiastical elite
as an alternative source of trustworthy agents who
carried authority in England and America alike. The high
proportion of ministers chosen as agents reflects the
1 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 190.
2 For Winthrop's personal motives for taking the agency,
see Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 117.
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important role of the churches and the clergy in
transatlantic affairs. Three of the Bay Colony's seven
agents were ordained ministers: Thomas Weld, minister at
Roxbury, and Hugh Peter of the church at Salem were the
Bay's first agents in 1641, and John Norton undertook
the 1661 mission as minister in Boston. Rhode Island's
Roger Williams, Samuel Gorton and John Clarke all had
religious credentials which had a bearing on their
missions, even if their social position was a little
different from the Bay ministers.
Appointing ministers as agents had wide
implications on both sides of the ocean. Early colonial
religious leaders, and the Massachusetts clergy in
particular, usually commanded respect well beyond the
bounds of their own congregations, and this could open
doors for agents in England. However, some colonists
worried that such employment dangerously blurred the
line between matters civil and spiritual, and there was
an ever-present danger that agents left to their own
devices would become involved in activities which, in
the colonies, would have been reserved for the civil
authorities. Serving as agents allowed the clergy to
maintain a high profile as part of the Bay Colony's
image, stressing the religious nature of New England
colonisation and presenting a picture of close
cooperation between church and state. However, critics
in England naturally assumed that the agents were
typical of the colonial clergy and therefore wholly
representative of New England church policy.
Using ministers as agents did touch upon some
fundamental aspects of colonial society. Massachusetts
was founded with specific rules about what later
generations would call the separation of church and
state, and however much influence ministers may have had
on the secular leadership, the clergy could not
themselves hold political office. The Bay churches were
powerful, but not in all areas of Massachusetts society.
The clergy were regularly consulted about issues such as
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Indian affairs and relations with England, as well as
more obvious questions of public morals and conduct.
Ministers often reacted strongly to any perceived threat
to the established order of Massachusetts: in 1645 they
argued against a relaxation of the laws regarding
strangers, fearing that the colony would be over-run by
the ungodly. In other areas more central to secular
power, like land distribution and taxation, the civil
authorities were less keen to allow clerical input.1
Over time, some of the advantages of sending
ministers to England could be cancelled out by changing
attitudes in the home country. In the early 1640s, New
England ministers could command almost automatic respect
from religious people in England: agents Weld and Peter
were highly successful in the initial stages of their
mission, especially in raising funds for colonial
education.2 As the decade progressed, the attitudes of
Englishmen to their New England brethren became more
ambivalent. Religious polarisation in the mid-1640s
meant that a Massachusetts minister could have as many
enemies as friends in England, simply because of the
form of church organisation he represented.3
Charitable appeals for the education of Indians and
the relief of the poor were an area in which ministers
could probably out-perform their secular colleagues, but
such tasks also raised questions of propriety in the
colonies. Most of the Massachusetts leadership accepted
1 For the influence of ministers on secular affars, see
David Hall, The Faithful Shepherd: A History of the New
England Ministry in the Seventeenth Century, (1972),
132. The 1645 controversy is described in Bailyn, The
New England Merchant s in the Seventeenth Century,
(1955), 106.
2 Weld and Peter attracted considerable financial
contributions to the colony in the first year of their
mission, having successfully petitioned Parliament for
leave to hold a collection in some of the London
parishes.
3 The impact of agents' religious activities in England
is discussed more fully in Chapter 5 below.
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that the clergy had a useful role to play in
transatlantic questions, but there was less agreement on
whether they should actually serve as agents, and in
particular whether it was appropriate for them to handle
financial matters. Salem leader John Endecott suggested
as an alternative to the 1641 mission that well-known
ministers like John Cotton should write to contacts in
England to elicit support.1
Most church elders and ministers wanted a more
prominent part than that, however. The Bay's internal
troubles in the mid-1640s prompted the elders of the Bay
churches to offer the General Court a lengthy and
detailed series of opinions on the questions of the
colony's relationship with England, and also the case of
the Remonstrant faction.2 Such consultation was an
integral part of planning Edward Winslow's agency, which
began shortly afterward. The Bay churches also wanted a
role in agent selection. The attempt to send John
Winthrop and John Norton to England in 1646 has already
been mentioned, but it is significant that the proposal
came initially from a church elder. In 1641, and again
in 1661, the Massachusetts leadership considered it
useful to have agents from both the civil and
ecclesiastical spheres, and the suggestion that the
Governor and a minister make up the agency team in 1646
was a further attempt to formalise this practice.3
The controversies associated with the selection of
clerical agents are best revealed by the first
Massachusetts mission, organised in 1641. The mission
was portrayed by the colony leadership as an expedition
to help those fighting for the cause of Reformation in
1 Endecott to John Winthrop, ca. February 1641, in
Winthrop Papers IV: 315.
2 Winthrop Journal, II: 294-299.
3 The lower house of the Massachusetts assembly explicity
stated in December 1661 that two agents should be sent
to England, one from "the civil state, the other of the
ecclesiastical". See Mass Archives, 106: 44b.
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England. John Winthrop argued as much, and agent Hugh
Peter had no hesitation in lending his preaching skills
to the Parliamentary Army. In such circumstances,
sending a minister to England bears some logic, but this
is not the full story. Peter himself was no cloistered
cleric, and his contribution to the lives of his Salem
congregation went far beyond affairs of the spirit. By
the time Peter left Massachusetts in 1641, he had
established fishing and shipbuilding enterprises, and
owned more than a thousand acres of land. He also
operated a mill and a glassworks. Equally important was
the fact that Peter's financial dealings predated his
arrival in Massachusetts. The minister, working under
the protection of the Earl of Warwick, had travelled
around England in the 1620s raising money for the upkeep
of his fellow clergy.1
Little wonder, then, that Salem leader John
Endecott was suspicious of the reasons offered by John
Winthrop for the mission to England. Peter was an ideal
choice if the real aim of the mission was the collection
of money for the colony, under cover of religious
reform. For a minister "to leave his work and to attend
to secular business which may be done by others", argued
Endecott, might be justifiably condemned as "something
Jesuiticall."2 In Endecott's view, Massachusetts was
trying to use the spiritual prestige of ministers to
achieve some very worldly goals. Endecott's doubts were
not widely shared, however. Most colonial leaders
expressed no apprehension about a possible corruption of
the ministers' role, and saw clerical involvement in the
transatlantic relationship as inevitable and beneficial.
Only as the 1640s progressed did the Bay Colony realise
1 Ronald Pacy offers a detailed catalogue of Peter's
financial interests and activities. See Pacy, "Spiritual
Combat: The Life and Personality of Hugh Peters, a
Puritan Minister." PhD thesis, State University of New
York, Buffalo (1978), 76, 38.
2 Endecott to John Winthrop, ca. February 1641, Winthrop
Papers IV:315.
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that its ministers were being forced onto the defensive
in England.
If the Bay Colony emphasised its religious tone by
choosing ministers as agents, the Rhode Island towns
were represented by men who had made careers out of
opposition to the Massachusetts churches. The role of
the three most prominent Rhode Island agents in the
spiritual and political leadership of their communities
has already been noted, but it is important to stress
that they drew much of their strength as agents from
their religious activities. Roger Williams, erstwhile
minister of Salem, Massachusetts, took separatism from
the English Church to dramatic extremes. He was a
prolific author of theological tracts, most of which
roundly condemned the Bay Colony for its form of church
government. John Clarke was the founding preacher of the
first Baptist congregation at Newport, Aquidneck, and
was in direct confrontation with the authorities in
Boston as a result of his preaching. Samuel Gorton was a
radical sectarian who once gave his occupation as
"Professor of Christ" and preached to his followers at
Shawomet, as well as to congregations in London's
Cheapside during his agency. All of Rhode Island's
agents could claim to have been persecuted by
Massachusetts because of their religious beliefs. This
is not surprising, given that most of the original
generation who settled around Narragansett Bay had some
grievance with Bay Congregationalism. The significance
of the agents' religious experiences is that they
offered considerable ammunition for attacks on
Massachusetts, and could sometimes force Bay agents-
especially the ministers- onto the defensive.
Rhode Island's agents took every opportunity to
publicise their religious experiences once they reached
England, and in the case of John Clarke there is even a
suggestion that trouble was provoked deliberately in
order to cast the Massachusetts authorities once more as
intolerant persecutors. Such a strategy was not uncommon
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amongst New England dissenters, and Quakers in
particular employed martyrdom as a tactic in the late
1650s. Clarke had arrived in New England in 1637, and
although he was not involved in the Antinomian crisis,
he joined the group which moved south to Aquidneck.1 In
1644, Clarke founded the Baptist church in Newport, and
his religion brought him into conflict with the
Massachusetts authorities in July 1651. Clarke, along
with two members of his congregation, visited an elderly
man in Lynn, Massachusetts. The three were arrested,
taken to Boston and fined for preaching: one of Clarke's
companions was whipped.2
Clarke does seem to have gone to peculiar lengths
to bring himself to the attention of the Massachusetts
magistrates, and it is hardly surprising that at least
one nineteenth-century Massachusetts writer argued that
Clarke was acting as an agent provocateur.3 Lynn was a
settlement about ten miles north of Boston, some sixty
miles on a direct line from Newport. Clarke was a long
way from home and right in the heart of the Bay Colony.
It is debatable, though, whether Clarke anticipated
going to England later in 1651 when he embarked on his
visit to Lynn. William Coddington caused serious splits
in the colony when he refused the Presidency and went to
England in 1648, but it was not until his return to
1 Clarke was held in high esteem from the beginning of
the Aquidneck settlement, signing the document which
established the civil government at Portsmouth early in
1639. RI Rec I: 52.
2 Accounts of Clarke's visit to Massachusetts are to be
found in Gerald Sandler, "Doctors Afield: John Clarke
(1609-1676)" New England Journal of Medicine (1963)
1027; William McLoughlin, New England Dissent 1630-1833:
The Baptists and the Separation of Church and State,
(1971), vol 1, 19-20. Primary accounts are in Clarke's
own 111 Newes from New-England (1652); the Massachusetts
viewpoint was put by Thomas Cobbett, The Civil
Magistrates Power in Matters of Religion (1653).
3 This suggestion, by John Palfrey, was refuted by Henry
Melville King in a historiographical debate in the later
19th century. See King, Early Baptists Defended, (1880),
12.
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Newport in August 1651 that the colonists formally
decided to send agents. Clarke was not commissioned
until October, some three months after he travelled to
Massachusetts. In any case, for Clarke to deliberately
provoke Massachusetts was a very risky tactic. At the
very least he could have been imprisoned for some
months, which in turn would have delayed any journey he
was planning to England.
Even if Clarke's motives for going to Massachusetts
in the summer of 1651 were innocent, there can be no
doubt that his experiences in Lynn brought him to the
fore as a possible candidate for the agency. This was
not directly a denominational issue- being a Baptist in
England was not likely to give Clarke any particular
advantage- but virtually any victim of Bay Colony
persecution could hope for sympathy from some of
England's leaders. In addition, while almost all of the
citizens of Aquidneck could claim to have been
persecuted by Massachusetts, most would have to admit
that their troubles dated to the later 1630s. The
Antinomian crisis which had led to their exile, however
traumatic, was hardly news compared to the story Clarke
was able to tell when he was sent as agent.
Ministers could be very effective when appealing to
the sympathies of English supporters, but their social
position also made their selection problematic. After
all, if political leaders could be considered
indispensable, congregations were even less willing to
see their minister leave for England. None of the
Massachusetts clergy who served as agents was given
permission to leave without some negotiation between the
colonial authorities and individual congregations. While
there were various reasons for selecting secular agents
in 1646 and 1655, it is likely that fears of opposition
from congregations played their part in influencing the
authorities. The Massachusetts church establishment
remained ambivalent about agency missions, having to
balance their desire for involvement and influence
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against the shortage of capable clergy in the colony.
Two other prominent groups within colonial society are
represented to a much smaller degree in the ranks of
agents. All the colonies had some military capability
and organisation from the earliest days of settlement,
and the leaders of anti-Indian campaigns were well
respected. Merchants too were important to the colonies,
and their numbers grew as the colonial economy became
more settled. Both occupations attracted much amateur
involvement, of course, but men who dabbled in trade or
held honorary commissions with the colonial militia need
not be counted. John Leveret was the only professional
soldier to serve as an agent, while William Hibbins was
the only merchant.
In both cases, their professional activities suited
them for the mission in hand, but the circumstances of
those missions also make it clear why colonies called
upon these professions sparingly when selecting their
agents. Only the first Massachusetts mission had a clear
economic motive, and so it made sense to call upon
William Hibbins. Importantly, though, Hibbins was a
merchant of a particular type, in that he was also
church member and a respected member of Boston's town
government. Many of New England's more prominent
merchants of the 1650s and later were further removed
from such orthodoxy, and if the colonial leadership had
wished to send a merchant in the early years of the
Restoration their choices would have been more limited.
It might be argued that later Massachusetts missions
were constitutional in nature anyway and that a merchant
would have been an inappropriate choice. Nonetheless,
the merchant community in general was seen to stand ever
more in opposition to the first generation leadership as
time went on, which added to the reluctance of the Bay
to make use of their transatlantic knowledge and
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connections.1
John Leveret's mission was also unusual, and a
range of factors contributed to his selection as agent.
Leveret's experience of transatlantic affairs could
hardly be matched, in that he had played a part in many
of the English world's most dramatic events in the
decade after 1645. He spent that year in England leading
a cavalry troop in Parliament's army, returning to New
England in 1646. The following year saw him back in
England briefly, witnessing the continuing struggles of
the Long Parliament and the increasing political
influence of the New Model Army. Back in New England,
his 1652 mission to negotiate with New Amsterdam
convinced him that the Dutch colony was ripe for the
taking, and he returned to England to get the support of
the Council of State for an attack. Early in 1654,
Leveret was back in Boston, leading a small but powerful
English fleet and calling for volunteers to help him
take New Netherland: his plans were thwarted by the Bay
Colony's reluctance to become involved and by the ending
of the first Anglo-Dutch war.
In 1655, Leveret's interests coincided with those
of the Bay Colony and he travelled as agent to
Cromwell's court. Appointing Leveret as agent
demonstrates a sense of pragmatism on the part of the
Bay Colony leadership. Leveret had recently been
something of an embarrassment to Massachusetts when he
seized a Dutch ship. Such actions were contrary to the
colony's policy of maintaining trade with New Amsterdam
despite the wider European conflict between England and
the Dutch.2 Nonetheless, Leveret's military credentials
and his acquaintance with Oliver Cromwell encouraged
Massachusetts to take advantage of his wish to cross the
Atlantic in pursuit of money owed him by the English
1 See Bailyn, New England Merchants, 106-11.
2 Leveret was given a 'grave and serious admonition' over
this case, less than six months before his appointment
as agent. Mass Rec IV part 1: 229.
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government. The Bay Colony had heard of Cromwell's plan
to attack the West Indies, and believed that Leveret
could convince the English authorities to buy naval
supplies for that mission in New England.
Much of Leveret's contact with the authorities in
the early years of his mission involved the wages he
claimed for his mission against the French settlements
north of Massachusetts in 1654.1 Leveret only returned to
Massachusetts at the Restoration, when he denied any
authority to represent Massachusetts and requested a
safe conduct pass to leave England. His papers, once
granted, included provision for his wife, family and
servants to travel also: clearly Leveret had been living
in England on a semi-permanent basis until the return of
the Stuarts threatened to make life dangerous for a
close supporter of the late Lord Protector.2 This record
implies that Leveret was not much of an agent, but the
fact remains that Cromwell did not take any action
against the colony during the mission. In hoping to
discourage such action, Massachusetts may well have been
right to choose an agent who could easily become part of
Cromwell's court.
Whatever the nature of their influence and
authority then, all the first generation agents had an
important part to play in colonial life before, during
and after their missions. Clearly, though, this was true
of any number of men. Having established that
prospective agents were notable figures, the colonial
authorities needed to look for other qualities before
making choices.
While leadership in general was a shared characteristic
1 In December 1656, Leveret petitioned for £4482 13s lid
which he claimed to have spent on army and navy
business. PRO, C01/13 f53.
2 PRO, C01/16 no. 50.
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of most agents, they also had other, more specific,
qualities and experiences which appealed to their
colonies. In particular, most agents had gained some
experience of representing their communities before they
were sent to England. The often tense relationships
between colonies provided much opportunity for men to be
sent on local diplomatic missions, while negotiations of
a different sort were required between the settlers and
the Indians. Clearly, the relative status of a colonist
visiting a neighbouring settlement was rather different
from an agent appearing before the English government,
but New England's leaders recognised that men who could
be trusted with their colony's interests in one
situation could probably be relied on equally in the
other.
Three agents- Williams, Winslow and Winthrop-
travelled to England more than once in an official
capacity, thus having direct experience of the task at
hand during their later missions. Such return visits
meant that contacts could be made and revived, and the
agent also would have an exact knowledge of what
business had been transacted during his last visit. In a
period when governments had little knowledge of the
geographical or political realities of New England,
agents who could claim the authority of precedent were
particularly useful. Having witnessed London's colonial
administrators in action, an agent was not only familiar
with procedures but also with the personalities
involved. Although the political upheavals of the period
caused considerable change in personnel and policies,
returning agents were able to maintain valuable contacts
through the 1640s and into the next decade.
Roger Williams went to England twice during the
period. His successful acquisition of the 1644 patent of
civil government for the Rhode Island towns helped to
make him the first choice when the mainland part of the
colony once again sought an agent in 1650. Williams was
reluctant to undertake a second mission, but his fellow
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settlers were adamant. The Rhode Island General Assembly
did consider three other men as possible alternatives,
but preferred instead to wait for the better part of a
year until Williams agreed to the agency. The colony
was clearly willing to wait for its first choice.1 Part
of the reason Williams was chosen was his close
friendship with Sir Henry Vane, erstwhile governor of
Massachusetts and leading figure in the Long Parliament.
Vane emerged from the political upheavals of the late
1640s with a higher profile than ever, and his rise in
influence was noted carefully by Rhode Island.2
Developments in England also had a beneficial
effect for Massachusetts agent Edward Winslow, albeit
for rather different reasons. Winslow undertook three
separate missions on behalf of Plymouth colony between
1621 and 1634, and Massachusetts considered this work a
great asset when offering him the agency in 1646. The
English government Winslow had known in the 1620s and
1630s was of course dramatically altered by 1646. His
experiences during the 1634 mission were traumatic:
Winslow was jailed by Archbishop Laud for having
conducted religious gatherings and marriages in
Plymouth, where there was no Anglican clergy. By 1646,
though, Massachusetts believed that such credentials
would meet with approval among England's parliamentary
leadership. Winslow was "well known to the
commissioners, having suffered...diverse months
imprisonment, by means of the last arch prelate, in the
cause of New England."3 Experience as an agent in England
could be positive or negative, but changing
circumstances opened the possibility that either could
1 RI Rec I: 231; Williams to John Winthrop, jr., 9
October 1650, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 323.
2 Two generations of the Vane family were prominent in
Stuart politics, but Sir Henry Vane, sr. plays no part
in this study. All references to 'Vane' indicate the
younger Sir Henry. RI Rec I: 94, 125.
3 Winthrop, Journal, II: 295.
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be turned to advantage next time round.
The younger John Winthrop's experience of
representing colonial interests in England stemmed from
a combination of accident and a happy coincidence of
public and private concerns. He was only formally
commissioned as an agent once, for his mission to seek a
charter for Connecticut in 1661, but transatlantic
activities going back almost three decades gave him a
valuable introduction to the job. Winthrop was in
England tidying up family business during the quo
warranto proceedings of 1634, when the crown attempted
to recall the Massachusetts Charter. He played no part
in the affair, but learned much about the workings of
the English government and the dangers which faced even
formally chartered colonies. Winthrop returned to New
England in 1635 in the employ of Lords Saye and Brooke,
who gave their name to the Saybrook Company. His task
was to determine the feasibility of establishing a
settlement in southern Connecticut, but the longer term
value of the episode was in the contacts he made with
influential Englishmen.1
Winthrop's closest involvement with an agency prior
to his own came when he accompanied the Massachusetts
agents across the Atlantic in 1641. He was not initially
part of the mission, and went to England chiefly to
organise funding for the development of an iron-works in
New England. However, when William Hibbins returned to
Boston after only a year in England, the remaining
agents urged Winthrop "with many pressing arguments" to
help with their agitations. According to his own
account, Winthrop spent a year helping with the Bay
mission, although he also devoted much effort to the
1 Winthrop's contact with Lord Saye continued until 1662,
when Winthrop tried to enlist Saye's help in securing a
Connecticut charter. For Saybrook, see Black, The
Younger John Winthrop, 96; Newton, The Colonising
Activities of the English Puritans, 80-100; Kupperman,
"Definitions of Liberty on the Eve of the Civil War:
Lord Say and Sele, Lord Brooke, and the American Puritan
Colonies." Historical Journal 32 (1989): 17-33.
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iron-works project, and returned to the colonies as soon
as he had raised the funds and recruited the men
necessary for the latter endeavour. Such links, both
official and personal, made Winthrop a valuable asset to
Connecticut.1
Other agents served their colonies within New
England, in a variety of circumstances. Some agents were
Commissioners of the United Colonies. Simon Bradstreet,
Edward Winslow and New Haven's ill-starred Thomas
Gregson all held this office before their missions.
Winslow and Gregson were founding signatories to the
original establishment of the Confederation in 1643,
while Bradstreet was the longest serving Commissioner of
all.2 John Leveret's introduction to serving the Bay
Colony was more military in nature, and took him to
various parts of New England prior to his agency in
1655. In 1642, Leveret presented an ultimatum to
Narragansett leader Miantonomi on behalf of the Bay
Colony. A decade later, Massachusetts sent Leveret to
Manhattan. He was ordered to assess the attitudes and
military situation of the Dutch and to decide whether
the United Colonies would be justified in attempting to
take New Netherland.3
1 Robert Black argues that Winthrop was a formally
appointed agent during his first two visits to England,
but the evidence is sparse. Massachusetts may even have
disapproved of Winthrop's involvement in the 1640s,
because it was reluctant to reimburse the bills he
claimed to have incurred on the colony's behalf. See
Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 78, 111; John Winthrop
to Massachusetts General Court, ca.1647, in Winthrop
Papers V: 123.
2 Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, 388.
3 Mass Rec II: 23; A brief account of the mission is in
John Hull, "The Diaries of John Hull" Archazologia
Americana: Transactions and Collections of the American
Antiquarian Society 3 (1857): 174. Leveret's partner on
the 1652 assignment, William Davis, was never sent to
England as an agent, but he was entrusted with
supervising financial matters for the 1662 mission of
Simon Bradstreet and John Norton. See Hutchinson Papers,
II: 74-5.
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Some missions within New England involved religious
rather than political diplomacy. The Massachusetts
churches often maintained contact with congregations
which had originally settled in the Bay before moving to
found new churches elsewhere. Elders and ministers alike
visited such churches, and sometimes tried to help solve
problems. John Norton spent a month in Hartford,
Connecticut in 1657 in an attempt to reconcile rival
groups in the congregation: he had some initial success,
but the church fell into factionalism again later that
year.1 A slightly different kind of mission was
undertaken by Boston elder William Hibbins, who
represented his church on a mission to Aquidneck in 1640
to investigate the new congregation formed by the
refugee Antinomians. Despite the exiles' refusal to
accept the delegates, the Boston church could not agree
on whether to break off contact with them.2
Such examples show that a significant number of
agents had previously represented their colonies, but
they do not mean that such experience automatically made
an individual a likely candidate for a later agency.
Colonies placed more emphasis on public standing and
religious orthodoxy than they did on directly relevant
experience. Perhaps the most pronounced example is that
of William Hibbins, whose career following his mission
has never attracted much attention. After returning to
New England in 1642, Hibbins was never suggested as a
candidate for any future agency, despite becoming a
colony magistrate and working as a successful merchant
until shortly before his death in 1654. There is no
evidence of Hibbins refusing to participate in future
missions, and no evidence either that the colony
considered his work in 1641 to have been unsatisfactory.
1 See John Hull, Diaries, 180/ Ellis, History of the
First Church of Boston, 94.
2 Hibbins' brief account of his mission to Aquidneck is
printed in Hall, The Antinomian Controversy, 390-1; see
also Winthrop, Journal, I: 330-1.
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Hibbins was formally thanked for his agency by the
General Court in November 1646, at the same meeting that
appointed Winslow agent.1 Had agency experience been
highly prized, then it would hardly have been outrageous
for Hibbins to be nominated for the mission. However,
Hibbins was clearly not in the same league as the men
who were proposed for the 1646 mission, and could not
match the authority commanded by such men as John
Winthrop, John Norton and Edward Winslow. In dangerous
times, colonies saw leadership as a more important
qualification than agency experience.
Given the community rivalry and conflict discussed in
the last chapter, it should come as no surprise that one
set of compromises in agent selection stemmed not from
the agents as individuals but from the factional and
sectional interests which they represented. These
factors in agent selection owed more to colonial
politics than to the qualities of individuals, although
separating the settler from the settlement was not an
easy thing in those communities which followed a
particular spiritual path. Inhabitants of Shawomet, for
example, were inevitably and rightly seen as followers
of Samuel Gorton, with all the religious and political
connotations which that implied. New England's tendency
toward localism thus became a factor in the choice of
agents as well as in wider concerns about missions as a
whole. The Rhode Island towns again provide the most
notable examples, but the Massachusetts authorities also
had to balance local interests.
In the three most controversial missions
dispatched by Massachusetts in this period- those of
1641, 1646 and 1661- no two agents or proposed agents
for a given mission came from the same town. In
1 Mass Rec II: 185.
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addition, the General Court was usually very careful not
to antagonise local sentiment. Governor Thomas Dudley
clearly anticipated resistance to the employment of Hugh
Peter, and wrote to Peter's church at Salem along with
"near all the rest of the magistrates and some of the
elders", requesting that the pastor be released from
service in the town. A similar approach was made to
Roxbury, which "freely yielded" Thomas Weld, albeit
after some debate. Such was the Court's unwillingness to
pursue the issue in the face of the ensuing resistance
from Salem, that the mission was only dispatched at the
second attempt after prolonged negotiations.1 In 1646,
Edward Winslow's advantages as a candidate were further
strengthened by the fact that he had played no part in
any of the Bay Colony's internal disputes in the
previous decade. Only in 1655, when Massachusetts was
relatively secure from criticism at home and abroad, did
no local interests emerge to challenge John Leveret's
agency.
Local tensions continued to be a characteristic of
the Rhode Island settlements throughout the 1640s and
1650s, and by the Restoration such interests had become
an integral part of the colony government. Rhode
Island's general assembly, made up of representatives of
the four towns, considered sending a new agent to
approach Charles II for a royal charter in 1660. John
Clarke was still in England, but was not included in the
initial list of candidates. Instead, a committee
nominated seven men, all of whom had good agency
qualifications. Roger Williams was of course an
experienced agent and probably the only man respected in
all parts of the colony. Samuel Gorton and Randall
Holden still led the settlement at Shawomet; they were
joined on the list by the son of their late colleague,
John Greene. William Brenton was the sitting colony
President, William Dyer had led the anti-Coddington
1 Winthrop, Journal, II: 25-26.
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agitation in Newport a decade before, and Benedict
Arnold was the leading figure in the faction which
occupied much of southern Providence.1
The most significant point about this list, though,
is that it includes men from all the major groupings in
what was still more of a confederation than a united
colony. The Gortonists, the Arnolds and the Newport
merchants had their representatives, and there were also
two candidates- Williams and Brenton- who might be
acceptable to all by virtue of their past and present
office-holding. Even so, choosing one or two men from
the list was an awkward proposition, and the court
ultimately decided to abandon the idea. It took the
easiest alternative, and extended the 1651 commission
held by John Clarke in the name of the island towns to
include the seal of the whole colony. Clarke had played
no part in the internal politics of the Narragansett Bay
area for a decade, and this, along with his experience
as an agent, persuaded the Rhode Islanders that he
offered the best compromise solution to their problems.
The final section of this chapter must consider the
questions posed by agents who clearly had personal
interests which spanned the Atlantic, and who took the
opportunity to further these during their missions.
Perhaps all would have returned to England on their own
in any case, but this is by no means certain. In most
instances, agents were simply opportunistic, in that
they took the chance offered by their missions to take
part in some English activity, usually religious,
political or economic, which interested them. Other
agents gave little hint while in America that they might
wish to participate in English affairs again, but then
stayed in England far longer than their missions




Some of the manifestations of agents' English
interests will be examined in Chapter 5, where their
contributions are placed in the wider context of
transatlantic society. For the moment, it is important
to assess the implications of agents' wider concerns for
the selection process. If many agents wished to go to
England enough to volunteer or at least respond
enthusiastically to a call to service, colonies could
anticipate little problem in finding a willing agent
once a mission had been decided upon. In the long run,
though, agents were more likely to become distracted by
their private interests in England. There is no evidence
of a colony rejecting a candidate on the grounds that he
had too many English interests. Indeed the contrary is
true: agents with a wide knowledge of, and involvement
in, English affairs were favoured by colonies, on the
grounds that they would use their experiences to the
profit of the colony. Only if an agent failed in the
long term to balance his personal and colonial
commitments would relations become tense.
The notably high number of agents that never
returned to the colonies suggests that England offered
much that was attractive to members of the first
colonial generation. Three of the Bay Colony's first
four agents- Peter, Weld and Winslow- stayed in England
permanently. Others, like Rhode Island agents Samuel
Gorton, Roger Williams and John Clarke showed no hurry
to return to America after their missions were
completed, and the same is true for the Bay's John
Leveret. If they were so determined to stay in England,
however, surely men like Edward Winslow would have
abandoned the colonies long before they did, without
waiting to be sent on a mission. Students of migration
use the concept of 'push' and 'pull' factors to explain
why individuals leave one place to go to another, and
such a framework can continue to apply to people after
they reach their destination. Unforeseen hazards may
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encourage thoughts of a return voyage, as might
favourable changes in the situation at home. Agents,
like many other colonists, had a range of reasons why
they might wish to leave New England either temporarily
or permanently, and individual examples help to
illustrate the ambivalence of even the most influential
of colonists about their new home.
First, the Reverend Hugh Peter. Peter's career
contains a number of examples of restlessness and lack
of concentration on his immediate task. Peter came to
New England originally in 1635 as an agent of the
Saybrook patentees, along with Sir Henry Vane, jr. and
the younger John Winthrop. He was quickly distracted,
however, and was soon devoting much of his efforts to
proposing solutions to the economic difficulties of
Massachusetts. To be fair, neither of his colleagues did
much to further the Saybrook project either, and Peter
may only have accepted the post because he was about to
be expelled from Rotterdam and hoped to secure a
ministry somewhere in New England.1 Before the decade was
out, however, Peter was thinking of moving again. He
tried to encourage economic cooperation with the Dutch
in New Netherland and also with the Caribbean colonies,
and his fe11ow-sett1ers believed he was actually
planning to emigrate to the latter.2
Other factors indicate that the Salem minister was
unhappy with his circumstances on the eve of his mission
to England. Peter's domestic life attracted some
controversy. His first wife was accused of not having
secured the approval of her old congregation in
Rotterdam for her removal to America- a serious charge
1 See Raymond Stearns, The Strenuous Puritan, (1954), 95.
2 Peter suggested that cotton from the West Indies could
be imported to offer winter employment in weaving for
the Massachusetts colonists. A few months before the
1641 mission, John Endecott was convinced that Peter was
going to move south. Peter to Winthrop, [1638], 4th MHS
Proceedings 7: 200-201; Endecott to Winthrop, ca.
February 1641, in Winthrop Papers, IV: 315.
114
when made against a minister's wife. Peter's second
marriage was even more controversial: two women claimed
to have received a proposal from him and the minister
himself came out of the affair considerably embarrassed.
On another level, Peter was unpopular with some of the
more separatist members of the Salem congregation, who
remembered with affection their erstwhile minister Roger
Williams. Such people had no sympathy for the new
preacher's failure to come to a firm decision over his
attitude to the Church of England.1
Peter probably saw the 1641 mission as the solution
to a generally deteriorating situation. He openly
considered going to England as early as 1639, and his
letters to John Winthrop in this period indicate that he
was trying desperately to find a way of extricating
himself from the looming scandal of his personal
affairs. Hindsight should not be allowed to impose any
inevitability on this process, and a return to England
may have been just one of many straws to be clutched.
Still, the way in which Peter expressed the idea is
unusual, and suggests that the agency was indeed the
fulfilment of an older hope. In 1639, Peter wrote of
postponing his marriage "'til we hear what England does,
supposing I may be called to some employment that will
not suit a married estate."2 There is not enough evidence
here to prove that Hugh Peter undertook the 1641 mission
to get away from his wife. When the opportunity arose,
however, he accepted the mission to England with no
hesitation, and it is clear that the idea of a return to
England coloured Peter's outlook throughout the final
1 Peter's biographers disagree about the Salem years.
Stearns paints an optimistic picture, arguing that apart
from the separatist challenge and the personal
difficulties, the Salem ministry 'went smoothly'. Such
qualifications are rather serious, though, and Pacy
argues in his biography that the string of controversies
which marked Peter's ministry may have made him glad to
leave in 1641. Stearns, Strenuous Puritan, 127-137;
Pacy, "Spiritual Combat", 87.
2 Quoted in Stearns, Strenuous Puritan, 136.
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years of strains and stresses in his Salem ministry.
Peter's restlessness and ambivalence about New
England did not become clearer as time went on. His
English career was a broadly ranging mixture of army
chaplaincy in England and Ireland, fund-raising for the
Parliamentary cause in Holland, and agitation for the
execution of Charles I and a further reformation of
church and state. Yet he had a fond regard for
individuals in New England and repeatedly claimed to be
planning a return to the colonies. Peter even welcomed
William Coddington to London in 1650, despite having
been one of the leading voices in the persecution of the
Hutchinson faction of which Coddington was a leading
member, and seems to have wanted to maintain all
possible contact with New England.1 Peter could have
lived on either side of the ocean, and he never seems to
have decided whether he made the right choice.
Peter's fellow agent Thomas Weld also remained in
England permanently, although in his case a more
specific cause may be identified. Weld had no reason to
leave Massachusetts of the sort experienced by his
colleague, but once in England the scandal over the
misappropriation of agency funds discouraged him from
returning to New England. Massachusetts tried to blame
Weld for the fact that funds raised for the education of
Indians went missing once they reached the colony. The
agent was fully vindicated by the English authorities
but could not easily forgive the colony's attempt to
make him a scapegoat. Significantly, however, Weld went
on to apply something of his American experience to his
later career in England, when he adopted strict
Massachusetts-style tests for piety in his Gateshead
congregation. Weld's confidence in the Bay government
may have been shaken by his agency, but his faith in the
1 Coddington recorded that his encounter with Peter was
very amicable, despite a rather tactless attempt at
humour when he called Peter 'Archbishop of Canterbury'.
See Coddington to John Winthrop, jr., 19 February 1652
in MHS Collections, 4th series 7 : 281.
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colony's church practices never wavered.1
Weld's successor in the Massachusetts agency,
Edward Winslow, offers an even more complex case.
Winslow had no clear reason for wanting to undertake his
mission, had little involvement in the conflicts which
led to it, and yet emerged as the most diligent of all
the Bay Colony's agents. His decision to undertake the
1646 mission was hailed half a century later as the
action of an American Hercules. According to Cotton
Mather, when the settlers were faced with the
Gortonists, Winslow "having been from his very early
days accustomed to the crossing of that sort of serpent,
generously undertook another agency."2
In fact, Winslow's acceptance of the mission owes
more to it being unexceptional to him rather than a
dramatic new undertaking. The struggle with the
Gortonists was just the latest problem facing the
colonial leadership in America, and Winslow's career
centred on such matters. Winslow kept in close contact
with events in England throughout his years in Plymouth.
In 1640, he informed John Winthrop of the death of Lord
Keeper Coventry and the dismissal of Secretary of State
Sir John Coke. The colonists, believed Winslow, had lost
1 The controversy over the funds raised by Weld and Peter
is described in Raymond Stearns, "The Weld-Peter Mission
to England." Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts 32 (1937): 188-247. Weld's later career,
in which he condemned Baptists and Quakers as roundly as
did the most vocal of his Massachusetts brethren is
discussed in Roger Howell, "Thomas Weld of Gateshead:
The Return of a New England Puritan." Archaeologia
Aeliana 4 ser 48 (1970): 303-331.
2 Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, (17 02) (repr.
1972),II: 209. Mather's work was designed to give
examples of model Puritan lives to remind his
contemporaries of how far they had fallen since the time
of the first generation, and has to be treated with
caution. Peter Gay analyses Mather's work and the
motives behind it in A Loss of Mastery: Puritan
Historians in Colonial America, (1966), 53-87.
117
their best friends at Court.1 He was just as well
informed of matters closer to home, and gave Governor
Winthrop a lengthy report about tensions with Dutch New
Netherland in 1644.2
It is not surprising therefore that Winslow should
be vocal on the subject of the Gortonists, but his
impassioned lobbying for a mission in 1646 makes it hard
to escape the conclusion that he did everything to
assist his selection short of openly demanding the job.
Quite why Winslow was so adamant about this issue is
unclear. He doubtless disliked and feared the activities
of Gorton, but so did many people who had a far more
immediate interest than a fifty-year-old settler from
Plymouth who had last crossed the Atlantic a dozen years
earlier. Furthermore, unlike Hugh Peter, Winslow had no
clear reason for wanting to leave New England. The
records of Plymouth Colony describe a man who had the
full confidence of his fellow settlers and was regularly
appointed to high office; indeed, Plymouth continued to
elect Winslow to a colony assistantship during his years
in England. Nowhere is there any hint that Winslow left
Plymouth under a cloud.
The enthusiasm with which Winslow conducted his
pamphlet campaign against the Gortonists and the
Remonstrants suggests that he considered himself to be
in his element, while his decision to accept a variety
of official duties from the Commonwealth government
confirms that Winslow found much that appealed to him in
mid-century England. Winslow was one of the most
conscientious members of the Committee for Compounding
in the early 1650s, and later accepted a commission with
1 The winter of 1639-40 saw a number of changes in the
government of Charles I, as he prepared for war with the
Scots. See C.V. Wedgwood, The King's Peace, (1974), 307-
12.
2 See Winslow to Winthrop, 6 April 1644, in Winthrop
Papers IV: 450-455.
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Cromwell's West Indies mission.1 Winslow saw himself as
part of an English world which spanned the Atlantic and
was equally at home in any part of it; his agency in
1646 was just another aspect of this outlook.
Winslow either did not intend to return permanently
to England, or preferred not to make his feeling public.
Plymouth colony, of course, missed Winslow's presence in
government, and president William Bradford appears to
have believed that the agent would only be away for a
short time. By 1650, Bradford was complaining that
Winslow had been
detained longer than was expected; and afterwards fell
into other employments there, so he has now been absent
this four years, which has been much to the weakening of
this government, without whose consent he took these
employments upon him.2
Many first generation agents found it hard to break
their renewed ties with England when their missions were
complete, however much time, effort and money they had
invested in New England. Rhode Island's John Clarke
stayed in England for twelve years, but was only active
as an agent from 1651-53, and again in 1661-63. The
intervening years were spent in obscurity in England, to
the extent that the colony had lost contact with Clarke
by the time of the Restoration. Despite being a major
land-owner in Newport and leader of a growing Baptist
congregation, Clarke found life in Cromwellian England
preferable to returning to Rhode Island: only with the
fresh upheaval of the Restoration did Clarke revive his
agency work and return to the colony with a new charter.
Other Rhode Islanders were in no hurry to return to
the colonies. Samuel Gorton remained in London until
1648, almost a year after he had secured a final
1 Winslow's name appears constantly in the attendance
lists of Compounding Committee minutes for 1650/51,
which are in PRO, SP23/8, 9, 10.
2 Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, 405.
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judgement in his favour from the Parliamentary
Commissioners. Likewise Roger Williams stayed in England
for almost two years after gaining the overthrow of
William Coddington's governorship of Aquidneck. Both men
could claim to be waiting to make sure their successes
were not reversed by the arrival of yet another agent
from Massachusetts or the Coddington faction, but the
timing is also revealing. Williams and Gorton were never
idle when in England; the former wrote a series of
theological tracts while the latter preached and
agitated as a radical sectarian. With the looming
prospect of further conflict in England in 1648, Gorton
decided to return to America, and Williams made the same
decision after Cromwell abolished the Rump Parliament in
1653.1
Agents like these were quite at home on either side
of the Atlantic. They had a contribution to make both to
the establishment of new model societies in America, and
also to the reformation of life in England. Just where
their priorities lay is hard to tell, except to the
extent that their priorities shifted with events in
England. In 1652, Roger Williams must have considered
his writings to be more important than his contribution
to the governance of Rhode Island- by the following year
this was no longer true. John Clarke was active in the
Baptist movement in England in the later 1650s, but
returned to Newport after the restoration of the monarch
and the Anglican church. Agents were, throughout this
period, intimately concerned with events in England and
in the colonies, and their missions were part of their
transatlantic outlook.
1 Phillip Gura argues that Gorton foresaw the collapse of
the Leveller movement and decided to leave England,
although his colonial concerns were probably just as
important. See Gura, "The Radical Ideology of Samuel
Gorton" WMQ (1979): 98.
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The compromise and accommodation which marked the
selection of agents meant that colonies were, in the
main, well served by willing representatives who had a
good knowledge of the workings of Atlantic government.
There were also some contradictions, however, which
could lead to tensions between colonies and agents in
the longer term. The qualities which make a good leader
and those which make someone a good representative are
not necessarily the same, of course. It was
inconceivable to the colonial authorities that
negotiations with England would be conducted by anyone
outside the established pool of trusted, orthodox
leaders, but the experience and high profile of such
agents also made them unwilling to be subservient to the
demands of colonial leaders in the face of unexpected
problems or conflicting loyalties.
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4
Differing Priorities: The Agents and Their Colonies
Some of the most profound problems faced by agents
stemmed from their continuing relationships with the
colonies they represented. So much so that by the end of
the seventeenth century, tensions between agents and
colonies had become the most clearly identifiable
characteristic of the agency as an institution. In one of
the first recorded generalisations about the history and
nature of the agency, Cotton Mather noted that of all the
agents of the seventeenth century, he did not know one
"who did not at his return, meet with some very forward
entertainment among his countrymen." Mather illustrated
his conclusion with the story of John Norton, who was
accused by his fellow colonists of having "laid the
foundation of ruin to all our liberties."1
Norton's troubles, of which more later, came at the
beginning of the 1660s, but almost all the first
generation agents experienced some tension in their
dealings with the colonial leadership. Much of this was
the result of uncertainty and insecurity on the part of
the colonies. Colonial leaders had to give agents certain
powers and authority in order that a mission might be
carried out at transatlantic distances. On the other
hand, the leadership insisted on exercising some control
over agents because they feared a loss of power and
authority to the English government if agents made rash
concessions. Differing degrees of licence were therefore
granted depending on the individual concerned and the
circumstances surrounding the mission. Unfortunately,
1 Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, (1702/ repr. 1972),
III: 38.
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several agents reached a different interpretation of
their powers from that favoured by their colonial
masters. If such differences in perception became marked,
the colonial leadership could come to believe that their
agent had, in a sense, gone native, thus adding to the
scope for misunderstandings.
Agents often felt aggrieved by their treatment at
the hands of their colonies, and never more so than in
the organisation of practical, logistical issues. Many
such problems must be characterised as teething troubles,
in that the agency as an institution was still very much
in its formative stages, but agents could rightly argue
that the authorities were slow to learn lessons. Agents
expected and deserved good communications with their
colonies, reliable mechanisms for funding missions, and
speedy settlement of outstanding bills at the end of a
mission: often, none of these was forthcoming. Those
agents who returned to the colonies were generally well-
regarded politically, and attained high office, but
disputes over mission finance often continued for years
afterward.
In large part, agents suffered because they did not
share the priorities of the colonial leadership. Colonies
were anxious to send agents when trouble arose and
devoted sufficient effort to the organisation of such
emergency action. They became steadily less eager to
support agents as missions progressed and any imminent
danger had passed. More often than not, contact would
become intermittent, financial support would cease to
have high priority, and agents would find themselves
almost forgotten. If the colonial leadership later
disapproved of the results of a mission, their tendency
to blame the agents concerned added further insult.
Colonies tried to overcome all these problems by
increasing the sophistication of their bureaucratic
measures. Using committees to gather finances, provide
agents with documentary evidence, and negotiate with
creditors put agency organisation on a much less
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haphazard footing. Such planning was intended to reduce
the likelihood of scandals, disputes and uncertainty over
an agent's role, and was undoubtedly designed more for
the benefit of the colony than the agent. Nonetheless, it
also reflects a wider formalisation of inter-colonial and
transatlantic relations, as the agency became a more
regular part of colonial administrative procedure.
Colonial leaders had to delegate some of their authority
to their agents if missions were to have any chance of
success. That it was impractical for all of a colony's
leadership to be involved in the minutiae of negotiations
at transatlantic distances was, after all, a fundamental
reason for sending agents in the first place. While this
principle was well established, however, its practical
application was more problematic. New England's elite was
never willing to give up any of its powers, and the
degree of discretion allowed to an agent was one of the
key points of uncertainty and contention in the formative
decades of the agency. Problems differed from colony to
colony, but the general pattern in the first generation
was one of increasing constraint on agents, following
disagreements in the colonies over the results of
earlier, relatively autonomous missions. While
disapproving members of colonial governments could often
do little about compromises and agreements reached in
London, they could try to restrict the powers of later
agents.
Much of the evidence for the doubts and concerns
felt by colonial leaders when passing some of their own
authority to agents is found in agents' commissions.
Several agents received formal commissions from their
colonies, with written statements of responsibilities and
powers. Such documents, especially when compared with
contemporary correspondence, reveal that missions were
organised with differing degrees of discussion, and with
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varying levels of agreement within the colony over how
much independence an agent was to be granted. There is
considerable variation in the form of agents' orders,
reflecting the fact that the institution of the agency
was being developed from scratch. In many cases only the
vaguest generalities were offered, and perhaps not even
in writing, while in others a list of clear objectives
was issued to the agent concerned.
The Rhode Island towns generally dispatched agents
in circumstances of some urgency against a background of
political crisis. Such conditions led to the hurried
commissioning of agents, who might receive only the most
superficial of orders. The situation in the Narragansett
region usually made it all too obvious why an agent was
going to England, and no formal commissions survive from
the first two missions by Roger Williams and the
Gortonists. This is not to say that such documents never
existed, of course, but the agents were all more or less
self-selected, and had sufficient authority in their own
communities to embark on their missions. In both cases
there was little or no organised government in the
Narragansett region at the time, and the early missions
were the result of settlers selecting one of their number
to go to England, rather than a colonial authority
choosing a representative.
Matters were a little more formal by the following
decade. In 1651, when the Aquidneck communities were
faced with violent clashes between supporters and
opponents of William Coddington, almost all the
inhabitants of the two towns gathered to sign a
commission for John Clarke, ordering him in general terms
"to do his utmost endeavours in soliciting our cause in
England". When Clarke was recommissioned a decade later,
though, the four main Rhode Island communities had
managed to form a working union, and the agent was sent a
more formal document which placed his status on a firmer
basis. The new commission stressed Roger Williams' 1644
patent as the basis of the colony's legitimacy, and
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ordered Clarke specifically to defend the rights and
privileges contained therein. Clarke was to be the
colony's "undoubted agent and attorney, to all intents
and purposes", but his brief was strictly limited to the
defence and preservation of the patent. The commission
states explicitly that no alteration to the patent terms
will be permitted by "any person or persons": it is
implicit that no changes to the patent were to be made on
the agent's initiative either.1
Clarke's second commission highlights another point
about such documents, in that it was aimed as much at the
English authorities as it was designed to give
instructions to the agent. Colonies knew that agents
would be asked to give evidence of their authority when
they petitioned English committees, and lost no
opportunity to include their message to England with
varying levels of subtlety. The main point Rhode Island
was making in Clarke's commission was that the
Narragansett towns were united as a responsible political
entity which "maintained government and order...by
administering judgement and justice" according to the
patent and in the name of Charles II.
Massachusetts, with its royal charter, believed that
it had less to prove than Rhode Island in terms of
colonial legitimacy, and was rarely so blatant in using
agents' commissions as propaganda. Nonetheless, the Bay
Colony kept one eye on likely English concerns when
drafting instructions and tried to anticipate in some
detail the problems which might arise when agents reached
London. Edward Winslow went to England armed with
detailed orders regarding the stance he was to take if
questioned on a range of issues.2 Winslow's commission
focused on the Gortonists, but went on to note that
1 Clarke's first commission is printed in Isaac Backus,
History of New England, (1777), vol 1, 274; his second
is in RI Rec I: 433-435.
2 The General Court's list of answers which Winslow was to
give in London is in Winthrop, Journal, II: 309-315.
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if any other complaints, in any kind, have been, or shall
be, made against us before the said commissioners, or
before the high court of parliament, you have hereby like
power and commission to answer on our behalf according to
your instructions.1
Although this clause makes Winslow's authority sound
wide-ranging, Massachusetts was specifically worried about
the threat from the Remonstrant faction whose members
were planning an appeal to England. However, the Bay
still hoped that the latter problem could be headed off
by taking firm action against the dissidents.
Imprisonments and large fines were employed in an attempt
to stop the petitioners taking their case to England, or
at least to give Winslow some time to spread his version
of events before they arrived. Aware that the agent's
instructions were likely to become public knowledge, the
colony refrained from mentioning the Remonstrants by name
in case the impression was given that Massachusetts was
losing control on a number of fronts.
From Winslow's mission onward, most Massachusetts
agents' instructions were restrictive rather than
enabling. Agents could certainly respond to new
situations, but only within the bounds of their more
general instructions. In 1655, John Leveret was issued
with a wide-ranging commission, allowing him to act in
"all matters of concernment" to Massachusetts, but he was
also given a separate list of specific instructions which
reveal that his authority was not as great as might be
supposed. The latter document shows that Leveret's job
was primarily to persuade the English authorities not to
listen to any new complaints until the Bay Colony could
send an answer of its own. Leveret was to hold up
proceedings until the colonial government had "knowledge
thereof and opportunity to answer for ourselves."
Massachusetts did anticipate one specific complaint from
the heirs or supporters of Sir Alexander Rigby, owner of
a patent for part of the territory which is now Maine.
1 Winthrop, Journal, II: 313.
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Rigby's son Edward had taken control of the company's
interests in 1652 and was expected to oppose any
northward expansion by Massachusetts following the
English navy's 1654 attack on French settlements in the
region. Even in this eventuality, though, Leveret was
just to "make the best answer" he could at the time and
seek further orders.1
Leveret's role in England was clearly subservient to
his employers, and he remained obedient to his orders.
After the Restoration, Leveret refused to respond to
criticism of Massachusetts, arguing that he had no
instructions relevant to the new situation. Leveret
repeatedly denied that he had any authority to act on his
colony's behalf and deal with the new royal officials,
but he was prepared to take some less formal actions.
Without asking Massachusetts, Leveret made initial
approaches to Viscount Saye and Sele and the Earl of
Manchester, entreating them to support the Bay Colony in
the uncertain times of the 1660s. Both men had been
interested in colonising projects for nearly four
decades, but had not always been on the best of terms
with Massachusetts. Leveret's gamble paid off, however,
and Boston revived contact with the peers shortly
afterward. Unwilling to push his luck, Leveret did no
more for the colony and returned to New England in 1662.2
Encouraged by the time which Leveret's stalling
bought them, the Bay authorities tried to enforce a
similar reticence on their next agents. Indeed, the
instructions issued to Simon Bradstreet and John Norton
reached new levels of constraint. On 24 January 1662, the
1 Leveret's commission is printed in Hazard, State Papers,
I: 607 ; also in Hutchinson Papers, I: 305 ; his
instructions are in Hazard, State Papers, I: 607-608. For
Edward Rigby's actions, see Rigby to Henry Jocelyn et.
al., 19 July 1652, in Kavenagh, Foundations of Colonial
America, I: 268-269.
2 For these contacts, see Leveret to Governor Endecott, 13
September 1660, in Charles E. Leverett, A Memoir,
Biographical and Genealogical, of Sir John Leverett,
Knt., Governor of Massachusetts 1673-9, (1856), 66.
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agents were issued with orders including the following
clauses:
You shall not engage us by any act of yours to anything
which may be prejudicial to our present standing,
according to patent. You shall give us speedy and
constant account of all your transactions and what else
may be of concernment to us.1
These instructions reflect the intense disagreement
over the mission within the ranks of the Massachusetts
hierarchy, and are the manifestation of Governor
Endecott's determination that the colony should not
concede any part of its chartered sovereignty to the
newly restored monarchy in England. Endecott and his
supporters recognised that they could not stop a mission
which had considerable backing in the colony, but they
used the formal documents issued to the agents to make
clear their intention to place the blame for any
unwelcome attention from England firmly at the door of
Bradstreet and Norton.
The restrictiveness of agents' commissions reflects
the fact that most agents were sent to solve a particular
problem and then return to the colonies. That agents were
often forced to move outside the bounds of their
commissions is not a measure of their failure, but rather
an acknowledgement of the realities of transatlantic
institutions. Massachusetts in particular failed to grasp
this point, however, and believed that the key to
successful missions was to restrict an agent's authority
so much that any new issue had to be referred back across
the Atlantic, however time-consuming that might be. The
Rhode Island communities, on the other hand, could ill
afford to be complacent, but they too were uneasy when
agents acted without specific instructions even in the
most extreme emergencies. The next section considers the
consequences of such independent action.
1 Hutchinson Papers, II: 76.
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In many instances, therefore, colonies attempted to set
limits on their agents' authority from the outset of each
mission. For such a strategy to work, colonies would have
needed a much closer knowledge of English affairs than
they in fact possessed. Tensions between agents and
colonies could easily emerge when agents, having assessed
the situation in England, decided that their missions
were unlikely to be successful unless some changes were
made to the objectives envisaged by the colonial
leadership. Clearly, such tactical decisions undermined
the strategic authority of the colonial leadership.
With hindsight, it is clear that colonies were more
often helped than harmed when an agent decided to act on
his own initiative. Even at the time, agents operating on
the front line in London had little doubt about this. It
is also possible to see the matter from the viewpoint of
the colonies, though, and while many of their fears
seemed even then to be paranoid, they cannot be written
off out of hand. Young communities which had built up
their authority gradually in the eyes of their own
settlers and their neighbours had no wish to see their
achievement overturned by the rash actions of an agent
acting without their knowledge on the other side of the
ocean.
The best example of the divergence of opinion
between colony and agent is the Clarke-Williams mission
of 1651-53. The two agents, dispatched by different parts
of the fragmented Rhode Island confederation, decided to
pool resources once they reached England. The towns they
represented were left unsure of what their agents were
doing, and doubly suspicious of each other as a result.
Worse still, the apparent usurpation of authority by the
two agents seemed worryingly reminiscent of the recent
attempt by William Coddington to seize control of
Aquidneck against the wishes of the settlers. If
Coddington could persuade the English authorities to
grant him personal control over half the colony, it was
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easy for the more paranoid settlers to picture similar
behaviour by Williams and Clarke.
At the outset, Clarke's mission had seemed
straightforward. He was commissioned in 1651 by Newport
and Portsmouth and his orders were signed by almost all
the male inhabitants of the towns: 41 men signed from
Portsmouth and 65 from Newport. The eighteenth-century
commentator Isaac Backus believed that the male
population of Aquidneck was 105 at the time, and the next
official record, from 1655, lists a total of 147.
Extrapolation is inevitably inexact, but support for
Clarke's mission must have been virtually unanimous.
There is also no doubt about the nature of the mission,
in that it was designed to overthrow William Coddington's
Governorship.1
The source of most of the later trouble was
Williams' mission, which was less well defined. From the
very beginning, the agent and his fellow colonists held
different opinions as to the exact purpose of the journey
to England. Williams told John Winthrop, jr. in October
1651 that he was being sent by Providence and Shawomet to
"endeavour the renewing of their liberties upon the
occasion of Mr. Coddington's late grant." Williams wanted
to overthrow Coddington's commission because it split the
colony which he, Williams, had tried to unite on the
basis of the 1644 patent.2
Providence and Shawomet, on the other hand, could
agree neither on the aims of the mission nor on Williams'
authority as agent. In July 1652, as if accepting the
agents' decision to work in unison, Shawomet suggested
that an agreement might be reached with Aquidneck to
allow the agents to sue for a unifying patent.3 Three
months later, a meeting of Shawomet and Providence told
1 See RIHS, Backus Papers, II: 25; RI Rec I: 299-302.
2 Williams to Winthrop, 6 October 1651, in LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 351.
3 Shawomet to Providence, 29 July 1652, in Providence Rec
XV: 56.
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Williams that he could have himself declared governor of
the colony under a restored patent if he thought this
would facilitate the negotiations with the English
government. This governorship, lasting for a year, might
bring much-needed stability to the colony.1
This last suggestion rekindled the suspicions of
some colonists. Shortly afterward, another gathering of
mainland settlers condemned the initiative, arguing that
the imposition of a governor- even one as well-respected
as Williams- was a threat to the liberties of the colony.2
Williams was then told that he had been sent to England
"for the renewing of the grand charter unto us without
any desire to evade or oppose Mr Coddington's Commission
for governing" Aquidneck.3 The 'grand charter' was the
1644 patent, but how the mainland towns intended to renew
it without first having Coddington's grant revoked is
unclear.
Such inconsistencies reinforced Williams'
determination to return to first principles and restore
the English authority contained in the 1644 patent,
regardless of what his fellow colonists believed. He was
convinced of the need for some symbol of unity to bring
the factions together, and embarked on his mission with
the clear aim of reviving a single government in Rhode
Island. Such a strategy was entirely in character.
Williams had acquired the 1644 patent without fully
consulting the island towns as to whether they wanted
unity with the mainland, and had urged that Shawomet be
included in the 1647 unification despite that town's
absence from the patent terms. Williams' activities in
1652 indicate that he was also willing to ignore the
wishes of the mainland if it would help get a new
unification document. All the Rhode Island towns came
1 General Assembly of Providence Plantations to Williams,
28 October 1652, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 372.
2 RI Rec I: 256.
3 Providence and Warwick to Williams, 22 March 1653, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 381.
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round to the idea of unification as the 1650s progressed,
but as will be seen, resentment over the activities of
Williams and Clarke resurfaced later when fresh finances
for Clarke's agency were being gathered in the 1660s.
Having strong-minded, independent agents could
therefore have repercussions far beyond the immediate
concerns of a mission. In general, agents who followed
their own initiative posed much less of a danger than
their colonies feared, and could be more successful than
when they followed orders to the letter. In joining
forces to represent all four Rhode Island towns, Williams
and Clarke took the only sensible approach open to them,
and the colony benefited in the long term. Equally, John
Leveret's unauthorised contacts with individual English
leaders helped pave the way for the mission which
followed, and the tight constraints on Bradstreet and
Norton served only to encourage suspicion in England
about the Massachusetts leadership. Nonetheless, the
balance between empowerment and restriction was never
fully worked out by the first generation, in large part
because early colonial leaders were never so confident of
their own authority as to be comfortable when delegating
part of it to an agent.
Differences in opinion like those between Williams and
his fellow colonists were not helped by the practical
problems surrounding agency work. Agents often felt
shabbily treated by their colonies in terms of the
logistical and financial support offered during missions.
Problems arose from the haphazard nature of agency
organisation in the early years, and particularly the
haste with which some missions were arranged. Colonial
authorities often paid much attention to the details of
each agency at the outset of a mission, but even then the
priority was to see the mission dispatched rather than to
ensure the well-being of the agent.
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Practical problems arose in a number of ways. Most
immediate was the initial passage to England. Colonies
worked on the assumption that crossing the Atlantic was a
routine process, and that once money had been provided to
secure transit on a suitable ship, the agent could often
be left to his own devices. Agents were often sent ill-
equipped in dangerous sailing conditions, because their
colonies had come to hasty decisions. Maintaining
communication between agent and colony posed some
difficulties as the mission progressed, but this often
had more to do with inefficiency in the colonies than
physical barriers to correspondence. Perhaps most serious
was the tendency for financial matters to become
difficult, with more than one agent complaining that his
mission was compromised through lack of funds.
The first logistical task facing agents and their
colonies was the organisation of a transatlantic passage.
Generally, this had to be achieved within the constraints
of commercial shipping, and the rapid dispatch of an
agent depended on a convenient ship being available.
Sailing patterns in the Atlantic were largely seasonal in
the mid-seventeenth century, and indeed for a
considerable time beyond. This model was dictated in part
by a wish to avoid sailing in the North Atlantic during
the winter, but it also stemmed from the trading
commodities which were the staple business of merchant
ships. Vessels seeking fish off Newfoundland, for
example, would leave England in the first four months of
the year, returning in the late summer. Those trading in
New England agricultural produce would arrive in the
colonies in spring laden with manufactured goods, then
wait for the autumn harvest, thus completing one of many
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different Atlantic trading circles.1
Clearly, the dispatch of an agent could be delayed
if the decision to send him was taken at a time when
shipping was unavailable. The first Massachusetts mission
is a good example. The agents left Boston in early August
1641, and it was almost two months before they reached
England. Leaving as they did before the harvest, they
could not secure a direct passage and had to go via
Newfoundland. They suffered another delay of three weeks
there before making an unpleasant but relatively short
three week journey to Bristol in a fishing trader.2
As well as trying to predict the seasonal cycles of
trading voyages, New Englanders expected to face severe
sea and weather conditions if they travelled during the
winter months. Early in 1647, Thomas Peter wrote to the
elder Winthrop of his journey from Massachusetts to
Spain: his ship sailed on 19 December and endured a "full
month of sad storms, such as seldom any seamen met with",
arriving in Spain bereft of its mainsail and having lost
all contact with its convoy companions.3 As has been
mentioned, New Haven agent Thomas Gregson was killed when
his ship foundered on the eastward voyage early in 1645.
John Winthrop, jr. was explicit about the threat prior to
his 1661 mission, when he wrote that planning for the
voyage had been postponed because no one could sail in
1 Ian K. Steele examines the seasonal pattern of Atlantic
shipping in the seventy years after 1675, arguing that
while much variation from seasonal patterns exists, it is
still true that most ships reached England in the
summer/autumn and left in the spring. Steele, The English
Atlantic 1675-1740, (1986), 9-10. The Newfoundland
fishing fleets are examined in Gillian T. Cell, English
Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660, (1969).
2 Accounts of the journey are offered by Stearns, The
Strenuous Puritan, 153; and Black, The Younger John
Winthrop, 112. The three week journey from Newfoundland
was about a week shorter than the average crossing time.
See Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland, 5.
3 Peter was the brother of Massachusetts agent Hugh Peter.




In spite of these reservations, a curiously high
proportion of agents travelled in winter. Of nine
separate eastward voyages made by agents between 1641 and
1662, six began between late November and mid-February.
Massachusetts agreed on its second mission at a General
Court meeting held in November 1646, and agent Edward
Winslow sailed for England in mid-December. The colony
was in some hurry to send an agent following the arrival
of Gortonist Randall Holden in Boston in September, and
no record survives of any apprehension about sailing at
that time of year.2 Massachusetts later sent John Leveret
to England in December 1655 and dispatched Bradstreet and
Norton as their next pair of agents in February 1662.
Rhode Island's John Clarke and Roger Williams left the
colony in November 1651. William Vassall, representing
the Massachusetts Remonstrants, sailed early in 1647.3 In
four of these cases, communities were in some hurry to
send an agent to England, but neither Leveret nor Gregson
1 Winthrop to Fitz-John Winthrop, 25 October 1660; in MHS
Proceedings, 5th series 8: 72.
2 Did Holden deliberately delay his arrival in Boston
until autumn in the hope that Massachusetts would not be
able to send an agent until the following spring? There
is no decisive evidence either way. Holden carried orders
from England dated 15 May 1646, so should have been able
to sail earlier; equally, the Gortonists were aware that
any delay might allow Massachusetts to occupy Shawomet
permanently. Winslow's letter to be carried to the
English authorities was dated 10 December 1646, and
Winthrop records that the agent left "about the middle of
December." See Winthrop, Journal, II: 313-4, 334.
3 In his account of the mission Vassall noted that during
the winter, "all passages from N. England are
tempestuous." Vassall had to argue thus, however, in an
effort to show that the severe storms which threatened
his ship were normal and not a providential sign of
displeasure at the Remonstrants' activities. See John
Child, New-Englands Jonas, (1647), 115.
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was under any particular pressure.1
Colonies clearly did not consider winter crossings
of the Atlantic to be sufficiently hazardous to postpone
the dispatch of agents, although they did find the
perceived danger a useful excuse with which to hide
disagreements over missions. In the midst of the furore
over the initial choice of Hugh Peter as agent in
February 1641, John Winthrop noted that the ship on which
the agents would have travelled was soon to depart and
that the mission was abandoned "for that season."2 There
is little doubt, however, that had the Salem church
immediately acquiesced to Peter's selection and not
spread dissent throughout the colony, the first Bay
Colony mission would, like the others, have been
dispatched in winter.
Colonial agents, therefore, were not curtailed by
the largely seasonal nature of Atlantic shipping in this
period. If a colony wanted to dispatch an agent to
England, he would be sent by any available ship. The high
proportion of winter sailings indicates that some ships
were available at that time of year, and that any risk to
agents and their documents was considered- at least by
the colonies- to be acceptable.
If agents were able to overcome the perceived
dangers of the North Atlantic in winter, the
communications links between them and their colonies were
still prone to numerous potential hazards on land and sea
alike. Communication was of course a two-way process, and
regular contact should have been desirable to agents and
colonies alike. Colonies could maintain close control
over the activities of their agents, while agents could
insist on moral and financial support as well as guidance
1 Leveret's voyage is unusual in that he did not have to
rely on commercial transport like the other agents.
Instead, he sailed to England aboard a French frigate,
captured during raids on New France. The fact that his
mission was in that respect voluntary underlines even
more strongly the lack of fear of winter sailings.
2 Winthrop, Journal, II: 26.
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on dealing with new problems.
Much of the question of continuing contact between
agents and colonies revolves around the routine
efficiency of transatlantic traffic. A range of obstacles
stood in the way of effective communication, potentially
hampering missions. Correspondence could arrive in
England or the colonies illegible because of water
damage, or several weeks or months late because of
diversions caused by a range of natural and man-made
obstacles. When the younger John Winthrop was in Europe
in 1642, some of his belongings were seized by pirates.
Winthrop's return to New England took more than 14 weeks
thanks to bureaucratic incompetence in England and
unfortunate weather in the summer of 1643.1 Even when they
reached land, travellers and letters were not necessarily
safe. In the harsh Massachusetts winter of 1641-2, a man
carrying all the letters which had recently arrived on a
ship from England had a narrow escape from drowning when
he fell through the ice covering a river.2
A lengthy list of such incidents may be culled from
the records, but their statistical significance should
not be exaggerated. Much evidence points to regular
transatlantic communication being possible in this
period, especially if correspondents were willing to take
some basic precautions.3 In terms of its most obvious
single indicator, crossing the Atlantic was actually
quite safe: relatively few ships were sunk. One historian
1 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 114; Petition of John
Winthrop, jr., to Parliament, ca.1644, in Winthrop Papers
IV: 424.
2 The elder Winthrop characteristically believed that the
man's escape stemmed from God's desire to protect the
precious correspondence rather than any goodness inherent
in the traveller himself. Winthrop, Journal II: 55.
3 David Cressy examines the various obstacles faced by
correspondents before concluding that determined letter
writers usually managed to conduct their business
successfully, albeit after considerable time and expense
in some cases. See Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and
Communication Between England and New England in the
Seventeenth Century, (1987), chapter 9.
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has concluded that only one of nearly two hundred ships
transporting New England immigrants in the 1630s was lost
at sea.1 While the agents studied here cannot be used as a
valid statistical sample, their experience is nonetheless
important. The individuals concerned made a total of
twenty-six separate Atlantic crossings between 1641 and
1663, and the unfortunate Thomas Gregson was the only one
who experienced a ship-wreck.2
Moreover, careful correspondents could take measures
to improve the odds of their letters arriving. Duplicated
letters were sent by different routes, or entrusted to
friends and colleagues who happened to be travelling. The
latter option was of course no defence against natural
disasters, but it did help to ensure accurate and speedy
delivery when humanly possible and was favoured by agents
who wished to send official documents back to the
colonies. Roger Williams sent the 1652 revocation of
William Coddington's commission back to Rhode Island with
Newport settler William Dyer; a decade later, John
Winthrop entrusted Connecticut settler and merchant John
Richards with the newly acquired Connecticut charter.3
John Winthrop's agency also demonstrates the extent
to which transatlantic communication was possible. A
1 Cressy concedes that this figure does not apply to
shipping in general, in part because the most dangerous
aspect of the round trip was often the eastward approach
to the English Channel. See Cressy, Coming Over, 148.
2 The figures given include journeys made by individuals
before their missions (Leveret in 1645/6 and 1647/8,
Winthrop in 1641/3), but in cases where more than one
agent travelled on the same ship, only one 'crossing' is
counted. For example, the first Massachusetts mission
accounts for three crossings; Weld, Peter, Hibbins and
Winthrop shared a common eastward journey in 1641,
Hibbins and Winthrop returned separately and the others
never left England again.
3 Williams' action, while helping to ensure the safe
transport of the papers, unfortunately further fuelled
the suspicions of the mainland communities that the
island was being granted special status. See Providence
and Warwick [Shawomet] to Williams, 22 March 1653, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 380-1. For Richards' work,
see Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 229.
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simple count of the surviving letters in Winthrop's
papers dated during his mission (August 1661 to April
1663) gives a total of thirty-eight letters sent to the
agent from New England: almost two per month. Not all, to
be sure, directly concerned the mission, but the
maintenance of family correspondence alongside business
matters reinforces the point that regular communication
was possible on a large scale in this period, provided
correspondents had the requisite motivation and
persistence.1
This last point is crucial: communications needed
human effort as well as technical capabilities, and most
agents fared less well than Winthrop. Rhode Island's two
mainland towns, distracted by the political upheavals
over William Coddington's actions, failed to answer any
of the letters which were diligently sent to them by
Roger Williams during the first year of his 1651 mission.
One of Williams' supporters in the colony complained to
its leaders that the agent had received no encouragement
or support.2 Later, Rhode Island occasionally ordered
letters to be written to John Clarke during the 1650s,
but contact was generally sporadic and often initiated by
the agent, not the colony.3
Indeed, there is little evidence of either Rhode
Island or Massachusetts frequently sending letters to
agents. Once the initial excitement of a mission had
waned, colonials tended to forget about their
1 The figures come from a study of the chronologically
arranged microfilm edition of the Winthrop Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society, (1976).
2 John Throckmorton of Providence to Warwick [Shawomet],
28 July 1652, in RIHS, Rhode Island Historical
Manuscripts, X: 133.
3 Clarke sent gunpowder to Rhode Island in 1656, and the
colony asked the agent to find out more about England's
attitude toward the Dutch in New Netherland that same
year. Apart from a revival of interest in English affairs
after the death of Oliver Cromwell, Rhode Island and
Clarke largely lost touch during much of the decade. For
letters, see RI Rec I: 328, 346, 414.
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representatives across the Atlantic. In most cases the
failure of the colonial authorities to provide long term
support was due to a lack of resolve and commitment
rather than insurmountable technical hurdles. In terms of
their political duties, some agents actually preferred
this independence, but they deeply resented the
accompanying failure to provide more practical logistical
support.
However familiar with England the agents were, and
however sympathetic their hosts, they could not
effectively perform their duties in London without the
financial means to support themselves and pay the bills
of those who helped them. Not only did money become the
single most serious cause of tension between agents and
colonies, but the lack of supply to agents actually
imperiled some missions. Colonies were slow to realise
that agents who were forced to raise money by working or
borrowing were almost certain to be less effective than
agents who had secure finances and sufficient resources
to entertain influential figures and circulate persuasive
propaganda.
Agency funding, like transport and communications,
had to operate within the confines of the Atlantic trade
and commercial networks.1 Colonial fiscal systems were at
varying levels of development in this period, but all had
difficulty raising money quickly. Broadly, colonies had
three ways to raise agency funds, only one of which was
applicable to the initial financing of shipping costs.
Somehow, colonial authorities had to raise money from the
settlers and pay a ship's master in cash or arrange for
him to carry a cargo to England for sale. Other methods
1 The most comprehensive recent study of the Atlantic
economy and the place of the American colonies in it is
John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of
British America,- 1607-1789, (1985).
141
of revenue raising were only viable in the longer term;
credits could be negotiated with English merchants
dealing in New England produce, or contributions toward
the colonial enterprise could be solicited from England.
Colonial governments raised money from their
settlers in a number of ways, but they faced some
considerable difficulties in the process. Some problems
were caused by the inherent inefficiencies of
seventeenth-century financial arrangements. There was, for
example, no single currency in early New England and
colonists used a variety of exchange media in the conduct
of their financial affairs. Many everyday transactions
involved barter. Merchants accepted agricultural produce
in exchange for manufactured goods, and then sold the
farm goods to inhabitants of the growing urban areas of
New England, or exported them.1
The use of barter offered several advantages in
comparison with the rudimentary currency systems of the
seventeenth century. In the first place, formal coinage
was scarce in the early decades of New England
settlement. Despite the liquidation of significant assets
by the emigrating English, most sterling currency
remained in England to pay for transport or as credit for
future orders with English merchants. The English
currency which did reach New England generally made the
return journey shortly afterward to pay for the
importation of manufactured goods, which were scarce in
the colonies. Alternative forms of hard currency included
some Spanish and Portuguese coins, which reached New
England from the Caribbean, and the Bay Colony minted
1 Newport merchant Peleg Sanford accepted pork, beef and
dairy products in exchange for English hardware and
haberdashery: he then shipped the agricultural goods for
sale in the Caribbean. See Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in
the Wilderness, (1938), 40; an example of a similar
operation in Salem, Massachusetts is in Essex Institute,
Curwin Account Book I, f65.
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coins of its own from 1652.1 Much of this coinage suffered
from the activities of fraudsters, who clipped metal from
the edges of coins or manufactured counterfeit versions.
In such circumstances, merchants and others were often
unwilling to accept coinage at face value even when it
was available, and barter provided a safer alternative.
When Roger Williams was offered payment for his first
mission, he specifically asked to be given a herd of
goats in lieu of any currency remuneration.2
A rather more formalised version of the barter
system was the development of fixed-price commodities,
the values of which were regulated by the colonial
authorities. Here, instead of haggling over the relative
values of goods for barter, colonials could settle debts
and pay taxes using officially registered items; Indian
wampum was legal tender in Massachusetts from 1643-1661,
and the value of corn was set in several colonies to
enable its use as an exchange medium.3 Southern and
Caribbean colonies adopted similar policies toward their
leading commodities, tobacco and sugar. Analogous to the
problem of debased coinage, there was of course the
question of how to assess the quality of the commodity
being used in any given transaction. Such difficulties
were particularly common in the official manifestations
of this mode of exchange, with colonial officials being
offered low quality goods as payment of taxes.4
When colonies attempted to gather taxes, they had to
allow for the variety of exchange media. Sometimes,
different rates were set for those paying in different
1 Keith Scott, Counterfeiting in Colonial America, (1957),
14 .
2 John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and
America, (1978), 8; see Williams to Providence, 22
January 1651, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 330.
3 Arthur Nussbaum, History of the Dollar, (1957), 6-7; RI
Rec I: 118. Corn was fixed in Massachusetts to ease the
problems of debt collection in the economic recession of
the early 1640s. See Winthrop, Journal II: 31.
4 McCusker, Money and Exchange, 118.
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forms of 'currency'. In 1662, for example, Rhode Island
set out an elaborate table of values when ordering a tax
for agent John Clarke. Beef, pork, peas or wheat were
acceptable according to their fixed values, and payment
in coin was also welcomed. Colonists could pay forty
shillings worth of agricultural goods, thirty shillings
in New England coinage or- best of all from the colony's
viewpoint- twenty-two shillings and sixpence in English
coin.1
The New England colonies developed their fiscal
systems at different rates, and the Bay Colony was in
general the most advanced in the mid-seventeenth century.
Taxation was an established part of life in Massachusetts
from the early years of the colony onwards. The Bay
Company moved to New England with a governmental
structure already established and officers- including a
Treasurer- in place. This is not to say that the new
colony was financially secure from the outset, but it did
at least establish early precedents for the sort of
specifically allocated taxes which later became the norm
for agency funding. On 28 September 1630, the
Massachusetts General Court ordered the collection of £50
for the maintenance of Captains Patrick and Underhill,
with the money to come, in differing amounts, from nine
communities. Such taxes, levied on the colony as a whole
with clear percentages to come from each town, continued
to be used for capital projects in Massachusetts, such as
the construction of defensive palisades.2 It also became
the standard means of raising taxes for agents throughout
New England.3
In the Rhode Island towns, fiscal matters were
1 Raising money for Clarke occupied most of the agenda at
the meeting of Rhode Island's Court of Commissioners on
17 June 1662. See RI Rec I: 480-483.
2 Mass Rec I: 77, 93.
3 Examples of this method of funding from Edward Winslow's
mission and that of John Clarke respectively are in Mass
Rec III: 118-9; RI Rec I: 422, 480.
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rather less organised than in Massachusetts. Perhaps the
most fundamental difference was that individual Rhode
Island towns operated their own taxation before any
colony-wide institutions were established. Many Rhode
Islanders had some moveable wealth, and also property in
the Bay Colony which they were able to sell. This is
particularly true of the group which settled Aquidneck in
the aftermath of the Antinomian dispute.1 With the
founding of towns around the Narragansett Bay, the new
settlers contributed to the town treasury in relation to
the amount of land they owned; Providence and Portsmouth
both set the level of payment soon after the first
arrivals in the region, and appointed treasurers to hold
the resultant income for the good of the community.2
Local taxation continued to be the norm in Rhode
Island until the colony's central authority became
stronger after the arrival of the 1663 charter. Only in
extreme cases during earlier years did the colonists
attempt to levy taxes over all four towns simultaneously.
Fittingly, the first ever colony-wide tax in Rhode Island
was intended to pay £100 to their first agent, Roger
Williams. The tax was announced by the fledgling union of
the towns on 19 May 1647, when the colony voted to
compensate Williams for his "so great travail, charges
and good endeavours." It is indicative of the insecurity
of the Narragansett communities that their first
cooperative fiscal action was to pay an agent for his
efforts in securing some legal identity for them.3
Despite their willingness to organise systems of
taxation, all the New England colonies were still forced
to rely on informal, voluntary systems when faced with
urgent demands on their treasuries. Since most agency
missions were organised in a hurry, initial funding was
1 William Coddington's sale of £1300 worth of property in
Massachusetts is the most striking example.
2 RI Rec I: 15 (Providence, 3 Dec. 1636), 56 (Portsmouth,
27 June 1638) .
3 See RI Rec I: 152.
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often supplied by leading colonists offering loans and
advances on taxes. The Rhode Island towns in particular
recognised that mechanisms for the collection of taxes
could be shaky when pressed too far, and preferred to use
coercion as a last resort after first trying to appeal to
their inhabitants' generosity. In 1661 and again the
following year, the Rhode Island General Court called for
contributions toward securing a new charter from the
restored monarchy. After only £40 of the £200 requested
had been raised, the colony reluctantly resorted to a
tax, with penalties for non-payers.1 Even in well-
organised Massachusetts, though, loans were requested in
times of great anxiety: the colony had to promise to
repay the donors of £100 raised to dispatch Edward
Winslow in 1646.2
While colonies were generally able to overcome
fiscal problems sufficiently to dispatch a mission,
agents were under no illusions that such efforts would be
maintained for long. Roger Williams' second mission, in
1651, is a good example. The people of Providence and
Shawomet were worried enough by the activities of both
William Coddington and Massachusetts to raise
considerable sums voluntarily to meet the initial costs
of sending Williams to England. William Arnold, who led
the Massachusetts-oriented faction in Providence, noted
that £100 had been raised with alarming speed on the
mainland, and that some individuals in Shawomet had been
giving £10-20 each, such was their concern for the
situation.3 In the longer term, however, this led to a
reluctance to pay any further taxes to support the agent.
Williams must have anticipated this, because shortly
before leaving for England he sold his trading post at
Cocumscussoc on the Narragansett Bay to Richard Smith,
1 RI Rec I: 480.
2 Winthrop, Journal, II: 309.
3 See Arnold to Massachusetts, 5 September 1651, in
Hutchinson Papers, I: 267-8.
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ensuring that his family would at least be provided for
in his absence.1 This was a wise precaution; in June 1652,
the Providence town accounts include only £18 paid to
Williams- just under half the town's share of his
maintenance, with a further £5 paid to his wife.2
Williams experiences were by no means unique, and
they reflect the difficulties involved in maintaining
financial support once an agent was an ocean away from
his colony. Raising money to pay for an initial sea
passage was possible within the bounds of the colonies'
own 'domestic' economy, but the ongoing financing of
missions over long periods of time had to fit the wider
context of transatlantic trade. Systems for transferring
funds across the ocean were already in place by the mid-
seventeenth century, and colonies which were determined
to arrange for the support of their agents had a range of
methods available to them. The transatlantic merchant
community was already operating successfully at this time
and colonial authorities made frequent use of their
contacts and resources.
New Englanders conducted most of their trade with
England. This relationship, despite later criticism of
the Navigation Acts and other mercantile laws, was not
forced on unwilling colonial merchants. New England
merchants in the seventeenth century and beyond traded
with the mother country in large part because the habit
of trading with friends and family in England made
transatlantic commerce less risky than it would otherwise
have been. This was, of course, equally true for English
creditors, who were more willing to ship goods to
colonial kinsmen, or to members of their local trading
1 See Williams to John Winthrop, jr., in LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 351. Williams' poverty may in part have
been due to his reported habit of giving money away to
the needy. See Brunkow, "Office Holding in Providence RI
1646-1686: A Quantitative Analysis." WMQ 37 (1980):
246 (n) .
2 Providence Rec, XV: 63.
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circles who had emigrated.1
Even when New Englanders looked beyond the home
country for trading opportunities, there was very often
an English component in such diversification. Trade could
in many cases still be conducted with personal
acquaintances, and this is testimony to the wide-ranging
activities of English merchants. The Canaries and Spain
provided a market for fish, cereals and timber, whilst
offering wine and sugar in return. As the 1650s
progressed, a similar trade developed between New England
and the Caribbean, and the links between London merchants
and both these regions meant that New Englanders could
send produce to the island colonies for bills of exchange
drawn in England, enabling a triangular shipping pattern
to emerge.2 It was from this trading network that the
means of financing colonial agents had to be found.
Just as the regular patterns of trade had some
effect on the transport of agents themselves, seasonal
factors could also pose problems for the sudden financial
requirements of an agency. Most major traders followed
the pattern of shipping textiles and
manufactures to the colony in the summer, and waiting
until the harvest could be brought in to provide a cargo
for the eastward voyage in the autumn. After a quarter-
century in America, leading Massachusetts settlers still
noted with some unease that most clothing had to be
imported from England in this fashion.3 Such a timetable
1 The kin-based trading systems of the English Atlantic
are considered in Bernard Bailyn, The New England
Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, (1955), 35-6.
2 Bailyn, New England Merchants, 85.
3 Massachusetts merchant and mint-master John Hull noted
in 1656 the departure of ships carrying "the sum of the
returns of the country this year unto England, as is
usual every year, we yet having our clothing (most of it)
from thence." See Hull, "The Diaries of John Hull:
Mintmaster and Treasurer of the Colony of Massachusetts
Bay." Archaeologia Americana: Transactions and
Collections of the American Antiquarian Society 3 (1857):
179.
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meant that there could be some urgency in the
arrangements, because heavily laden merchant ships needed
to sail before their cargoes began to deteriorate. A
delay in bringing in the harvest for shipment could mean
a breakdown in the network of transatlantic credits,
which in turn reduced agents' ability to request loans
from merchants in London on the promise of repayment from
the colony purse. Thus in 1662, the Connecticut
government ordered a general commandeering of boats,
carts and people in a hurried effort to ensure that the
cereal harvest reached New London on time; the drive
succeeded, and John Winthrop's mission was greatly
assisted.1
The Rhode Island towns also had to deal with the
problem of having to wait for the harvest in the summer
of 1662, when they attempted to raise money for John
Clarke's continued quest for a new charter. The colony's
cereal farmers were told that they must either contribute
in cash or send horses to Barbados to raise money. Those
who were ready to slaughter animals at that time could
pay the tax in pork or beef.2 Despite this effort, Rhode
Island could not match the centralised efficiency of the
Connecticut government, having to rely on individual
towns to collect goods, rather than arrange a single,
rapid collection on a colony-wide basis.
Clarke himself was highly critical of the colony's
limited attempts to support him. "I have very much
marveled", he wrote to Rhode Island, "how you could
satisfy yourselves all this time without sending me
suitable supply whereby I might manage that business with
good success to which you engaged me." Considering the
magnitude of the threat to the colony, Clarke argued, the
authorities had to an amazing degree failed to take the
1 Conn Rec I: 385-6, 392, 400.
2 RI Rec I: 482
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necessary action.1 The previous decade, Roger Williams had
levelled similar complaints at his employers in Rhode
Island. Williams complained that he had been sent to
perform tasks "of a costly and high nature for so many
days and weeks and months together, and there left to
starve or steal, or beg or borrow."2
While Rhode Island tried to muddle on with its
established practices, Massachusetts developed some
innovative ideas for funding agents as early as 1650.
Rhode Island's attempts to support agents could easily
degenerate into factional squabbling with the result that
agents were forgotten: in Massachusetts, more mature
political and fiscal structures sought alternative means
of funding agents rather than ignoring them altogether.
Massachusetts came up with a variety of potential
solutions to the long-term funding problem, all of which
involved persuading someone else to foot at least part of
the bill. The colony had always been keen to gather
contributions from sympathisers in England for a variety
of purposes including education and Indian conversion. It
was a small step from that to using such donations for
agency funding. In addition, the Bay was the largest
member of the Confederation of the United Colonies, and
hoped to make the agency a cooperative enterprise,
involving contributions from the other New England
settlements.
Matters came to a head during Edward Winslow's
agency. On 19 October 1649, the Massachusetts General
Court wrote to Winslow thanking him for his service and
recommending that he return to America. The agent had
previously written to the General Court requesting that
he be relieved of his commission, and the colony noted in
return its "own present charge and inability to
accommodate [Winslow] with suitable and comfortable
1 John Clarke to General Court of Rhode Island, "June
1662?" in Winthrop MSS, reel 7.
2 Roger Williams to Providence Town, ca. August 1654, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 400.
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allowance", as well as the fact that the deepening
political crisis in England meant that there was little
chance of the colony being threatened by London.1 Within a
year, however, while Winslow stayed in England to seek
employment under the new Commonwealth, it had become
clear that Massachusetts might still have need of an
agent in England. English republicans showed signs of
taking a much more active role in colonial affairs than
had their predecessors in government. Such moves took on
their most threatening appearance with legislation
banning trade with royalist plantations in America and
implying parliamentary sovereignty over all the colonies.
However important Winslow was, Massachusetts did not
immediately agree to continue financing him, but rather
tried to persuade the other members of the United
Colonies to contribute to the agent's support. The Bay's
representatives presented an appeal to the Commissioners
in September 1650.2 Massachusetts argued that Winslow had
always been working on behalf of the wider interests of
the United Colonies, and that the organisation as a whole
should consider sending the agent "some honourable and
equal recompense" for his work. Furthermore, the Bay
Colony argued that more funds should be provided because
Winslow's continued presence in London was crucial to the
work of spreading the gospel, and quoted a letter to that
effect from the President of the Corporation for the
Propagation of the Gospel, William Steele.
The Commissioners were unimpressed. Massachusetts,
they observed, had never shared the services of their
agent with the other colonies, nor had the Bay consulted
with them at the time of Winslow's departure in 1646. The
United Colonies were willing to acknowledge the
importance of Winslow to the evangelical cause, but only
to the extent of authorising a payment of £100 to be made
to the agent from the funds of the Corporation. In fact,
1 Mass Rec III: 178.
2 Plymouth Rec IX: 161-2.
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Massachusetts had asked both Plymouth and New Haven if
they wished to contribute to the costs of Winslow's
mission in 1646.1 Exactly what the people of Plymouth
thought of this is unknown, given the fact that Winslow
was one of their leading men and had been 'borrowed' by
the Bay Colony in the first place.
In the event, Winslow stayed in England, funded
partly by the Corporation and partly by the Commonwealth
government, which paid him for his work as a Compounding
Commissioner. He continued to lobby the authorities on
behalf of both Massachusetts and Plymouth, and was in
that sense very much an ideal agent. Committed to the
survival of the United Colonies, Winslow was willing to
obstruct the petitions of others even after his formal
commission and wages from the Bay Colony lapsed.
However confused and inefficient agency funding was,
no mission actually failed through financial problems in
this period. Rhode Island's agents suffered personal
hardship and had to rely on the good nature of their
English friends and supporters, but they all achieved
their aims. While agents believed that their successes
depended on luck rather than good planning and support,
colonies thought that agents exaggerated the difficulties
and expenses of working in England. Such differing
perceptions of the financial reality of missions
continued to be the main point of contention in the post-
mission relationship between colonies and agents.
Once their missions were completed, agents faced a
variety of possibilities. The nature of missions in this
period, with agents generally being sent to perform
specific short-term tasks, meant that most agents might
have been expected to return to the colonies after a year
or two in England. As has been noted, however, there was
1 Mass Rec III: 79.
152
a considerable variety in the length of missions, and
also in the time spent by agents in England after their
missions were effectively over. As a general rule, the
longer an agent spent in England, the more tangled his
relationship with his colony became. Agents usually had
many loose ends to tie when they returned to New England.
Money remained a problem, and the ambiguous results of
some missions led to protracted squabbling. In Rhode
Island, for example, John Clarke was still in dispute
with the colony over his wages a dozen years after his
mission, while different factions in Massachusetts argued
over the extent to which Simon Bradstreet and John Norton
had drawn unwelcome attention to the colony. This section
will consider such ongoing strains between agents and
colonies, and also some of the more lasting effects that
being an agent had on the careers of individuals.
Financial questions made up the most important
grievance held by agents on the completion of their
missions. After agents had returned to the colonies, the
nature of the funding question shifted from the need to
provide resources for the conduct of a mission, to
concerns about paying an agent a sum in reward for his
services, and sometimes in repayment for expenses
incurred. Neither of these new concerns inspired the sort
of efforts associated with the raising of money at the
very start of a mission.
The gradual decline in a colony's willingness to
allocate funds to agents over the course of their
missions is typified by the case of Rhode Island agent
John Clarke. Clarke's anger at his colony's failure to
provide him with operational funds has already been
mentioned, but a whole new round of controversy began
with the agent's return to New England in 1664. Although
money was the main issue, the dispute took on the same
pattern as the political row over the Williams-Clarke
mission in 1652. The mainland towns, and particularly
Shawomet, revived old objections to Clarke and even
condemned Roger Williams when he attempted to intervene
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on Clarke's behalf.
The people of Shawomet had done good service in
financing Roger Williams on his second mission to
England, and were to a degree justified when they argued
that Clarke was acting for the island towns and was
therefore not their responsibility. Equally, Shawomet
could argue truthfully that Samuel Gorton and his
colleagues had received nothing from the colony purse for
their voyage to England in 1646. The English government's
support for the Gortonists then had deterred further
Massachusetts incursion onto Rhode Island territory, and
thereby headed off a serious threat to the rest of the
colony towns. In the light of this, Shawomet felt that
its neighbours had been less than suitably grateful.
Much of the Shawomet argument focused on
alternative means of paying Clarke's wages. In the first
place, the townsfolk noted that Clarke had been active as
a preacher and polemical author in London, and that this
had doubtless "brought him in good means for his
maintenance". Even if Clarke had not made much from his
moonlighting activities (and it is hard to argue that he
returned from England having made his fortune), there
were others in the colony who should be charged before
the Shawomet men. Pomham's Indians, living on Shawomet
Neck, had "injuriously intruded" upon the best lands of
the town, argued the Shawomet settlers, and should "be
caused to pay for their so doing." In addition, there
were Englishmen who had betrayed the colony and who
should be fined to pay Clarke's fees. Although it is not
stated explicitly, the Shawomet men were doubtless
referring to their old adversaries in the Arnold faction,
the Atherton planters who sought to occupy the
Narragansett Country, and possibly even William
Coddington- the townsmen had not forgotten Coddington's
dealings with Massachusetts and the Dutch in the 1640s.1
1 Shawomet's position is expressed at length in a letter
to the Governor and Council of Rhode Island, 12 December
1664, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 544-550.
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Roger Williams tried to mediate in the quarrel, but
with little success. He wrote to Shawomet, arguing that
Clarke had done great service to all parts of the colony,
and that the tax being demanded on the agent's behalf was
a "very moderate and equal sum."1 Williams' plea earned
him a stiff rebuke from the Shawomet settlers, who read
his letter in public at their next meeting before
condemning it as 'pernicious' and claiming that it was
intended to "stir up strife, division and contention in
the town."2
Clarke was never able to settle his affairs
completely after his twelve year absence from Rhode
Island. His most serious difficulty was a debt incurred
in 1665, when he mortgaged his house and land in Newport
to Richard Deane of London for £140. Over the next six
years Clarke paid back £136, but by the time of his death
in 1676 still owed some £50 in interest.3 This was despite
the fact that prior to his securing the loan, the General
Assembly had decided that Clarke was owed a total of £343
13s 6d for his agency.4 Just how much of this was ever
paid is unclear; in 1673, Clarke made a final appeal to
the colony for £450, and this was in turn rejected by the
General Assembly.5
Clarke's later problems were in part due to
continuing grudges held by William Coddington, who had
been rehabilitated into Newport life by the 1670s. The
Newport elite which dominated the Rhode Island assembly
for once shared part of the view of the Gortonists,
arguing that Clarke originally went to England as much
for his own reasons as for the good of the colony.
1 See Williams to Warwick [Shawomet], 1 January 1666, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 535.
2 See Howard M. Chapin ed., The Early Records of the Town
of Warwick, (1926), 162.
3 Richard Deane to the Executors of the Estate of John
Clarke, 5 May 1680, Providence Rec, XV: 204-5.
4 Rl Rec II: 79.
5 RI Rec II: 514.
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William Coddington, whose commission as Governor Clarke
had been sent to England to overturn, was by this point
firmly back in the ruling circle of the colony, and it is
likely that Coddington could not resist one final strike
against his old adversary. Coddington also had a circle
of supporters in positions of influence around him,
including his son-in-law, leading merchant Peleg Sanford.1
Clarke's case is an extreme one, because it
rekindled a range of old resentments which had smouldered
since the early 1650s. Rhode Island's decision not to
send a new agent to deal with the restored monarchy
certainly saved some money in the short term, in that any
replacement for Clarke would have needed the sort of
initial funding described above.2 Such short term thinking
created a range of other problems, however. If Clarke had
not been recommissioned, his finances would have been
much more straightforward regardless of whether he
returned to Rhode Island after the Restoration. As has
been noted, the tone of Clarke's relations with the
colony in the later stages of his mission may well imply
that he regretted having revived his agency after such a
long period of inactivity.
However much Clarke and his neighbours may have
squabbled over money, the agent's political abilities
were never in doubt. Clarke went on to be Deputy Governor
of Rhode Island in the 1670s, and stayed in high office
throughout the period when his finances were in dispute.
Such ambiguities in Clarke's later career are a
reflection of the balance which Rhode Island had to
strike between indulging in factional bickering and
recognising that leadership was not so common a quality
as to be lightly squandered.
Massachusetts also had a mixed record in terms of
1 For Coddington's rehabilitation, see Henry E. Turner,
William Coddington in Rhode Island Affairs, (1878), 52.
2 The question of whether to send a new agent or revive
Clarke's commission occupied Rhode Island through much of
1660 and 1661. See Chapter 3 above.
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its treatment of agents whose missions had run their
course. Those who actually returned to the colony tended
to prosper, but those who remained in England permanently
endured sometimes frosty relations with their erstwhile
neighbours. Money was an enduring problem for those who
stayed in England, but for those who returned,
Massachusetts once again found a way of satisfying its
treasury and its agents simultaneously.
Massachusetts usually rewarded its agents with a
combination of public office and land. While good quality
land within the protected coastal areas of New England
was never abundant, it was still easier for the colonial
authorities to acquire and distribute than was any kind
of monetary medium. John Leveret in particular was given
considerable tracts of land in the early 1660s. In May
1662 he was granted a total of one thousand acres for his
"services for the country both in England and here."1 The
following year, Leveret was commissioned Major-General,
and he went on to reach the pinnacle of political life a
decade later when he was elected Governor of
Massachusetts.2 Leveret's successor in the agency Simon
Bradstreet was eventually to join him on the roll of
colony governors. Arguably, both these men were destined
for such high office even before their missions, but it
is still important that serving as agent was considered a
positive part of their climb up the political ladder.
Two of the Bay Colony's first three agents had a
much more negative experience. While William Hibbins
returned to New England and became a colony magistrate,
Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter remained in England and became
ever more estranged from Massachusetts. Weld and Peter
were formally recalled by the Bay in 1645, after three
years of being badly distracted from their mission. The
agents been initially successful in acquiring immunity
from customs for Massachusetts and also in their fund-
1 Mass Rec IV part 2: 56.
2 Mass Rec IV part 2: 80.
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raising activities, but it was hard to maintain momentum.
Hugh Peter's absence from London during the civil wars
left Weld alone, and in 1645 Weld suggested to
Massachusetts that they transfer his commission to London
merchant James Pocock.1
In the years which followed Massachusetts treated
Weld and Peter shabbily. It is unclear who first
suggested that the agents were guilty of misappropriating
funds donated for the conversion of Indians and the
transport of orphans to New England: English Presbyterian
Thomas Edwards certainly made the most of the scandal and
it may well have been a sectarian plot from the
beginning. Massachusetts, though, never moved to defend
their former agents, and indeed allowed Weld and Peter to
take the blame until the New England Company discovered
in 1650 that the irregularities had actually taken place
in the colonies, and that the Bay leadership had used the
agents as scapegoats to hide its own guilt.2
In addition, Hugh Peter discovered in the years
following his mission that part of his property was being
quietly annexed by his neighbours. It was clear from the
mid-1640s onward that despite his protestations to the
contrary, Peter had no intention of re-crossing the
Atlantic, and this encouraged his less scrupulous
acquaintances to take some of his property at greatly
undervalued prices as repayment for his debts.3 While
Peter undoubtedly had a grievance here, it must also be
said that others with whom he did business made no
attempt to defraud him. This was especially true toward
the end of his life, when the resentment felt by many in
Massachusetts over his 'abandonment' of the colony had
1 Stearns, Strenuous Puritan, 173.
2 See Jennings, Invasion of America, 233.
3 Peter to John Winthrop, in Winthrop Papers V: 158.
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faded.1
The Weld/Peter case is the only example of permanent
estrangement between agents and their colony in this
period. Given the troubles already noted involving other
agents, like Williams, Clarke and Bradstreet, it is
surprising that there were no more instances of bitter
discontent. It is, though, no coincidence that Weld and
Peter proved to be the exceptions. John Endecott's
original doubts about Peter's commitment to the future of
Massachusetts seem well borne out by the agent's
immersion in English affairs, and both agents gave the
impression- justified or not- that they cared more for
the troubles of England than they did for the problems of
their employers.2
The colonial authorities learned from some of the
mistakes of the first generation missions. The clearest
manifestation of their efforts to make the institution
more manageable is the gradual formalisation of
procedures surrounding missions, especially in
Massachusetts. In part, as has been noted, colonies
wished to impose more controls on their agents'
activities as the period progressed, but there was also a
wish to avoid a repetition of the worst misunderstandings
and scandals.
Massachusetts recognised that questions of funding
for colonial enterprises were especially controversial,
and tried to set up a variety of methods by which this
issue could be handled in a more circumspect manner. Not
all the steps taken were administered in the colonies.
1 For example, George Curwin of Salem sent Peter £80 in
payment for land in 1660. See Essex Institute, Curwin
Family MSS, 20 Dec. 1660.
2 Endecott was suspicious of Peter as a worldly cleric, and
believed he might be inclined to abandon Massachusetts
for the West Indies. See chapter 3 above.
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Massachusetts pressed for the creation of the New England
Company, which would act as a respectable conduit for
money for missionary activities. The agent most involved
in this move had also learned lessons from the past:
Edward Winslow was careful not to become victim to the
sort of troubles experienced by Thomas Weld. Although
Winslow was by a long way the most vocal and persuasive
of those who agitated for the gospel propagation
enterprise, he never became involved in the attendant
financial matters. New England Company President William
Steele wrote to the Commissioners of the United Colonies
in 1651 that "Mr Winslow will by no means be persuaded to
meddle with the receipts of money."1 Winslow's commitment
to the cause of New England was matched only by his
knowledge of the attitudes and potential failings of the
colonial leadership.
Part of the formalisation of agents' relations with
their colonies is clearly demonstrated in the second wave
of agency activity, which was much more bureaucratically
organised than the first. Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Connecticut all appointed committees to oversee their
missions to Charles II, and in particular the ever-
present financial questions. Such formalisation was
partly an attempt to avoid some of the ambiguities of
earlier missions, but it also reflects a more general
stabilisation of government across New England. Colonial
authorities had moved beyond ad hoc administration by the
time of the Restoration, and were were keen to operate
the kind of stable governmental structures familiar to
the English on both sides of the Atlantic. Agents in the
1660s had become firmly established in the political
culture of the colonies, with generally accepted
administrative mechanisms to go with them.
In Massachusetts, the organisation of the
Bradstreet/Norton mission in 1661/2 demonstrates the
extent to which factions within the colonial leadership
1 Plymouth Rec IX: 194.
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had learned to institutionalise their conflicts.
Opposition to the mission came from Governor Endecott and
his deputy Richard Bellingham, but supporters of the
venture also held high office in the ranks of the colony
magistrates. No longer were opponents of the Bay's top
officials always outcasts and dissidents- they were
equally likely to be members of the colonial elite
themselves. The bureaucratisation of the mission owes
much to political intriguing on the part of these rival
groups. The committee formed to oversee the mission was
loaded with more conservative members opposed to the
mission, but this manoeuvre back-fired when Endecott and
Bellingham boycotted the proceedings, leaving a moderate
majority.1
Once free to go about its work, the committee began
to pull together all the elements of agency activity
which had emerged in the previous two decades.
Documentary evidence, as has been noted, was the central
plank of most agents' appeals: the committee ordered the
colony secretary to transcribe and pass to the agents all
the
proceedings of the court concerning Gorton and his
company, Rhode Island, the ironworks, the Quakers,
Piscataqua, Dr. Child and his company, Mr. Hieldersham,
the Lords' letters about appeals, reasons political for
these plantations, two copies of the patent, petition to
the King, and such other as he shall see needful....2
The agents were as well financed as they were laden with
documents. The committee kept a careful ledger of the
£425 contributed by fifteen men for the finance of the
mission, and placed merchant William Davis in overall
charge of fiscal matters.3 When John Norton fell ill, the
committee negotiated with the captain of the ship which
1 For the mission's place within the wider context of
Restoration Massachusetts, see Paul R. Lucas, "Colony or
Commonwealth: Massachusetts Bay 1661-1666." WMQ 24
(1967): 88-107, esp. 93-95.
2 Hutchinson Papers II: 67.
3 Hutchinson Papers II: 83.
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was waiting expensively in harbour to carry the agents to
England.
The final Massachusetts mission of the period was a
model of organisation, and a good example for the future
formalisation of permanent agencies. Using committees
could only achieve so much however. To be sure,
Bradstreet and Norton were never accused of the sort of
financial irregularities which haunted the Bay Colony's
first agents. On the other hand, many in Massachusetts
refused to believe that the agents had remained true to
their instructions and had diligently resisted all
English attempts to intervene in colonial affairs. No
matter how organised missions became, fundamental doubts
and misconceptions about the relationship between England
and the colonies could not easily be overcome, and
agents, as always, bore the brunt of consequent
criticism.
The single most striking trend in the relationship
between agents and colonies in this period is therefore
one of increasing control and formalisation on the part
of the colonial authorities. This evolution came about
for two reasons: the desire to limit the discretionary
powers of agents by formulating specific and limiting
orders, and a need to overcome practical difficulties
caused by both a lack of organisation in the colonies and
embarrassing financial irregularities in the handling of
charitable donations. The trend had some success on both
fronts, but the advantages were felt more strongly by
colonies than by agents. It is fortunate for the New
England settlements that most agents had interests in
England which made them willing to undertake missions
despite the difficulties they were likely to face in
dealing with their employers, and it is to such concerns
that the next chapter turns.
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Means of Persuasion: Agents and Transatlantic Attitudes
The preceding chapters have placed some emphasis on
themes of ambivalence, misunderstanding, ignorance and
disappointment in the transatlantic relationship, and
such problems come to the fore in the English activities
of agents. It is vital to remember that agents did not
operate in a vacuum, petitioning England's leaders for
sterile administrative documents before taking the first
opportunity to return to the colonies. Many agents
interpreted their role widely, and tried to present their
cases to a far larger group of people than London's
politicians and officials. Petitioning governments was
their primary concern, of course, and this large topic
will be considered at length in the remaining chapters of
this study, but it is necessary first to examine the
broader canvas of agency work.
Agents were not the only people who divided their
time between the colonies and England in the mid-
seventeenth century. This fact had a range of
implications for agents and their work, and also for the
broader sweep of transatlantic relations. The presence of
colonials who were old acquaintances could make life
easier for agents as they tried to organise finances,
pamphleteering, or meetings with English leaders. At the
same time, the activities of other colonials could either
directly or indirectly damage agents' missions: agents
from rival colonies inevitably tried to thwart each
others' plans, and the behaviour of some high profile ex-
colonists in the religious and political controversies of
the 1640s threatened to tar others with the same brush.
This wider question of the general image of the American
colonies is crucial, and particularly so in the case of
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New England. Agents were able to mould that image, but
they were also limited by it, and by the preconceived
ideas it generated among their English hosts.
Religion, so much a part of New England's image (and
self-image), is central to the reception accorded agents
by their audience in England. Ecclesiastical credentials
were at once the most useful passport and heaviest
millstone an agent could carry. In making the case for
their colony, agents could guarantee a receptive hearing
from co-religionists, but they could also expect a
sharply negative response from those who disapproved of
the practices of either agent or colony, or both. Some
agents, who did not match the religious stereotype of
their colony, found themselves condemned for opinions
they did not in fact hold, and colonies were similarly
attacked for the views of their agents.
For Massachusetts agents, religion was a largely
negative factor, because the Bay Colony drew condemnation
from various English groups ranging from those who
opposed Congregational church government to those
Congregationalists who favoured toleration of other
churches. Importantly, though, Rhode Island was rarely
singled out for criticism, despite having agents like
Samuel Gorton and Roger Williams who were much further
from the mainstream than even the more radical Bay
ministers.
Another major issue was the relationship between New
Englanders and Indians. Agents made a range of
contributions here, but often found themselves on the
defensive in the face of criticism of colonial efforts at
conversion. Once again, Massachusetts bore the brunt of
negative comment, and Rhode Island's record in Indian
affairs emerged with some credit. Both Roger Williams and
Samuel Gorton included evidence of their dealings with
Indians in their petitions and pamphlets, taking every
opportunity to discredit the Bay's methods.
Battles over all these issues were fought largely by
exchanges of polemical pamphlets published by the agents
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concerned, and these documents demonstrate a range of
relatively sophisticated propaganda techniques. Agents
published widely during the 1640s, producing tracts which
had little direct relevance to their missions as well as
extended petitions and appeals relating to their
particular causes. Overall, eagerness to use the printing
press as a weapon contributed to the effectiveness of
many agents. A large amount of evidence about agents'
views and methods may be gleaned from their pamphlets,
which stand as the most striking proof that agents were
willing and able to play a full role in English affairs
during their missions.
The first step in putting agency work in its wider
context is an examination of those other New Englanders
who made a contribution to events in England in this
period. Remigration has already been mentioned as a
problem in 1640s Massachusetts, and recent studies
suggest that a large number of first generation settlers
returned to England either permanently or for extended
periods. Such a pattern reinforces the idea that England
and the colonies were not divided by an impenetrable
barrier, and that a significant proportion of colonial
settlers did not necessarily see their journey to America
as an irrevocable action. Some made several return trips
before settling permanently on one side of the ocean or
the other, more travelled back once, and more still left
evidence of continuing doubts about whether they had made
the correct decision: some of the last group would
probably have returned had they been able to raise the
money. This section considers some of those who crossed
the Atlantic more than once, and the effect they had on
the activities of agents.
The first scholar to embark on a major study of
early American remigration was William L. Sachse, who
argued that colonials saw opportunity in returning to
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England as well as in the more traditional
historiographical model of westward expansion. Sachse's
work was mainly concerned with the eighteenth century,
but he also identified earlier cases in which England
seemed to present possibilities unavailable in the
colonies. In particular, Sachse noted that many New
Englanders sought employment and advancement in England
during the interregnum: New England ministers, many of
them early Harvard graduates, returned to England in
numbers between 1640 and 1660 to seek positions vacated
by Laud's clergy, while military men found employment
with Parliament's armies and later with the Protectorate.1
Some recent work has delved a little more deeply
into the motivation of remigrants and has also,
importantly, considered the attitudes of remaining
colonists toward those who left. Remigration had always
been a characteristic of life in Massachusetts, but the
English Civil War made it harder to dismiss those who
returned as weak backsliders. While individual remigrants
could be both a help and a hindrance to agents, the
phenomenon of remigration itself proved to be a taxing
issue for agents in the 1640s. Critics of New England
pounced on the eastward traffic as evidence of colonial
failure and discontent, and New Englanders themselves
suffered doubts about their mission.2
Two of the Bay Colony's first agents were,
ironically, to join the ranks of those who returned
permanently to England, but at the beginning of their
mission they vigorously defended colonial practices and
condemned those who left the colony. In New Englands
1 Sachse, "The Migration of New Englanders to
England,1640-1660", AHR 53 (1948): 251-278; also his The
Colonial American in Britain, Madison, WN (1956),
especially 89-92, 132-145.
2 The most recent work on the subject includes David
Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and Communication between
England and New England in the Seventeenth Century,
(1987), 191-212; Andrew Delbanco, "Looking Homeward,
Going Home" NEQ 59 (1986): 358-386.
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First Fruits, Thomas Weld called up a theological
allegory and extended a medieval view of Ireland to
encompass the New England colonies. As Ireland cannot
brook venomous beasts, wrote Weld, so New England will
have no "vile persons, and loose livers."1 Weld may have
been trying to achieve a number of things in using this
metaphor. An educated audience would have recognised his
paraphrasing of Bede, thus helping to maintain the
agent's reputation for serious scholarship. Perhaps more
importantly, the equation of a New England that was
anathema to the degenerate with a place that was free
from serpents is a clear attempt to portray the colonies
as a godly paradise untouched by evil and temptation.2
If the general question of remigration posed
problems for Massachusetts agents, individual remigrants
could be even more embarrassing. Throughout this period,
vocal and knowledgeable ex-colonists threatened to
undermine the careful propaganda being disseminated by
agents and colonial authorities, quite apart from any
damage being inflicted by rival agents. Many critics had
specific grievances which stemmed from a particular
incident, while others acted in semi-permanent opposition
to the colonies in general or- more usually- to
Massachusetts.
Probably the most vocal and long-standing critic of
the Bay Colony was the aptly-named Samuel Maverick, who
maintained a regular criticism of religious and social
policy in Massachusetts for more than three decades. Much
of his time was spent in New England, and his career as
an anti-Massachusetts agitator reached its peak in the
early 1660s when he bombarded the Earl of Clarendon with
complaints about the Bay's operation as a 'free state'.
1 Weld, New Englands First Fruits, (1643), 24.
2 Bede wrote that in Ireland "there are no reptiles, and
no snake can exist there". See Bede, A History of the
English Church and People, 2nd Penguin edn. (1968), 39.
For a further discussion of Bede's use of this allegory,
see J M Wallace-Hadrill, Bede's Ecclesiastical History of
the English People, (1988), 9.
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Many critics of the Bay Colony had, like Maverick, been
interested in settlements on the fringes of Massachusetts
and objected to Boston's expansionist tendencies.
Although such voices were heard most clearly in the early
1660s, remigrants were a regular source of opposition to
Massachusetts agents throughout this period.1
If some ex-colonists made life difficult for agents,
there were also many who provided invaluable assistance.
One problem facing students of the agency is to determine
the mechanics of agency work, and in particular how
agents went about making contact with friends, colleagues
and sympathisers. Those studying the eighteenth century
agency have identified London's coffee houses as an
important element in the lives of agents: persons
interested in the colonies tended to congregate in
particular establishments, and an agent could make useful
contacts and keep abreast of news.2
While coffee houses did not become commonplace in
London until the later seventeenth century, there is
evidence that bookshops served a similar function for at
least some of the first generation agents. The clientele
was of course not restricted to colonials, and bookshops
were also informal meeting places for London's
intelligentsia.3 When William Coddington was in England in
1650 seeking his commission as Governor of Aquidneck he
had a chance meeting with Stephen Winthrop at Giles
Calvert's shop. Winthrop- son of the Massachusetts
governor and younger brother of Connecticut's John
Winthrop, jr.- had been helped out of an awkward
financial dispute in 1645 by Sir Henry Vane, and was,
1 See Chapter 7.
2 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 115-120; also, and more
generally, Sachse, The Colonial American in Britain, 17-
18.
3 W. Clark Gilpin argues that Dexter's print shop "may
well have been an important setting for Williams'
reintroduction to the English religious and political
scene." Gilpin, The Millenarian Piety of Roger Williams,
(1979), 68.
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like Vane, a committed tolerationist. Coddington
reintroduced Winthrop to Vane, and relied on both men for
further contacts during his stay in England.1 Vane in
particular was central to Coddington's plans, because of
his high profile in the Commonwealth Government and his
involvement in the committee which heard Coddington's
petition.2
Another measure of the importance to agents of the
publishing business is found in their relationships with
printers. Printers were high on the list of contacts for
agents arriving in London. Many agents travelled to
England having already decided that they would present
their views in print, and a number of tracts were
composed during the Atlantic crossing. Roger Williams,
for example, noted in the preface to A Key into the
Language of America that he had drafted the work while
sailing to England.3
Close contact with printers and booksellers allowed
agents to keep track of their opponents and respond to
criticisms appearing in print. Williams also offers an
example of the sort of long-term contact which could be
maintained between some agents and their printers. During
his 1643-4 mission he quickly formed a close friendship
with printer Gregory Dexter, who subsequently followed
Williams to Rhode Island and became a leading figure in
the colony. Williams may have come to regret Dexter's
move to America, however, because while New England
benefited from the printer's skills, the agent claimed to
have trouble finding a suitable printer during his second
1 See Coddington to John Winthrop, jr., 19 Feb 1652, in
MHS Collections, 4th series, 7: 281; Black, The Younger
John Winthrop, 157. For the dispute between Winthrop and
London Alderman Berkeley, see Mass Archives, 2: 489;
Winthrop, Journal, II: 256.
2 This episode will be discussed in more detail in the
next chapter.
3 See Williams, Writings, I: 19.
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mission to England.1 Still, Williams was able to exploit
the radical interests and connections of another leading
figure in the trade: two of his 1652 pamphlets were
printed for the bookseller Giles Calvert.2
The most impressive of such connections is that
between Edward Winslow and London printer John Bellamy.
Bellamy's interest in America was not restricted to
publishing Winslow's tracts, and he handled a number of
sermons and accounts of Plymouth colony in addition to
those carried to England by Winslow.3
Some agents relied on special interests or
professional skills to establish contacts in England. In
part, this may have been only vaguely related to their
agency work, but it also put them in touch with educated
and often influential people who might have some value to
them later. Roger Williams made use of his linguistic
abilities to further his friendship with John Milton. The
latter's significance as a poet is less important here
than his political and administrative role: Milton served
as a propagandist for the Parliamentary cause throughout
the 1640s and was Latin secretary to the Commonwealth
1 Dexter's work in printing almanacs for the Cambridge
press in Massachusetts is revealed in Paul Sternberg "A
Note on the Printing of the New England 'Almanacks'",
Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, (1984):
356-361. Williams wrote home from London bemoaning having
to use "printers men unknown to me", but it is of course
possible that he was simply paying Dexter a compliment.
See Williams to Dexter, 7 October 1652, in LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 366.
2 The tracts were The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody and
The Fourth Paper Presented by Major Butler. For Calvert's
place in London radical circles, see Hill, The World
Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English
Revolution, (1975), 373.
3 Bellamy's career as the "'Pilgrim' Publisher" is
described in detail in Leona Rostenburg, Literary,
Political, Scientific, Religious and Legal Publishing,




Connecticut's John Winthrop, jr. was particularly
adept at making contacts in a wide intellectual circle.
Winthrop pursued new approaches to the English
authorities, devoting his efforts to working out which of
the new English elite he had best court in order to gain
a sympathetic hearing from those in power. Winthrop was
something of a physician and chemist, as well as being
interested in metallurgy and astronomy, and he used his
contacts and correspondents in London's scientific
community to point him in the direction of potentially
sympathetic royal advisers. The Connecticut agent went on
to become the first New Englander to be a member of the
new Royal Society, and this brought him respectability,
along with expanding his circle of influential
acquaintances.2 Samuel Hartlib, the pioneering
educationalist, was among the first to warn Winthrop of
the new regime's plans to investigate New England and
possibly even send a royal governor. Hartlib urged
Winthrop to contact the courtier and physician Benjamin
Worsley, who reputedly had Clarendon's respect when it
came to colonial matters.3
Agents and other colonials could use such personal
contacts to put their message across on a limited scale,
but there were other cases in which a much wider audience
was desirable. The details of such campaigning will be
considered later in this chapter, but it is worth noting
here the opportunities available to those agents who
wished to put their petitions and stories in print.
Published pamphlets are the most visible expression
of the messages agents wished to present to their English
audience. While important aspects of their work are
1 Williams' contacts with Milton are considered in David
Masson, The Life of John Milton, 6 vols, (1859-1880), IV:
395-6.
2 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 217.
3 See Hartlib to Winthrop, 9 October 1661, in Winthrop
MSS, reel 6.
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revealed in correspondence and in dealings with
officialdom, agents made their widest contribution to the
period in the pages of their printed tracts. They were
greatly assisted in this by the near-collapse of the
official censorship system in the early 1640s. Following
the flight of Charles I from London in 1642, and despite
subsequent attempts by successive regimes to regulate
publishing, the presses became the most widely used tool
of a host of political and religious groups, as well as
individuals seeking publicity for their own particular
causes.1 Agents were no exception, and often printed
versions of their petitions accompanied by extensive
polemical commentary in the hope that their claims would
gain support from influential readers. Many agents'
pamphlets, however, had little to do with the mission at
hand, but rather expressed personal views on some of
England's great issues. As colonial representatives and
individual activists alike, agents made a significant
contribution to what Hugh Peter called England's
"pamphlet-glutted age".2
Seven agents were involved in publishing polemical
tracts while in England, either as authors or on behalf
of people in New England who sent manuscripts to London
to be printed. The range of work is indicative of the
interests of agents, and also of the kind of
controversies which could subsequently surround their
work. Roger Williams wrote a series of theological works,
mainly advocating religious toleration, as well as a
pioneering examination of Indian languages. Thomas Weld
wrote promotional tracts for Harvard College and the
Indian conversion mission, and published (with an added
preface) the elder John Winthrop's account of the
Antinomian crisis. Edward Winslow handled the publication
1 Christopher Hill notes the importance of the expansion
in printing to the activities of a range of groups in The
World Turned Upside Down, 17-18.
2 Peter, Church-Government and Church-Covenant discussed,
(1643), preface (no pagination).
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of a range of material describing the conversion of the
Indians, as well as condemning the Bay Colony's opponents
in pamphlets of his own. Samuel Gorton, John Clarke and
William Vassall all wrote tracts complaining about their
persecution by Massachusetts. Finally, Hugh Peter wrote
more than two dozen tracts, although most were reports of
army affairs in the 1640s and had nothing to do with his
mission.1
Almost all of these works were criticised or
supported by other pamphlets penned by a variety of
activists and commentators alike. Agents had no monopoly
on printed accounts of New England affairs, and neither,
for that matter, did other colonials: some of the most
vocal supporters and critics of the colonies never left
England. The next section begins to examine the broader
context of New England's links with English society,
starting'with the question of religion.
Matters of faith and church organisation loomed large in
transatlantic affairs, and especially in contacts between
England and New England. Given the stated religious
motivation for the establishment of the New England
colonies, the intense theological debates in England
during the 1640s, and the religious concerns
(professional and otherwise) of many of the agents, it is
not surprising that such matters tended to polarise
opinion and give much ammunition to English critics. Many
colonials had an intense interest in the religious
debates and quarrels of the period and contributed to
them in writing and by their presence in England: at the
same time, many in England watched events in New England
to see what lessons could be learned. It is in this field
that agents had their most noticeable impact on English
society. Here also, they faced the most serious criticism
1 Agents' works are examined and cited individually
throughout this chapter.
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of themselves and, by extension, of their colonies.
Agents typified the ambivalence of many of their fellow
colonists in the 1640s and early 1650s, when they
wondered if England or New England was the true venue for
the new reformation. The high profile of those agents who
also held clerical office inevitably gave New England's
dealings with England a religious tone, and ensured that
questions of faith and church policy were rarely separate
from wider issues involving the northern colonies.
New England's theological experiment was central to
conditioning English attitudes toward the colonies, and
agents were often trapped by long-standing perceptions
over which they had little influence. English critics of
Massachusetts church policy attacked agents regardless of
the fact that many agents differed considerably from
their fellow settlers in religious terms. By the same
token, the reaction of English critics to agents'
activities could focus unwarranted condemnation on the
colonies. Finally, the extent to which agents changed
their religious views after spending time in England
reflects the different backdrops against which the
English, wherever they were, had to find their favoured
path to a new church order.
Agents could not have avoided involvement in
religious questions, and many of them did not want to
try. As has already been noted, half of the first
generation agents were preachers of one kind or another.
This statistic reflects the high standing of religious
leaders in the New England colonies, both as leaders of
local communities and as an ecclesiastical 'think-tank'
often consulted by the colonial government. More
importantly, though, the involvement of the clergy meant
that many agents were placed in a situation in England in
which they were expected to take a stance in the events
of the period both as individuals and as representatives
of religiously-inspired colonies.
Anyone with strong theological views had plenty
opportunity to express them before a wide audience in
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1640s England. As the censors lost control of the
presses, so Archbishop Laud's church ceased to dominate
the nation's religious practices. To a royalist
conforming member of the Church of England like Edward
Hyde, these years were disturbing indeed:
And from this time the licence of preaching and printing
increased to that degree that all pulpits were freely
delivered to the schismatical and silenced preachers, who
'til then had lurked in corners or lived in New England.1
Hyde's belief that much of England's ferment could be
blamed on New England's renegade preachers was common
enough. The leading Presbyterian minister Robert Baillie
complained in 1645 that congregational thinking was
gaining dangerous influence in the upper reaches of
English society, having until recently been restricted to
Holland, some of the London churches, and, most
importantly, New England.2
Evidence of New England's unenviable reputation
appears in a range of sources. In addition to the
predictable attacks by religious opponents, settlers in
the northern colonies ran the full gamut of criticism
from being the butt of jokes to being accused- often by
those who might have been considered likely allies- of
deserting England in its time of need. At one extreme,
New Englanders sometimes found that they were not taken
quite as seriously as they would have liked. Settlers who
came to Massachusetts on the Mary Rose in 1640 reported
that they had been the subject of irreverent jeers from
sailors: later, when some colonists visited the ship to
buy goods the crew expressed surprise. Surely, the
sailors argued, the locals "could not want anything, they
1 Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and the Civil
Wars in England, W.D. Macray ed.,(1888), I: 269.
2 Baillie, A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time,
(1645), 59.
175
were full of the spirit."1 Some of the attitudes toward
New England expressed by English religious activists
demonstrate an incredulity which was different only in
degree. If Anglicans and Presbyterians thought them
dangerously radical, the sectarian radicals could not
understand why the colonists stayed in New England when
there was reforming work to be done at home. A
significant body of opinion throughout English society
believed that the final victory over the forces of Anti-
Christ was imminent, and the decision of distinguished
New England clergy to remain in the American wilderness
was met with suspicion and incomprehension.2
In spite of such attitudes, some of England's
Parliamentary leaders had considerable respect for the
Bay clergy in the early 1640s. In 1643 a group of
prominent English figures asked leading New England
ministers to return home and assist in the impending
reorganisation of the Church. The request was signed by
five peers and thirty-four others, most of whom were MPs.
Many of these men had been involved in the planning and
financing of colonial enterprises since the 1620s, and
had also been patrons and protectors of a number of
ministers, some of whom had migrated. In addition, they
were shortly to have prominent roles to play in
successive interregnum governments, and in particular the
colonial committees of Parliament and the Council of
State.3
1 Massachusetts leaders soon afterward expressed
themselves thoroughly vindicated: the Mary Rose was sunk
in harbour in July 1640 by an accidental (but no doubt
divinely arranged) gunpowder explosion. See John Endecott
to John Winthrop, 28 July 1640, in Winthrop Papers IV:
270-1.
2 For a discussion of English theologians' attitudes
toward New England, see Philip F. Gura, A Glimpse of
Sion's Glory, (1984), Chapter 8.
3 The signature list included half of the original
eighteen members of the Earl of Warwick's colonial
commission, which will be considered in the next chapter.
See Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts Bay, 100-101.
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The negative reaction of the colonists to this
appeal set the tone for a gradual alienation. John
Cotton, Thomas Hooker and John Davenport were asked to
attend the Westminster Assembly, which was charged with
devising a form of government for the church which
allowed cooperation with reformed churches in Scotland
and elsewhere, as well as clearing all "false calumnies
and aspersions" from church doctrine.1 None of the
ministers was enthusiastic: Hooker flatly refused to
cross the Atlantic to join what he perceived as a
minority faction in London, Davenport made no attempt to
change the initial refusal of his congregation, and
Cotton took his regular seat on the fence, declaring
himself reluctant to make the journey alone while
acknowledging the righteousness of the cause.2
With hindsight at least, the three ministers'
reluctance to heed the call was probably wise. The often
negative experiences of those clerics who travelled to
England as agents in the 1640s indicate that Cotton,
Davenport and Hooker might have had a rough reception.
Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter were already in England when
the appeal went out to Cotton and his colleagues. Both
agents drew serious criticism from English polemicists,
although for rather different reasons. Peter rapidly
became distracted from his agency by his work as an army
chaplain, and stopped working for Massachusetts long
before his commission was officially recalled in 1645.
Nonetheless, his actions continued to be interpreted as
representing the practice of religious affairs in Bay
Colony. Weld's contribution to the agency took the form
of pamphlets defending the colonial churches from charges
of intolerance, but his work served largely to reinforce
1 See Robert S. Paul, The Assembly of the Lord, (1985),
69.
2 See Winthrop, Journal II: 71-2. There is evidence that
Hooker did try to influence the Assembly in writing: see
Sargent Bush, "Thomas Hooker and the Westminster
Assembly" WMQ 29 (1972): 291-300.
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the views of critics.
Neither agent had any hesitation in throwing himself
wholeheartedly into English controversies. Peter was
sometimes an embarrassment to his new colleagues in
Parliament's army as well as to his colony, and this
contributed further to his being an easy target for
opponents. Some of the stories which abounded of Peter's
over-zealous pursuit of the reformation reveal
disapproval of the minister's conduct on the part of his
superiors. In 1649 Presbyterian pamphleteer Clement
Walker described Peter's attempt to arrest Presbyterian
minister Edmund Calamy. According to the admittedly
hostile source, Peter believed that his name alone would
frighten the ministers who were meeting at Calamy's
house, and went on to spend the evening "vapouring and
canting religion and nonsense" to the assembled divines.
Calamy subsequently discovered that Peter had acted
without any orders from his military commanders.1 Neither
did Peter mellow with age. In the last months of the
Protectorate, William Lockhart informed Secretary of
State Thurloe of Peter's arrival in Dunkirk. Lockhart was
clearly exasperated by his new chaplain, writing that "if
it were possible to get him to mind preaching, and to
forbear the troubling of himself with other things, he
would certainly prove a very fit minister for soldiers."2
Presbyterians lined up to condemn Peter, sometimes
explicitly as a New Englander, and sometimes as a typical
believer in congregational church government. The chief
aim of this onslaught was to demonstrate that Peter and
his fellow New Englanders were hypocrites, who made a
great show of their piety while making full use of their
new-found positions of power- on either side of the
Atlantic- to achieve worldly prosperity. Robert Baillie,
Scottish Presbyterian and delegate to the Westminster
1 Theodorus Verax [pseud. Clement Walker] Anarchie
Anglicana or The History of Independency, (1649), 67.
2 Thurloe State Papers VI: 223.
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Assembly, wrote in the spring of 1644 that Peter's
"malapert rashness" would be "very dangerous to this
Church and State." William Prynne embarked on some
manuscript research in 1645 and revealed to the world the
submission Peter made to the Bishop of London on 17
August 1627. At that time, Peter had been obliged, in the
face of episcopal censure, to describe the Church of
England as "the most glorious and flourishing Church this
day under the sun": Prynne was keen to contrast this with
the preacher's more recent stance.1
Peter's most persistent critic was Thomas Edwards,
who listed the sins and ill deeds of every
congregationalist and radical he could find in his three-
part work Gangraena. Peter, in Edwards' words, was the
"Solicitor General for the Sectaries", a man who refused
to return to New England even though he was required so
to do by the doctrines of his own church, and who had
profited personally from money ostensibly raised to send
poor children to New England and from the confiscation of
Archbishop Laud's library.2
Thomas Weld kept a lower profile than his fellow
agent. Nonetheless, he inadvertently ensured that the
controversy over the Antinomian crisis of 1637-38 became
an issue in England six years later. The dispute between
Anne Hutchinson's supporters and most of the
Massachusetts leadership was, at least in the eyes of the
colony elite, the most serious threat to civil order
faced in the early years of settlement. The actual risk
to the Bay from the Antinomians may have been
exaggerated, with men like John Winthrop reacting less to
the reality of the Hutchinson's beliefs than to older
1 See Baillie to William Spang, 12 April 1644, in Baillie,
The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, David Laing,
ed., 3 vols. (1841-1842), II: 165; Prynne, A Fresh
Discovery of some Prodigious New Wandring-Blasing-Stars
and Firebrands, (1645), 33.
2 Edwards, Gangraena, (1646), I: 98-100.
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European stereotypes of religious sectarians.1 In any
case, by the mid-1640s the dispute was far from the most
pressing concern in the debates over the future of
English church policy, and should have been largely
forgotten.
In 1644, however, a pamphlet relating details of the
crisis and of Hutchinson's trial appeared anonymously in
London: authorship is generally credited to the elder
John Winthrop.2 Exactly how it came to be published is
unclear, but Weld took it upon himself to add a preface
and reissue the text. Weld expressed himself reluctant to
revive the story on the grounds that many of those
involved had since repented their heresies, but in fact
he took every opportunity to assert the topicality of the
work. The Antinomians had flourished in New England
because they encouraged people to live lazily, safe in
the belief that they would ultimately be saved no matter
how they sinned in the meantime. It was for this reason,
argued the agent, that "this kind of doctrine takes so
well here in London".3
In drawing parallels between religious controversies
in Massachusetts and England, Weld was setting up New
England Congregationalism as a model for the treatment of
sectarian radicals. Such a strategy was potentially
harmful because it gave the colony's enemies a clear
target. Worse still, it was likely to alienate some
potential friends, because a number of prominent
characters in the Antinomian crisis were well-known
figures in the transatlantic religious community by the
1 See Stephen Foster, "New England and the Challenge of
Heresy, 1630-1660: The Puritan Crisis in Transatlantic
Perspective." WMQ 38 (1981): 624-660.
2 Antinomians and Familists Condemned by the Synod of
Elders in New-England, (1644).
3 Weld's re-issue of the pamphlet included a new title but
no alteration to the main text. See A Short Story of the
Rise, reign and ruine of the Antinomians, Familists and
Libertines, (1644) in David Hall, ed. The Antinomian
Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History, (2nd edn
1990), 204.
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time A Short Story was published.
All three of the ministers- Cotton, Hooker and
Davenport- who were the subject of the appeal by
England's leaders in 1643 were mentioned either in
Winthrop's text or in Weld's preface. John Cotton had
been much embarrassed by the whole Antinomian affair,
having been the only minister in the colony approved of
by Anne Hutchinson. Although the clergy always denied
that Cotton's preaching differed from that of his
colleagues, Cotton's association with Hutchinson did lead
to doubts about his integrity. Thomas Hooker had been
moderator of the court which investigated the beliefs of
the dissidents, while John Davenport, mentioned only
briefly in Winthrop's text, was prominent in the
interrogation of Anne Hutchinson prior to her banishment.1
Also notable among Hutchinson's opponents was Hugh Peter,
who became even more open to charges of inconstancy as
the 1640s progressed and he moved to being a vocal
tolerationist.2
Weld's publication of A Short Story, intended as a
justification of the Bay Colony's actions against radical
sectarians, only served to give ammunition to the
colony's critics. In particular, it became part of a
growing volume of evidence of Massachusetts intolerance,
soon to be added to by Rhode Island agents Williams and
Gorton. Weld did not anticipate that the toleration
question would become an increasingly important aspect of
the divisions between the various factions which made up
the English church reform movement.
Despite its dangers, Weld's attempt to draw
parallels between events in England and the colonies
became a common tactic of agents and English commentators
alike. New England had more than a decade of experience
in maintaining the sort of church government and social
1 See Winthrop, A Short Story, 269-71 (Cotton), 212
(Hooker), 305 (Davenport).
2 See Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma, 183.
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organisation which was at the centre of much debate in
England, and it was inevitable that supporters and
detractors would both try to draw conclusions from this.
Competing agents in particular tried to couch their
appeals in terms of the likely impact on England if one
or another colonial faction or interest should prevail.
Some such warnings bordered on the apocalyptic.
Edward Winslow sketched what he saw as the logical
conclusion of the Gortonists' criticism of the Bay Colony
magistrates, and is worth quoting as an example of the
sort of vituperation piled upon the Shawomet settlers.
Gorton, Winslow claimed, believed that the office of
civil magistrate was not necessary, and that justice
should be administered by men with powers common to the
rest of their brethren: to be part of Christ's
brotherhood was more important than any civil office. It
was therefore obvious to Winslow that
if ministration of justice and judgement belongs to no
officer, but to a man as a Brother, then to every
Brother, and if to every Brother, whether rich or poor,
ignorant or learned, then every Christian in a Common¬
wealth must be King, and Judge, and Sheriff, and Captain,
and Parliament man, and Ruler, and that not only in New-
England, but in Old, and not only in Old, but in all the
Christian world; down with all Officers from their rule,
and set up every Brother for to Rule, which the godly-
wise may easily discerne to the establishment of all
confusion, and the setting up of Anarchy worse than the
greatest Tyranny.1
Winslow's vision of chaos raised many issues to which he
repeatedly turned in his polemical work. The prospect
that the poor and ignorant would soon consider themselves
on a par with the more traditional ruling elite was as
abhorrent to many in England as it was to Winslow.
If Winslow saw Massachusetts dissidents bringing
anarchy to England, other agents viewed the Bay Colony's
own social and political practices as a more serious
danger to the home country. William Vassall condemned the
colony's treatment of the Remonstrants in his 1647
1 Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, 44.
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pamphlet, and hoped that "as from New England came
Independencie of churches hither, which hath spread over
all parts here; that from thence also (in time) arbitrary
government in the Commonwealth may not come hither." In
a simultaneous attack on English Congregationalists,
Vassall observed that "Independents are all of a piece,
for subtlety, designs, fallacies, both in New England and
in Old."1
Occasionally, pamphleteers tried to portray the flow
of anarchy and disorder as running in the opposite
direction. New England's radicals, it was argued, were
fermenting the sort of trouble familiar to the home
country during the 1640s, but previously unknown in the
colonies. This tactic was of course a direct and useful
counter to those who claimed that the colonies as a whole
were the original source of religious controversy in
England. Edward Winslow complained that the Remonstrants
had spread news of their activities throughout the
neighbouring colonies, to the Dutch settlements, and even
to the southern and island plantations. The Governor of
Bermuda was apparently convinced that New England would
soon be "altogether by the ears as well as England."2
Such explicit attempts to link events in England and
the colonies do not indicate any sense of separation on
the part of agents. Indeed, it was because they saw the
English world as a single entity that they were able to
identify issues on either side of the Atlantic which they
believed would convince their audience.
One aspect of the transatlantic religious debate
which intimately concerned agents was the toleration
question. Rhode Island was one of the few branches of
English society operating on the principle of religious
toleration in the 1640s, and its agents were vocal
proponents of the idea. At the same time, Massachusetts
agents used the anarchic reputation of the Narragansett
1 Child, New Englands Jonas, 117, 120.
2 Winslow, New Englands Salamander, 116.
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settlements to argue against toleration.
Roger Williams made an early contribution to the
argument over toleration in 1644 and continued to publish
material on this issue during his second mission in 1651-
53. Williams' tolerationist pamphlet The Bloudy Tenent of
Persecution for Cause of Conscience condemned the use of
civil power in matters of religion, and began a lengthy
debate with John Cotton.1 Samuel Gorton complained that
Massachusetts was banishing and persecuting those
"differing from them in point of doctrine."2 Williams'
co-agent John Clarke wrote in 1652 that "no servant of
Jesus hath any authority from him to force upon others
either the faith or order of the Gospel of Christ."
Clarke promised to supply eight arguments against
"persecution for case of conscience."3 All three agents
based their petitions and much of their pamphleteering on
the claim that they had been persecuted by Massachusetts
for their beliefs rather than any threat they may have
posed to public order.
As advocates of religious toleration, Williams and
Gorton were very much in a minority in the mid-1640s,
although Clarke was received more favourably by the
Commonwealth. Recent scholarship has revealed that it is
a considerable oversimplification to argue that
toleration was the major dividing issue between the two
main church groups in 1640s England. It has often been
assumed that while Presbyterians were undoubtedly opposed
to a large scale toleration of sects and factions,
English Congregationalists were more inclined to favour
toleration. Some English leaders did become convinced of
the need for toleration in the later 1640s, but their
motives often owed more to a pragmatic assessment of the
military recruitment needs of the Parliamentary armies
1 The Bloudy Tenent and its sequel, The Bloody Tenent Yet
More Bloody, are printed in Williams, Writings, II, III.
2 Gorton, Simplicities Defence, 18
3 Clarke, 111 Newes from New-England, 26.
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than any theological interest.1
Rhode Island agents discovered that as
tolerationists they stood outside the mainstream of
England's theological debates in the mid-1640s, and that
they were likely to draw criticism from either of the two
most significant parties. The Presbyterian Robert Baillie
wrote in June 1644 that Williams was advocating "a
singular Independency, denying any true church in the
world". Notably, though, Baillie observed that Williams'
opinions were also causing a "great and bitter schism" in
the ranks of the Independents.2 Williams himself
complained that English Independents had much the same
view of using civil power to enforce religious conformity
as had the Massachusetts churches, and indeed rivalled
Presbyterians in this matter.3 Independents and
Presbyterians alike ordered Williams' tracts to be burned
in 1644. Samuel Gorton spent part of his time in London
preaching to a radical congregation in the Coleman Street
area, and was active enough to be investigated by a
Parliamentary commission in 1648: the complaints against
him which le d to the hearing came from supposedly
tolerationist Independents.4 Even John Clarke was well
outside the mainstream English church during the
Commonwealth and Protectorate, preaching to Baptist
congregations and possibly becoming implicated in the
1 Avihu Zakai argues against the traditional view that
Independents advanced the cause of toleration from as
early as 1643. See Zakai, "Religious Toleration and its
Enemies", Albion 21 (1989): 1-33; also "Orthodoxy in
England and New England: Puritans and the Issue of
Religious Toleration, 1640-1650." Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 135 (1991): 401-441.
2 "Publick Letter" 7 June 1644, Baillie Letters II: 190.
3 Williams, Writings, III: 350.
4 See Gorton to Nathaniel Morton, 30 June 1669, in Peter
Force, Tracts, IV: 14-15.
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activities of the Fifth Monarchists.1
One of the most important observations that can be
made about Rhode Island agents' religious activities is
that it provoked very little adverse comment about the
colony, and certainly nothing compared to the criticism
attracted by the Bay colony's representatives. There are
a number of reasons for this, although most stem from the
general ignorance of English commentators regarding the
number and variety of political and ecclesiastical
settlements in New England. Rhode Islanders' colonial
connections were rarely made explicit, while it was all
too obvious where the Bay Colony agents came from.
Scottish theologian Samuel Rutherford disagreed with
Williams' view of the division between civil and
ecclesiastical powers, but seemed to have little
awareness of the religious practices of Rhode Island: he
made no reference to Williams' colonial career other than
to condemn what he called the agent's "heathenish or
American peace".2 Even when Williams' colonial background
was explicitly described, Rhode Island was not held up to
the sort of criticism Massachusetts suffered. In common
with most writers, Robert Baillie over-simplified the New
England situation. He noted Williams' attempt to make
contact with the Indians but acknowledged no distinctions
within the ranks of the colonies and contented himself
with characterising the low level of church membership
across New England as a "grievous absurdity".3
Most Presbyterian commentators saw the disruption
within the ranks of the New England colonies as a symptom
of the inherent problems with the Congregational church
concept. This meant that while Rhode Islanders like
1 See Richard Greaves, "A Colonial Fifth Monarchist? John
Clarke of Rhode Island" Rhode Island History 40 (1981):
40-47. A more detailed discussion of Clarke's activities
follows below.
2 Rutherford, A Free Disputation Against Pretended Liberty
of Conscience, (1649), 321, 325, 333.
3 Baillie, A Dissuasive from the Errors of the Time, 60.
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Williams and Gorton were being condemned in England for
their radicalism, Massachusetts did not get any credit
for taking steps against them. Only occasionally did the
Bay Colony meet the approval of the critics of
Independency. Samuel Rutherford gave backhanded praise to
Massachusetts for the hard-line taken by the colony
magistrates against the Antinomians, claiming that the
Bay authorities were learning from experience to move
toward Presbyterian methods and ideas.1
Ironically, England's tendency to treat all New
England as one entity owes something to the success of
the Bay Colony's own propaganda. The term 'New England'
changed in its everyday meaning as the seventeenth
century progressed. Originally a simple geographic label,
with the great migration of the 1630s it became
synonymous with the Massachusetts settlement. Such usage
fitted well with the professed intention of the migrants
to establish a new, reformed English society. Supporters
of Massachusetts continued to use the term in this sense,
because it encouraged the impression that the Bay Colony
and its laws and customs were uniformly accepted across
the region. With the formation of the Confederation of
the United Colonies of New England in 1643, 'New England'
was reinforced as a generic term for the orthodox
settlements. Rhode Islanders were aware of the tendency
of English commentators to oversimplify the region's
character: John Clarke offered a short geography lesson
at the start of his 1652 pamphlet, and encouraged his
readers to think of Rhode Island as separate from their
usual idea of New England.2
In the 1640s, however, the activities of Rhode
Island's agents were used to incriminate Independency in
general, and Massachusetts was widely held to be the key
source of Independent agitators. The radical heretics of
1 Rutherford, A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist,
(1648), 177.
2 Clarke, 111 Newes from New-England, 22-23.
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Rhode Island were held up as a symptom of the failure of
the Bay Colony's Congregationalist experiment, rather
than as a separate threat. When Samuel Gorton was taken
before the above-mentioned Parliamentary committee to
answer charges that he had preached without authority,
the account of his several punishments at the hands of
Massachusetts was clearly available to the court. The
only conclusion drawn by the Presbyterian who reported
the story, however, was that Gorton's "impious and
audacious blasphemies" were merely a taste of what would
happen if Independents came to power in England.1 The
situation was almost one in which any religious publicity
was good for Rhode Island, and bad for Massachusetts.
The religious activities and reputations of New
Englanders aroused most controversy in the 1640s, and
played a much reduced part in the lives of agents and
other colonials in later years. Religious controversies
did not cease to exist by any means, but there were fewer
agents in England, and those who did serve made less of a
contribution to pamphleteering than had previously been
the case. In addition, religious activists had new
concerns: they had to come to terms with a war against
their co-religionists the Dutch in 1652, and later saw
the Cromwellian revival of the older conflict with
Catholic Spain.
Nonetheless, there were still occasions when New
Englanders were not allowed to forget their colonial
connections or their religious activities. In particular,
the Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 threatened a more
serious purge of the unorthodox than had been the case
with any previous change of regime. Two agents- John
Clarke and John Leveret- were in England when Charles II
was crowned, and both had to take steps to distance
themselves from the events of the previous decade and
avoid falling foul of the new government. The two cases
1 Anonymous, Hinc Illae Lachrymae, or the Impietie of
Impunitie, (1648), 4.
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are rather different, because Leveret had no intention of
continuing as agent, while Clarke not only had to avoid
censure but also retain his status as Rhode Island's
representative. Clarke's case is therefore worth
considering in some depth.
Analysis of John Clarke's English career would be
much simpler if he had a less common name, and there are
relatively few instances in which he can be identified
with absolute certainty. He usually made his Rhode Island
connection explicit when writing tracts and in
correspondence, but attempts to distinguish him from
namesakes in such documents as English church membership
records is inevitably an inexact science.
One thing which Clarke certainly did after the
Restoration was publish a tract entitled The Plotters
Unmasked, Murderers No Saints. This was a vehement
condemnation of Thomas Venner's Fifth Monarchist
uprising, and was published soon after the failure of
that insurrection in January 1661. Within weeks, Clarke
made his first petition for a Rhode Island charter, and
it is hard to escape the conclusion that the pamphlet was
intended to establish his loyalty to the new regime and
thus create a favourable reception for the petition.
Clarke was convinced that he had to repudiate the
rebels and provide testimony to his own law-abiding
nature for two reasons, both familiar to those agents who
had been caught up in the religious debates of fifteen
years before. First, Clarke was suspected of involvement
in the Fifth Monarchy movement, and was certainly a well
known radical Baptist. Second, and in a rather indirect
manner, his New England origins cast him in a dubious
light.
The evidence that Rhode Island's John Clarke was an
active Fifth Monarchist is inconclusive, although there
are sufficient circumstantial clues to make a reasonable
case. Clarke's writings and correspondence in the 1650s
reveal a man with strong millenarian beliefs. In
particular, his letters to Colonel Robert Bennett in 1655
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and 1658 make repeated reference to themes which appear
regularly in millenarian work. Clarke urged Bennett to
"wield the shield of faith and the sword of the Spirit"
and "march courageously after that Captain who, ere long,
will gloriously appear to be the Lord of hosts and the
Prince of kings."1
As the editor of these letters notes, there was at
least one other radical called John Clarke in London the
later 1650s, and it may have been this man who was
imprisoned in 1658 following a raid on a gathering in
Swan Alley, Coleman Street. Rhode Island's Clarke made no
mention later of spending six months in jail while in
England. It is true, however, that the account of the
1658 trial has various parallels with the colonist's own
experiences while on trial in Massachusetts seven years
previously. In both cases the defendant quoted the Bible
extensively, had to have his hat forcibly removed, and
launched a bold attack on the validity of the government
by which he was being tried.2
Whether the Rhode Island agent was at the heart of
London's Fifth Monarchy agitation, or held a more
academic millenarianism, he was not involved in Venner's
1661 revolt. Clarke was arrested and briefly detained in
the aftermath of the uprising, but so were numerous other
Baptists, Quakers and Congregationalists.3 His religious
activities in the previous decade, and in particular his
preaching to the Baptist congregation at Worchester
House, would have been sufficient to have him arrested in
1661. However noticeable it was, though, Clarke's
behaviour did not come close to the sort of subversion
practised by Thomas Venner. What Clarke did share with
1 B.R. White, ed. "Early Baptist Letters", Baptist
Quarterly, 27 (1977-78): 142-149. Quotation from Clarke
to Bennett, 6 August 1655, 144.
2 See A Narrative... of John Canne. .. . (1658); Clarke's
account of his Massachusetts experience is in his 111
Newes from New-England,- 27-4 0.
3 See Bernard Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, (1972), 199.
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former Massachusetts settler Venner was a New England
connection, and this, when combined with the taint of
religious radicalism, persuaded Clarke that he had to
prove his loyalty. Venner spoke of his years in New
England during his trial in mid-January 1661, creating
just the sort of publicity that agents and colonies alike
would have rather avoided.1
Part of the reason for doubting Clarke's involvement
with the Fifth Monarchists is his rapid move to petition
the Crown for a colony charter in the aftermath of
Venner's uprising: it has been argued that a known
radical would have been forced to keep a low profile for
a time.2 In fact, Clarke's New England background made it
imperative that he rapidly demonstrate that he was in
London as an agent, and remove all suspicion that he was
there as an insurrectionist. While Venner would have been
no more tolerated in the colonies than he was in England,
Charles II nonetheless suspected that New England was
still the potential source of rebellion that it had been
to his father. Clarke had neither the orders nor the
resources to make a serious bid for a charter early in
1661, but by lodging an initial petition he could at
least make it clear that he was in England for a good
reason, and register his intention to further represent
Rhode Island.
Massachusetts provides one final example of the effect of
religious activities on transatlantic relationships and
the careers of agents. Simon Bradstreet and John Norton
had a complicated relationship with their colony, as has
been noted, but they also faced personal attacks in
England over their attitudes to Quakers in the colonies.
In addition the colony itself was the subject of Quaker
1 Venner was executed on 19 January 1661 after a two day
trial. See Maclear, "New England and the Fifth Monarchy"
WMQ 32 (1975) , 257.




The Massachusetts leadership was united in its
condemnation of the Quaker agitators who began arriving
in the colony in the later sixteen-fifties. Although
there were clear divisions between and among the
Magistrates and Deputies over the 1662 mission to
England, it should not be assumed that the moderate
faction which organised the dispatch of the agents was
any more tolerant of radical sectarianism. The colonial
leadership may have differed in the best approach to
securing English support and avoiding English
interference, but a wish to be on cooperative terms with
the home country should not be equated with any
anachronistic idea of political or religious liberalism.
Quakers began their barrage of criticism of
Massachusetts well before the Restoration, and a
considerable volume of evidence was available in England
by the time of the Bradstreet-Norton mission. One of the
earliest major accounts was published by Francis Howgill
in 1659, in which the experiences of Quakers in New
Netherland and Plymouth as well as in Massachusetts were
described. Howgill's account was supported soon after by
Humphrey Norton, who compiled his account while returning
to England. A large part of Norton's evidence was
gathered from New Netherland, and he clearly aimed to
stir nationalist feelings when he stressed that
Englishmen were suffering there, quite apart from the
fact that they were also Quakers. Rhode Island, Norton
concluded, was the only place of refuge on the continent,
and the "habitation of the hunted-Christ."2
Massachusetts was undoubtedly guilty of most, if not
all, of the atrocities claimed by the Quakers, and the
1 For a recent study of Quaker agitation in the Bay
Colony, see Carla Pestana, "The City upon a Hill under
Siege: The Puritan Perception of the Quaker Threat to
Massachusetts Bay, 1656-1661" NEQ 56 (1983): 323-353.
2 See Howgill, The Popish Inquisition Newly Erected in
New-England, (1659); Norton, New Englands Ensigne, (1659),
19, 14.
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ferocity of the Bay Colony's actions indicates a deep
fear of the potential impact of the new sect. Nor did the
colony leadership stop at using the full severity of
their laws against the Quakers. As in the case of the
Gortonists early in the previous decade, Massachusetts
recognised that there was a propaganda battle to be
fought if others were to be 'saved' from the influence of
the radicals. Earlier dissidents had been exiled in an
attempt to silence them, but the Bay leadership had more
tools at its disposal by 1659, one of the more potent
being the printing press at Cambridge.
The most widely circulated anti-Quaker tract to be
printed in New England was John Norton's The Heart of
N-England Rent. Norton's work, which was later reprinted
in London, was a forceful defence of the Bay Colony's
actions, and also a bitter condemnation of what the
author saw as a decline in the moral fabric of the
colony: the subtitle of the work condemned the
"blasphemies of the present generation." Norton asked
"whether the keepers of a vineyard having set up an
hedge, may not maintain it against the wild beasts of the
field, when breaking of it down?" He also drew on
perceived historical parallels to cast the Bay Colony as
the defenders of Christendom. The Gnostics of the early
church, wrote Norton, had been revealed as false Apostles
despite the persuasiveness of their claims to be in
fellowship with Christ, and the same would in time be
true of the Quakers.1
Norton's role in the fight against the Quakers was
not restricted to pamphleteering, and he rapidly gained a
reputation as a leading persecutor of the sect. By the
time of the 1662 mission, Norton's name had appeared in a
number of Quaker tracts, as had that of his fellow agent
Simon Bradstreet. Norton had been the chief interrogator
of Christopher Holder and John Copeland in 1657; worse,
he had refused to censure the Boston jailer for cruelty
1 Norton, The Heart of N-England Rent, London edn (1660),
85, 87.
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toward the Quaker William Brend, despite complaints from
some members of Norton's own church. The same account
levelled particular criticism at magistrate Bradstreet,
Governor John Endecott and Deputy-Governor Richard
Bellingham.1 Other critics attacked Norton's writings and
questioned his claim that Massachusetts was a bastion
against heresy. Isaac Penington, son of one of the
leading London Aldermen of the interregnum, wrote
detailed answers to various papers including Norton's in
1660. While Penington did not doubt the honest intentions
of many who emigrated, he noted that many more had
remained in England to "bear their testimony for God and
his truth by suffering." Perhaps the Bay Colony had not
really had "sufficient warrant from God to transplant."2
Massachusetts may have hoped that such criticism of
individuals and the colony alike would meet with little
favour in England at the turn of the decade. Even if the
short-lived governments of 1659-60 had been aware of
every claim in every Quaker pamphlet, they had higher
priorities than the enforcement of toleration in New
England. Later, whatever the restored monarchy may have
thought of the Bay Colony, colonial leaders can be
forgiven for assuming that it would surely think less of
the Quakers. Initial contact between Boston and London
after the Restoration made no apology for actions against
the Quakers. This may have been simple arrogance on the
part of Governor Endecott, or it may be that the Bay
genuinely believed it would be congratulated for holding
the line against the radicals.
Quaker propaganda, allied to the fact that most of
the Bay leadership had been involved in measures against
the sect, made it very difficult for Massachusetts to
send an agent in 1662 who was not vulnerable to
accusations of intolerance. Evidence from Quakers added
1 Howgill, Popish Inquisition, 33, 37, 62.
2 Penington, An Examination of the Grounds and Causes...,
(1660), 50-70 (quotation: 51).
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to the general feeling that the Bay Colony's behaviour
was unacceptable, and that its divergence from England
during the previous three decades had become too great to
be ignored.
Questions of faith and ecclesiastical policy occupied the
English wherever they settled in the mid-seventeenth
century, and agents inevitably faced a barrage of
informed criticism. There was one related issue, however,
which promised to give agents and other colonials a near-
monopoly on available information. Questions about
Indians allowed agents to employ the full weight of their
American experiences. This was an area in which few
Englishmen had first-hand knowledge, and was therefore a
convenient battleground between agents themselves. In the
1640s especially, Massachusetts and Rhode Island agents
tried to take advantage of the issue for their own ends.
Relations between colonists and Indians had been a
major concern of the New England settlers in their first
decade in America, and it was soon to be prominent in a
transatlantic context also. In particular, the progress-
or lack thereof- in the drive to convert Indians to
Christianity was a prime concern of some English
commentators and sponsors of the colonies. Most agents
serving in the 1640s had to deal directly or indirectly
with the relationship between colonists and native
Americans in the course of their missions. New England
Indians were used for many purposes by the colonists,
from providers of food in hard winters to the subjects of
tales told to frighten children. They also, sometimes
willingly, represented part of the case put forward by
agents. Some English observers used conversion as a
yardstick for colonial success, forcing agents to defend
their colonies' record in that field. Agents themselves
used stories about Indians for various purposes:
Massachusetts agents used the issue to seek charitable
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contributions and make a case for the military expansion
of Bay Colony, while Rhode Islanders capitalised on
Boston's poor evangelical record and enlisted Indians as
supporters in their claims against Massachusetts'
expansionism. While none of these manoeuvres helped the
Indians in the long term, the activities of Rhode Island
agents did help to postpone the complete English conquest
of southern New England.
Massachusetts agents Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter
first raised the Indian question in New Englands First
Fruits, published in 1643. The pamphlet painted a glowing
picture of the colonists' efforts to bring the light of
civilisation to the Indians, who were previously in
"hellish darkness". Less emphasis was given to religious
questions, though, than to the portrayal of English
actions towards the Indians: the natives had welcomed the
English, stated the agents, and never ceased to be
impressed by the civilised behaviour of the settlers, who
were careful to buy all land fairly and accord the
Indians equal rights before the courts.1
The rest of the agents' pamphlet was devoted to an
account of the first years of the college at Cambridge,
Massachusetts, which they argued showed considerable
promise in the training of ministers but lacked funds for
proper teaching. Converting Indians and educating would-
be ministers were actually rather low in the scale of
priorities adopted in the Bay Colony, but naturally
enough the agents picked out two issues which could
appeal to wealthy English sympathisers. The success
enjoyed by Weld and Peter in raising money for these
causes in the earlier parts of their mission is testimony
to their perceptive targeting.
In their discussion of the Indian question, Weld and
Peter inadvertently began a debate which they had cause
later to regret. Peter in particular became so bitterly
disappointed by the whole business that he labelled
1 Weld, New Englands First Fruits, (1643), 8.
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Indian conversion "a plain cheat".1 More important than
the disillusionment of individuals, however, was the way
in which relations between Massachusetts and the Indians
provided a ready means of attack for opponents of the Bay
Colony and an on-going issue to be faced by later
Massachusetts agents. Edward Winslow found himself on the
defensive in the later 1 64 0 s and had to devote
considerable effort to the promotion of the Bay Colony's
evangelical image.
Roger Williams made a rather different use of the
Indian question during his first mission in 1643.
Williams had been forced to spend some time with the
Indians when he was banished from Massachusetts in 1636:
it was mid-winter and the Narragansett tribe offered him
shelter until he was able to establish his new settlement
at Providence. His experiences enabled him to make an
informed attack on the image of the Indians put forward
by Weld and Peter.
In New Englands First Fruits, Weld had made much of
the difficulties facing the colonists in the conversion
of Indians. The Indians had to be educated and
enlightened from scratch, having never had any contact
with English settlers before. In addition, Weld stressed
that the language barrier was daunting. Both sides found
language-learning difficult, Weld admitted, but the task
was particularly hard for the English, faced as they were
with the many Indian dialects spoken in the region.2
Weld surely believed that he was on solid ground
here. The language problem had been identified from the
early days of colonisation as a barrier to meaningful
discussion with Indians on any topic other than the most
routine. In the beginning, the issue had been approached
with some confidence, and settlers claimed "we purpose to
learn their language as soon as we can, which will be a
1 Stearns, The Strenuous Puritan, 180.
2 Weld, New Englands First Fruits, 1.
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means to do them good."1 However, one writer complained
that while it may have been easy enough to communicate in
terms of trade and the like,
how shall a man express unto them things merely
spiritual, which have no affinity with sense, unless we
were thoroughly acquainted with their language, and they
with ours?"2
When Weld added his voice to the issue, he simply
extended the familiar argument that Indian languages
would take time to learn, and that conversion would
necessarily have to be delayed.
Not so, argued Williams. The Rhode Islander arrived
in England shortly after New Englands First Fruits was
published and was soon in print himself. A Key into the
Language of America contains the first of several
statements by Williams on the question of Indian
conversion and reveals some important differences between
his approach and that of the Bay Colony. First, Williams
knew that it was possible to communicate with different
Indian groups. He did not explicitly criticise Weld's
pamphlet, and actually acknowledged the work of his
"worthy countrymen...(of late in print)". Nonetheless,
Williams did take pains to emphasise at the very
beginning of his Key, that Indian
dialects do exceedingly differ; yet not so, but...a man
may, by this help, converse with thousands of natives all
over the country: and by such converse it may please the
Father of Mercies to spread civility, (and in His own
most holy season) Christianity...3
Although Williams was promoting his own guide to
Indian languages as a means of overcoming problems, he
also made it clear that his own knowledge had not come
from books, but from regular contact with the Indians.
The difficulties suggested by the Massachusetts agents
1 New Englands Plantation, 13, in Force, Tracts, I.
2 A Planters Plea, 29, in Force, Tracts, II.
3 Williams, Writings, I: 80.
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stemmed in large part from an almost total lack of effort
on the part of the Bay clergy, rather than any real
difficulties in communication or lack of resources.
Williams went on to claim that he could easily have
persuaded all the Indians he knew to observe the Sabbath,
but that such superficial observation of Christian
doctrine did not constitute true conversion.1 The logical
conclusion of Williams' arguments was unlikely to please
the orthodox on either side of the Atlantic. Later, in
his Christenings make not Christians, Williams argued
that America was not alone in lying "dead in sin and
trespasses", and that the English had work to do
reforming in their own country before they spread the
gospel to the Indian.2
When Christenings reached the press in 1645,
Williams was already involved in England's religious
debates, and his ideas about conversion served to further
tie him to the radical fringe. To much of Williams'
audience, the chief impact of his early work was to give
the impression that Massachusetts was neglecting one of
its stated reasons for existence. Williams may have
abstained from conversion because of theological qualms,
but the fact remained that he had made sufficient contact
with the Indians to reach the point where conversion was
technically feasible. It was clear from Williams' account
that the Bay Colony had not even made that degree of
effort to bring the Gospel to the Indians. This, despite
the colony having been established in America for a dozen
years under a charter which stated explicitly that
conversion of the Indians was "the principal end of this
plantation."3
Later Rhode Island agents also turned the Indians
into a political weapon for use against Massachusetts.
1 Williams, Writings, I: 220.
2 Williams, Writings, VI: 37.
3 For the Charter, see English Historical Documents, IX:
82.
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Usually, their approach was more direct than that of
Williams, but just as carefully planned. If Williams
endeavoured to learn about Indian culture and explore
religious beliefs, some of his fellow colonists came to
rely on more practical aspects of Indian life. The most
elaborate instance of Indian involvement in the affairs
of an agent did not involve conversion, but rather
represents a desperate attempt by two of New England's
persecuted communities to hold back a common enemy.
Samuel Gorton, defending his settlement of religious
refugees at Shawomet, took the radical step of enlisting
Indian support in his battle with Massachusetts. Gorton
persuaded three of the Narragansett leaders to pledge
their loyalty to Charles I in 1644. Gorton's reasons for
doing this were various. The move mirrored the Bay
Colony's action in persuading William Arnold's faction in
the town of Providence to align itself with the United
Colonies. More importantly, in a period when most
factions in England were still paying careful lip-service
to the idea that Charles was a good king with evil
counsellors, Massachusetts could not readily belittle the
sachems' oath of allegiance.
The Narragansett tribe and Gorton's followers had
much in common by 1644. Both feared being hounded off
their lands by Massachusetts, which had already used
military force against both groups. Gorton and his
followers sought shelter with the Narragansett following
the raid on Shawomet by a troop of Bay militia and the
subsequent trial and imprisonment of the Gortonists.
Although released and banished because they were
spreading sedition even from their jail cells, the
Gortonists had good reason to fear that Massachusetts
might act even more drastically in future. At much the
same time, the Narragansett had been given a salutary
example of Bay Colony justice when their leader
Miantonomi was murdered by a rival tribe with the
approval and assistance of the Massachusetts authorities.
Samuel Gorton gave a full account of his relations
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with the local Indian tribes in Simplicities Defence, and
never missed a chance to enlist Indian support for his
actions. Sometimes, Gorton's accounts of Indian
interpretations of events were clearly designed to give
the impression that the Indians were a wise and worldly
people, and he made use of even the most enigmatic of
Indian criticisms of Massachusetts. When the Gortonists
were making their way back to the Narragansett Bay after
their release from prison, they encountered the local
sachem. Gorton asked him what he knew of Captain Cook,
leader of the expedition to capture the Shawomet men. The
Indian replied that he had no call to judge Cook, except
to note that to his people, "good Captains" were those
who supported the few against the many.1
The Narragansett were much impressed by the
Gortonists survival, having believed that the members of
the sect would be unlikely to return from captivity in
Massachusetts. Gorton took full advantage of the
situation and held a carefully planned meeting with the
Indians. One or more of the Gortonists had been ejected
from every English colony in southern New England by that
point, but they told the Indians that they were far from
discouraged. On the contrary, as Englishmen, they were
entitled to help from the authorities in London. However
blatant this stage management was, it certainly worked:
the Indians called an assembly on the spot and declared
their allegiance to King Charles.2
The negotiations between the Gortonists and the
Narragansett were not entirely one-sided, though. The
Indians were aware that a civil war was being fought in
England, and assumed that Massachusetts had released
Gorton from prison because it feared retribution from
1 Gorton, Simplicities Defence, 85.
2 Gorton's tactics are considered in William G. Roelker,
"Samuel Gorton's Master Stroke", Rhode Island History 2
(1943): 1-10. The sachems' pledge of allegiance to
Charles I is in Gorton, Simplicities Defence, 90-92.
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Gorton's English supporters.1 Gorton undoubtedly disguised
the fact that he was no more certain of a favourable
hearing in London than anyone else. Still, assuming he
could persuade the Warwick Commission to stop the Bay
Colony's expansion, the Indians' interpretation might
prove to be true, and thereby benefit them as well as the
Shawomet settlers. Throughout his account, Gorton uses
the Indians' view to stress that the Bay Colony was out
of the control of England, and that it was the persecuted
parties of New England who were loyal to the home
government. The Gortonists, observed the Indians,
"belonged to a better master than Massachusetts did."2
Gorton's intentions are revealed by the final
sentence in this part of his account, in which he notes
that he and his comrades were entrusted to convey the
Indians submission to the King, "in case we went over
about our own occasions." The attempt to be coy is
markedly unconvincing. There is no doubt that a mission
to England was being planned before the conference, and
that the submission of Pessisus, Canonicus and Mixanno
was organised as a potentially useful weapon in that
mission's armoury. Gorton gave the Indian action a
prominent place in Simplicities Defence, mentioning the
submission of the tribe on his title page, and using it
cleverly to stress his opinion that Massachusetts was
acting without regard to the authority or laws of
England. Using letters written to him since his departure
from New England, Gorton repeatedly stressed the Indians'
willingness to live peaceably under the laws of England,
and the corresponding refusal of the Massachusetts
authorities to allow them so to do.
Gorton's tactics did not in the long term save the
1 The elder Winthrop feared the consequences of Indians
taking advantage of England's troubles. He recorded in
his journal that the uprising in Virginia in 1644 came
shortly after Indians observed Parliamentary and Royalist
ships in combat in the Chesapeake Bay. See Winthrop,
Journal, II; 167-8.
2 Gorton, Simplicities Defence, 89.
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Narragansett, but they did help to save his own people.
Edward Winslow responded to Gorton's charges by offering
an alternative version of Miantonomi's death, but could
not adequately argue against the Indians' subjection to
England. Winslow did his best to blacken the reputations
of Gorton and the Indians, and tried to explain away the
English involvement in Miantonomi's murder by claiming
that two colonists were there simply to ensure that the
sachem was killed quickly and not tortured.1 Winslow also
repeated the point made earlier by Thomas Weld, who noted
in his preface to John Winthrop's history of the
Antinomian crisis that two Indian sachems had led their
tribes in subjecting themselves to Massachusetts, seeking
both protection and instruction in the Gospels.2 After
Gorton's revelation that some Indians were much happier
to subject themselves to England than to Massachusetts,
this tactic only added weight to Gorton's charge that the
Bay was acting as a separate state and not paying due
regard to England.
Winslow's raising of the Indian as an object of fear
and treachery in the dispute with Gorton shortly gave way
to more subtle tactics. The Indian question served a
double purpose for Massachusetts in the 1640s and beyond.
In the face of some mystified English queries as to why
the colonists remained in New England when the
Reformation effort in England was in need of good men,
Massachusetts continued to use the conversion of Indians
as a way of justifying the continued existence of the New
England settlements. In addition, despite the scandal
over misappropriated funds during the Weld-Peter mission,
the Bay Colony recognised that significant sums of money
would be sent to New England by benefactors, provided
they could be given sufficient encouragement. This money
could be diverted for non-evange1ica1 purposes.
1 Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, 80-81.
2 See Winthrop, A Short Story, in Hall, ed. The Antinomian
Controversy, 219; Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, 2.
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Massachusetts attempted to keep Edward Winslow as their
agent in England at the expense of the Corporation for
the Propagation of the Gospel in New England, and weapons
were also purchased by the Bay Colony with money
originally donated for the maintenance of preachers.1
When he became involved in the gospel propagation
enterprise, Edward Winslow moved into the most
significant and successful phase of his propagandist
career. Ironically, Winslow's own considerable writing
experience was rarely employed in convincing England that
the Indians were being converted: rather, he was
instrumental in collecting and editing letters and
evidence from the evangelical ministers of Massachusetts.
Although Winslow can take some credit for persuading the
Warwick Commission that Massachusetts should be left to
deal with its own internal religious squabbles in the
1640s, his efforts in securing the creation of the
Corporation for the Propagation of the Gospel were
undoubtedly his greatest service to the leaders of the
United Colonies. It is fitting that this should be so,
for it nicely sums up Winslow's quarter-century of
pamphleteering. In his first propaganda tract, Good News
from New England, the Plymouth agent had devoted some
effort to misrepresenting the Pilgrims' relations with
the local Indians in order to justify that colony's
acquisition of valuable land and trade resources.2 By
1649, Winslow had widened his scope to much of New
England, but tracts like The Glorious Progress of the
Gospel were published with much the same intentions. By
painting a rosy picture of attempts to convert and
'civilise' Indians, Winslow hoped to ensure a steady flow
of money and goodwill from England to the Puritan
colonies.
1 See Jennings, Invasion of America, 247.
2 Winslow was sent to England to explain away Miles
Standish's massacre of Massachusetts Indians at
Wessagusset. See George Willison, Saints and Strangers,
(1946), 199-200; also Jennings, Invasion of America, 187.
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Agents therefore played their part in ensuring that New
England- for good or ill- remained in the thoughts of a
range of interested parties in the home country. Their
primary task, however, was to make contact with England's
leaders, and present persuasive petitions. The two
chapters which follow analyse direct contacts between
agents and colonial administrators and the decisions
reached by the latter. Before that, however, the final
section of this chapter will examine the ways in which
agents attempted to influence the English authorities
from a distance, through the pages of their polemical
tracts.
Impressing powerful people was one of the major
purposes of agency pamphleteering, agents took every
available opportunity to commend their work to those in
high office. Pamphlet dedications in the seventeenth
century are often full of complimentary platitudes, and
follow common forms. A sample of those written by agents
reveals great stress on the "weighty, difficult, and
distractful incombrances" faced by the commissions and
committees of government, and hope that the "spirit of
tenderness and compassion toward the oppressed" exhibited
by leading political figures would result in the petition
concerned receiving the "favourable approbation" of the
English authorities.1
The Earl of Warwick and his Commission for the
Plantations were regular recipients of such praise from
agents in 1646/7, and the four pamphlets produced in
those years by Samuel Gorton, Edward Winslow and William
Vassall mark the zenith of competitive agency
pamphleteering. All were closely related to missions, but
1 These examples come from John Clarke, 111 Newes from
New-England, (1652), 3; Samuel Gorton, Simplicities
Defence, (1646), Epistle Dedicatory (n.p.); Edward
Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, (1647), Epistle Dedicatory
(n.p.).
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usually aimed at making a wider impression also.
Together, they exemplify the tactics, methods and skills
of agent pamphleteers.
Gorton was first in print with Simplicities Defence
Against Seven-Headed Policy, published in the late summer
of 1646. This work condemned Massachusetts for its
actions against both the Shawomet settlers and the
Narragansett Indians. Winslow found the work in
circulation when he reached England early in 1647, and
responded with Hypocrisie Unmasked. Shortly afterward,
the Massachusetts Remonstrants put their case in New-
Englands Jonas Cast up at London: the tract appeared
under the authorship of Major John Child but was widely
believed to come from the pen of William Vassall.
Winslow's reply to the Remonstrants is contained in New-
Englands Salamander.1
The central tactical difference between the first
two pamphlets is that Gorton's was published after he had
obtained a favourable hearing from the Warwick
Commission, while Winslow's predated his own approach to
the committee. Gorton's work was far from being
redundant, though, and indeed demonstrates his political
skills and awareness of the problems facing him. Gorton
had no illusions that the Warwick Commission's initial
decision would be the end of the matter. He spent the
summer of 1646 preparing all the available documentary
evidence to support his claim that the Bay Colony was
acting beyond the bounds of its charter and, more
1 The chronology of these pamphlets is important.
Simplicities Defence has a title-page date of 3 August
1646, and George Thomason's catalogue records it as
having been received on 7 November 1646. Hypocrisie
Unmasked appears under 2 October 1646 in Thomason, but
the pamphlet refers explicitly to events in Massachusetts
in November 1646, and Winslow did not leave Boston until
mid-December. Assuming the title-page date (1646) to be
accurate, the pamphlet must have been published between
Winslow's arrival in England and the end of the Julian
year on 24 March 1647. New-Englands Jonas is dated 1647,
and was received by Thomason on 15 April. New-Englands
Salamander is also dated 1647, and is listed by Thomason
on 29 May 1647.
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importantly, in violation of the laws of England.
Simplicities Defence was intended as a more complete
relation of events in New England than the petitioners
had previously offered. Gorton had gained the sympathy of
the Commissioners in the spring: now, he hoped to
reinforce that advantage before the expected reaction
from the Bay Colony.
Gorton was a sophisticated propagandist. He made
extensive use of correspondence and official documents
from the colonies to give his pamphlet a comprehensive
provenance. To be sure, references to other works were
nothing new in the pamphlets of the 1640s, and it was
common for polemical tracts to be rebuffed later in
almost line-by-line criticism. References to the bible
filled the margins of texts relating to theological
questions, and indeed many of those which had no bearing
on theology at all. Gorton took this a step further,
though. By publishing letters and official records
gathered from Massachusetts, the Shawomet settlers and
the Indians, Gorton was able to weave his story around a
solid frame of evidence, much of it from sources hostile
to himself. This was calculated to persuade readers of
the veracity of the Shawomet settlers' case, but equally
important, it put Massachusetts on the defensive. When
Edward Winslow arrived to campaign for the Bay Colony, he
found himself having to refute claims based in
significant part on documents emanating from the colony
which he represented.
Winslow's response was not long in coming after he
reached England. The purpose of Hypocrisie Unmasked was
rather different from Gorton's work, because it had not
only to repair any damage done to the Bay Colony's image
in general terms, but also represent the first part of
Winslow's counter-petition to the authorities. The
dedicatory passage in Hypocrisie Unmasked is in effect an
open letter to the Warwick Commission. Winslow denied
that the issue was one of persecutors and victims, and
claimed that the real dispute was between defenders of
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order and anarchists. Far from criticising Massachusetts,
England should add its authority to the colony's attempts
to curb the activities of "dangerous enemies" like Gorton
and his Indian allies. Gorton himself, the "pestilent
disturber" of New England society, should be kept in
England and never allowed to return to America. With an
eye on the possible arrival in England of one or more of
the Remonstrant faction, Winslow also indicated that the
Commission could do great service to Massachusetts by
discouraging future petitions from those who had for some
reason fallen foul of colonial justice.1
The significance of the last point is two-fold.
First, Massachusetts was well aware of the damage being
done to its image by the appearance of a variety of
dissidents in England, each adding a new chapter to the
growing volume of criticism of the New England
authorities. Winslow himself was candid on this point,
acknowledging that the "gross deformatory aspersion" cast
by the Gortonists might "sadden the thoughts of our
nation against us". Second, the Bay Colony needed a clear
sign from England that the route of appeal to the home
government was firmly closed, because this would make
potential opponents of the Bay hierarchy think twice
before clashing with the colonial leadership. New
England's leaders feared the onset of a cycle of
disruption, where dissident groups in the colonies
appealed to England, encouraging other objectors in New
England to follow the same path, whilst also giving the
impression in England that the colonies were slipping
into chaos. This might result in attempts by England to
control the colonies directly, or simply persuade leading
Englishmen that the northern colonies were not worthy of
further investment. Either eventuality would seriously
weaken the power of the leaders of New England.
Just as they employed every available piece of
documentary evidence to give their work authority, agents
1 Winslow, Hypocrisie Unmasked, epistle dedicatory (n.p).
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were also given to quoting well known names as witnesses
to events portrayed in pamphlets. The importance of
individual English leaders to agents had already been
noted, and pamphleteers rarely lost an opportunity to
drop influential names, sometimes on the most feeble of
excuses. Such tactics could of course be counter¬
productive if the individual involved had a bad
reputation in England, but in general the impression of
weight and veracity was successfully given.
Enlisting support from individuals was an important
part of the conflict between Winslow and the
Remonstrants. To Winslow's good fortune, the real issues
between Massachusetts and the petitioners were lost amid
controversy over a storm suffered by the ship carrying
Vassall and his Remonstrance to England. Rumours spread
quickly that the ship had been in severe peril until
someone threw the petition and associated papers
overboard, causing an immediate lessening of the storm.
It is a measure of the influence of such accounts of
divine intervention that William Vassall had to devote
considerable space in New-Englands Jonas to denying the
rumours.
Winslow, experienced propagandist that he was, made
the most of the affair. He offered a list of reputable
witnesses who were on the ship, and who were apparently
willing to testify to the falsity of the Remonstrants'
version. Given that his list included John Leveret,
Winslow's witnesses were doubtless partial, but he made a
point of stressing their military titles and the fact
that Captain Sailes was a former Governor of Bermuda. In
addition, Winslow noted that the Reverend Thomas Peter
had originally intended to travel with the ship but had
instead taken a different passage on the advice of, among
others, John Cotton. What Winslow did not mention, of
course, was that Peter's own voyage was if anything even
more stormy than that experienced by the Remonstrants.1
1 Winslow, New-Englands Salamander, 133, 131. Peter's
account has already been noted: see Chapter 4 above.
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While content to let superstition do most of his work for
him in this case, Winslow still rarely missed an
opportunity to score a point.
The cornerstone of Winslow's strategy against both
the Gortonists and the Remonstrants was his attempt to
secularise what the dissents portrayed as questions of
faith. Such thinking had long been part of the defence of
the Massachusetts authorities when they were accused of
interfering in matters spiritual. Thomas Weld, for
example, wrote of the "open contempt cast upon the face
of the whole General Court" by Anne Hutchinson's
Antinomians during the crisis of 1637-38.1 The final
manifestation of Winslow's campaign was the reprinting of
Hypocrisie Unmasked in 1649. The new edition was
identical apart from the title, which had been changed to
The Danger of Tolerating Levellers. Winslow had come to
see in the Bay Colony's struggle against the Gortonists a
lesson to be learned by the English Parliament when faced
with agitators and radicals who muddied the line between
political and ecclesiastical reform.
The role of agents in English affairs appears, therefore,
to have been fraught with ambiguities. They found the
support of some remigrants invaluable, while being
embarrassed by those same individuals' decision to
abandon the colonies. They played a full role in
religious controversies while resenting the tendency of
English commentators to subject their views, and those of
their colonies, to close scrutiny. Acting as
representatives and propagandists for their colonies also
gave agents an opportunity to decide which side of the
Atlantic suited them best as individuals, and the number
1 See Weld's preface to John
the Rise, reign and ruine of
and Libertines, (1644) in
Controversy, 211.
Winthrop, A Short Story of
the Antinomians, Familists
Hall, ed. The Antinomian
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who stayed permanently in England testifies to the
ability of many colonists to rejoin the mainstream of
English society.
In the second wave of agencies, in the early 1660s,
agents had fewer opportunities to play a broader role in
English society. This is in large part a reflection of
just how important religious questions had been to most
of the first generation. Without the freedom to express
their views, the Restoration agents devoted more time to
their missions and less to other activities. For agents,
as for most English people, the return of the Stuarts
required some changes, although perhaps not quite so many
as has been supposed. It is to continuity and change in
agents' dealings with England's colonial administrators
that the next chapter turns.
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Interregnum Missions: Precedent and Stability
During the interregnum, agents had to approach English
leaders who were potentially friendly toward the New
England colonies. To some extent, this was far more
problematic than dealing with governments which were
clearly hostile. As the last chapter demonstrated, there
was often some ambivalence in the transatlantic
relationship, and agents could never be sure of their
reception. Opponents of Stuart political and religious
policy wielded power on both sides of the Atlantic, but
while those in authority often had common origins and
even common goals, the circumstances in which they
governed were radically different. Variations in the
political environment created a divergence in priorities
and methods. England's leaders in the 1640s faced
responsibilities and hazards which had in some degree
been familiar to their New England brethren for a decade
or more, but they often came to quite different
solutions. By the mid-1640s New Englanders realised that
hopes of a near-automatic affinity between them and
England's new rulers were unrealistic. It fell to agents
to overcome such hurdles.
England's interregnum governments were usually
willing to listen to New England agents, which was at
least an improvement on the chilly relations between the
colonists and the court of Charles I. Indeed, the
problems faced by agents throughout the interregnum were
not that England's leaders actively opposed their
petitions, but rather that New England's squabbles
usually did not have the priority that the colonists
expected. It came as an unpleasant surprise to the
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Massachusetts leadership in particular that some of
England's most influential figures did not consider the
theocratic commonwealth to be of much relevance to
England's broader overseas aims. Parliamentary factions
did not find common cause with New England sects, however
much individuals may have shared religious beliefs. In
addition, leading members of the House of Lords, who had
been prominent patrons to the colonising movement in the
1620s and 1630s, became increasingly disenchanted with
the prospects of the northern colonies, and their views
coloured the decisions of the Parliamentary government in
the 1640s.
Most important were the linked questions of
precedent and stability. Throughout the 1640s only a
small minority of England's leaders was fully committed
to drastic change in the structures of government, and
where existing mechanisms and institutions posed no
threat to the Parliamentary cause, adjustments and
reforms were kept to a minimum. Such conservatism seemed
to offer hope of maintaining some stability in the face
of appeals for stronger action from radical elements, and
formed the basis for most government during the
interregnum: this policy was to a large extent mirrored
in colonial administration. The only regime likely to
make major alterations to the constitutional position of
the New England colonies was the Commonwealth government
of 1649-1653. It is no coincidence that some of the most
fruitful personal ties between Rhode Island agents and
English leaders involved the more radical
parliamentarians who remained in office through the 1640s
and came to dominate the Commonwealth period: nor is it
surprising that Massachusetts feared the intentions of
the English republic more than any other interregnum
regime.
The interregnum saw the rise of committee government
in many fields- not least in colonial administration- but
it remained an era in which personalities could easily
dominate. The first, and by no means the easiest task
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facing an agent upon his arrival in England was the
identification of the individuals and institutions to
whom he must deliver his petitions. Even when the correct
committee was identified the agent had to establish which
members of that body were regular in their involvement
and influential in their opinions. Such questions
frustrated agents and have also confused some historians,
but it was in the identification and exploitation of
favourable contacts that the success of missions usually
lay.
This chapter considers such practical aspects of an
agent's work alongside the wider political and
administrative concerns of England's leaders during the
interregnum. It is chronological in structure, beginning
with early attempts by the Short and Long Parliaments to
act in colonial matters and tracing the work of agents
through the committees and councils of successive
regimes. The period from 1643 to 1655 saw almost constant
agency activity, and agents' work reflects the often
difficult means by which England and New England tried to
reach a working accommodation.
The Short Parliament, which sat from 13 April to 5 May
1640 was the first such assembly in England for more than
a decade.1 It had no direct impact on the New England
colonies, and heard no petitions from agents, but it was
nonetheless of some significance to colonial affairs in
general. In particular, it allowed many of those who had
been working to promote colonial enterprise during the
1630s to air their views in a public forum, and register
their intention to use their influence to further the
cause of overseas trade and plantations. It is clear from
1 A recent analysis of the Short Parliament, which places
proceedings in the wider context of Anglo-Scottish
tension, is in Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British
Monarchies, (1991), 90-123.
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these brief proceedings that some of England's most
prominent figures had been waiting for some time to
present their grievances in Parliament, not least in
colonial issues.
In his speech on 17 April 1640, veteran
parliamentarian John Pym made much of the disaffection
which had grown among merchants and traders over the
previous decade. In particular, argued Pym, the burdens
of new taxation had "been insupportable to the poor
plantations... in diverse parts of the continent and
islands of America." The southern tobacco-growing
colonies were Pym's main concern here, but he went on to
note that other parts of America, if well managed,
offered opportunities for Charles I. "It is not unknown
how weak, how distracted, how discontented, the Spanish
colonies are in the West Indies", observed Pym, who
believed that established settlements in New England,
Virginia and Bermuda might provide men to invade and
occupy Spanish territory.1
The prospect of Parliament taking such initiatives
in colonial affairs was seen as a double-edged sword in
New England, and raised some early fears about the
implications of Parliamentary involvement. Clearly, any
steps that Parliament might take to improve the trading
prospects of colonial merchants would be welcome. At the
same time, Massachusetts was already worried by
remigration, and by suggestions that some of its leading
men were planning to move to the Caribbean. If prominent
figures like John Pym publicly supported this latter
idea, then the Bay Colony was understandably cautious in
its dealings with Pym and his colleagues: too close a
relationship with such people might have been interpreted
as a willingness to heed their advice. As will be seen,
the northern colonies dealt with Parliament regularly
throughout the interregnum, and never approached the
exiled king. This recognition of where power lay must not
1 Stock, Proceedings, I: 97-8.
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be confused with an unambiguous support for successive
Parliamentary regimes, however.
New England's first direct contact with England's
leaders in the 1640s was with the Long Parliament, which
first met on 3 November 1640. It is important to stress
that the calling of this body did not immediately herald
a dramatic breach between king and Parliament. In
particular, Parliament made no attempt to challenge
Charles's jurisdiction over the colonies during its first
two years. In October 1641, for example, the Lords heard
a petition from Anthony Panton of Virginia, who
complained about the actions of the colonial government.
Various members of the Virginia elite were in London at
the time, and the Lords ordered the temporary detention
of three men, including the newly appointed governor
William Berkeley. There is no suggestion that Parliament
saw this as an opportunity to exercise control over
England's most important colony, though. Berkeley was
allowed to continue to Virginia the following month after
Parliament satisfied itself of the validity of his
commission from Charles 1.1
When the king and his court broke with Parliament
and left London in 1642, agents and their colonies were
placed in something of a quandary. Clearly, anyone who
petitioned one side risked antagonising the other, and
there was some initial doubt over the true location of
effective power in England. In at least one case the
confusion led to an open split: Virginia's agent George
Sandys petitioned the House of Commons, but was sharply
rebuked by the colonial assembly which in turn appealed
successfully to the king. Support for Charles and the
Royalist cause remained widespread in Virginia, in part
because Parliament was perceived as being more likely to
revive the old, and much dreaded, Virginia Company. The
dispute between agent Sandys and his employers was
1 The case is charted in various documents printed in
Stock, Proceedings, I: 123-128; Berkeley was 'released'
on 5 November 1641.
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concluded by a letter from Charles I, who was trying to
gather his forces in York, in which any prospect of a
return to Company rule was emphatically denied: Charles
clearly recognised one issue which would ensure the
loyalty of his subjects in Virginia.1
There is no evidence that Massachusetts ever
considered appealing to the king. In part, this stemmed
from bitter experience. The last royal intervention in
New England affairs had been the attempted recall of the
Bay Colony charter, and individual settlers' memories of
royal government in the 1620s were no more pleasant.
Although Charles might have welcomed any support offered
to him in the dangerous times of the mid-1640s, he would
have had to be desperate indeed to receive agents who
were, in his view, of much the same persuasion as his
Parliamentary opponents.
There were other important reasons for directing
petitions to Parliament. The Long Parliament was based in
London and therefore controlled or influenced the most
powerful economic factors which affected New England. The
creditors with whom the first Massachusetts agents were
commissioned to negotiate were mainly based in London,
and there was no better place to try to alleviate the
Bay's shaky financial state. The southern colonies, with
their established trade in plantation crops, were able to
maintain economic ties with Royalist England through
western ports like Bristol, but New England's commercial
ties were with merchants and supporters in London, or in
the eastern counties where the colonial leadership had
formerly lived.
Parliament, sitting in London, and led by men who in
many cases had some sympathy for the New England exiles,
seemed a much more promising option than the refugee
royal court. Early in 1643, Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter
1 An account of case, including a copy of Charles' 5 July
1642 letter is found in "Extract from a manuscript
collection of annals relative to Virginia" in Force,
Tracts, II: 3, 8.
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petitioned for a customs exemption and for leave to raise
money in the London parishes for the transportation of
poor children to a new life in the colonies. The House of
Commons granted an extension to the original customs-free
period included in the Massachusetts charter, and was
sufficiently impressed by the agents' ecclesiastical
credentials to authorise the collection as well.1 The
removal to the colonies of vagrants, orphans and others
acting as a drain on the parish purse was one of the
frequently stated advantages of having such plantations,
and Parliament was happy to encourage the Bay Colony in
this matter.
Parliament's apparent willingness to consider
colonial affairs did not go unnoticed. A growing number
of petitions, mainly from anti-Roya1ist parties
interested in the Caribbean plantations, reached
Parliament during 1643, and there were also fears that
the king was planning to appoint governors and try to
take control of colonial shipping.2 Clearly, Parliament
had to establish itself as the unquestioned authority
over England's colonial resources, but it was in some
measure reluctant so to do. Colonial affairs had always
rested in the hands of the executive rather than the
legislative branch of government: kings and privy
councils rather than parliaments held sway over English
colonies. In colonial matters, as in others, Parliament
was uneasy about setting up new structures which would
mark a clear departure from recent precedents. The Long
Parliament did not envisage itself as having executive
powers in its early years and only gradually developed
ways of exercising such a role as the 1640s progressed
and relations with Charles I deteriorated.
The Long Parliament's first major step in colonial
administration was the establishment of the Warwick
Commission on 2 November 1643. Six peers and twelve
1 Stock, Proceedings, I: 139-40.
2 Stock, Proceedings, I: 147.
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commoners were appointed to the Committee of Lords and
Commons for Foreign Plantations, more commonly named
after its chairman Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of Warwick.1 The
Commission was a constitutional compromise, in that it
was chosen from the ranks of MPs and Lords but did not
have to report on its activities to Parliament; in
addition, Warwick's authority came from his appointment
as High Admiral and Governor-in-Chief of the Colonies in
America, rather than his membership of the House of
Lords. These distinctions maintained a form of executive
authority for colonial affairs at a time when there was
no overall executive that Parliament could recognise.
The Commission had wide powers, but it remained
reluctant to interfere in colonial affairs. In
particular, it rarely took action unless first approached
by agents or colonies. Even then, its procedures were
slow and its decisions often inconclusive. Nowhere is
this tendency more marked than its dealings with
Maryland, which, with its Catholic proprietor and vocal
Protestant faction might have expected close attention
from England's new leaders. In November 1645, the
Commission considered a petition from a number of
inhabitants of Maryland, who objected to the "tyrannical
government" headed by Baron Baltimore. Sure enough, the
Commission concluded that the petitioners had a strong
case, and that it would be a good idea for the colony to
be "settled in Protestant hands." Still, it did not issue
any orders under Warwick's authority, preferring to urge
that a Parliamentary ordinance be passed.2
Warwick himself was charged with drafting this
ordinance, but it took him a full year to present his
views to the Lords. The draft ordinance was forceful: it
declared Baltimore's patent void, displaced the leading
1 The ordinance which established the Commission is in
Lords Journals VI: 291-2. See also Stock, Proceedings, I:
147-149. Membership and other information is given in
appendix 2 below.
2 Stock, Proceedings, 171-172.
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officers of the colony and announced that Parliament
would forthwith appoint a new governor.1 In the event,
while the Lords approved the measure, it was never
presented to the Commons. The Lords called, and
cancelled, several meetings with Baltimore during the
months which followed, and heard various petitions from
him and from his opponents.2 No further action was taken
by the Commission either. Much the same procrastination
can be observed in the case of the Caribbean settlements,
despite several petitions from them in the same period.3
Part of the reason for the Commission's reluctance
to become more closely involved in the southern and
island colonies was that there would undoubtedly have
been some resistance from Royalist factions there. Lord
Admiral Warwick knew better than anyone that Parliament
did not have the naval strength to fight a civil war and
mount expeditions to the colonies at the same time. As
will be seen, circumstances would be different in the
early 1650s, but during the years that Warwick's
Commission administered colonial affairs it was
restricted both by practical constraints and by a more
general reluctance to step beyond existing precedents.
In its dealings with New England, the Commission
demonstrated a similar tendency to react to petitions
rather than act on its own initiative. New England agents
set much of the agenda for the Commission. At a time when
most members were engaged in more pressing political
issues, agents could claim a near-monopoly on information
reaching the Commission. Surviving decrees therefore
reveal as much about the original petitions from the
agents as they do about the decision-making process
itself.
The only evidence surviving from the Warwick
1 Stock, Proceedings, 183-4.
2 See, for example, petitions from Baltimore and a group
of London merchants both heard on 4 March 1647 in Stock,
Proceedings, 194, 195.
3 Stock, Proceedings, 187-194.
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Commission's New England proceedings are letters issued
to petitioners, and also some rare references in the
writings of those who came into contact with it. There
are no minutes of meetings, or any other detailed
accounts of discussions. The signatures which appear on
Commission documents are the only indication of the
involvement of individual members. Signatures, of course,
cannot reveal the frequency of attendance at meetings or
the strength of opinions held. In addition, just because
someone did not sign a particular document does not mean
he disapproved of its contents. Nonetheless, the
signatures can give some indication of which members were
most active and interested in particular issues.1
Evidence about individual committee members is
important to the study of any interregnum body, because
an understanding of the interests and activities of
decision-makers allows judgements to be made about the
role of personal, religious or political factors in the
reception accorded to agents. In the case of the Warwick
Commission, a number of men need to be studied. The
requirement that a majority of the members approve
Commission decrees ensured a far higher degree of
participation than might otherwise have been the case.2 Of
the original eighteen members, one died before any
official decrees were issued, but only two others failed
to sign at least one Commission order.3 On 21 March 1646,
the Warwick Commission was more than doubled in size,
after the members themselves argued for an expansion in
1 Drafts of some Commission letters, written by secretary
William Jessop, are in British Library, Sloane MSS, 184
f114-135. Most of the letters given to agents have been
printed, and references to these are in appendix 2.
2 This rule was unusual for colonial committees. Later
bodies, which did not have the same executive powers,
frequently set their quorum level at a small percentage
of their total membership.
3 John Pym died on 8 December 1643. Oliver Cromwell and
Sir Gilbert Gerard never signed a Commission document.
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the interest of having more frequent meetings.1 This
sample of signatures is large enough to allow informed
analysis of the motives and interests of the Commission.
Seven Commission documents relating to New England
survive, ranging in time from 1644 to 1648. Together,
they represent the English leaders' efforts to maintain
an authoritative role in colonial affairs in the midst of
domestic turmoil. While membership and circumstances
changed over time, the priorities of the Warwick
Commission with regard to New England remained largely
constant. This section considers in turn the case of the
1644 Narragansett Patent, the 1646-47 dispute between
Edward Winslow and the Bay Colony's critics Gorton and
Vassall, and the final proclamation of the Commission in
1648 .
Roger Williams' 1644 patent for Rhode Island has already
been mentioned: it formed the base upon which subsequent
political consolidation in the Narragansett region was
built. Williams' work was challenged by Massachusetts
agent Thomas Weld, and had Weld been successful, the Bay
Colony would have acquired a legitimate title to the
region to accompany its military capabilities. The
conflict between the two agents is notable in that they
never competed face to face, but rather pursued
completely separate paths in pursuit of the same
objective. That Williams reached his goal and Weld did
not owes more to the wider activities of the agents and
the constraints under which they had to operate than to
their specific claims over the Narragansett Bay.
Both agents completed their missions claiming to
have secured documents from the Warwick Commission. Weld
sent a patent to Boston, dated 10 December 1643, which
granted control of the Narragansett country to
Massachusetts, and Williams returned to Rhode Island with
1 Stock, Proceedings, 17 6-7.
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a patent for the same region dated 14 March 1644.1 The two
documents have caused a considerable amount of
historiographical comment, which is worth examining
because much of it has missed the point. The debate has
assumed that Weld and Williams were actively and openly
competing for a patent which they intended to use as the
basis for their future relations with England and with
their neighbouring colonies. The evidence indicates,
however, that only Williams had this intention, and that
Weld was forced to have much more limited aims.
The arguments which have set the tone for most
subsequent analysis were originally aired in the 1860s,
when leading members of the Massachusetts Historical
Society conducted a debate over the two patents. Charles
Deane, writing in February 1862, argued that the
Massachusetts patent was genuine and legitimate, but that
it had not been used by the colony because of fears that
such use would imply subjection to the English
Parliament.2 Later that year Thomas Aspinwall challenged
Deane, denying the validity of the patent, and alleging
that Weld failed in a clandestine attempt to gather a
majority of the Commission's signatures by approaching
them individually.3 More recently, historians have
continued to characterise the Williams/Weld question as a
failure on Weld's part to gain the necessary number of
'votes'.4
The dispute over the number of signatures hinges on
two clauses in the original ordinance which established
the Warwick Commission. The Commission had a quorum of
1 Weld's patent is printed in New England Historical and
Genealogical Register, 9 (1 857) : 4 1-43. Williams'
Narragansett Patent is in RI Rec I: 143-146.
2 Deane, "The So-Called Narragansett Patent", MHS
Proceedings (1860-62): 402.
3 Aspinwall, "The Narragansett Patent", MHS Proceedings,
(1862-63): 41-77, 42.
4 See, for example, Ola E. Winslow, Master Roger Williams,
(1957), 187; LaFantasie, Correspondence, 227(n).
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five (including Warwick himself), but could only take
major decisions involving the constitutional rights and
privileges of colonies if a majority of the eighteen
members was involved.1 Williams' patent had ten
signatures, but Weld's only had nine.2 Strangely enough,
however, both men could in fact claim to have secured the
necessary majority, because Commission member John Pym
died on 8 December 1643 and was not replaced until the
following August: for most of 1644, therefore, nine
signatures constituted a majority.
Despite having this reasonable counter to any
protest about signatures, Massachusetts never tried to
use the document in its dealings with England. It only
once officially invoked Weld's patent, when threatening
Rhode Island in 1645. The Bay Colony informed Roger
Williams on 27 August 1645 that it had recently received
a patent from England, and that Rhode Island's right to
occupy the territory concerned was therefore abrogated.3
Williams refused to be intimidated, and Massachusetts did
not pursue the matter. Weld's document surfaced briefly
again in the early 1660s, when the Atherton Company of
land speculators listed it as part of its claim to the
land west of the Narragansett Bay. By that time the
patent was widely regarded as a fake. Rhode Island
President Brenton informed Atherton planter Edward
Hutchinson that he had seen a copy long before and that
the patent was "not fairly got". England's archives had
been searched, claimed Brenton, and the only patent to be
found was that gained by Williams.4 The Earl of Warwick
himself claimed never to have heard of any formally-
passed Massachusetts patent from 1643. Samuel Gorton
asked about it during his own mission in 1646, and
1 Lords Journals, VI: 292.
2 See Appendix 2, below.
3 See RI Rec I: 133.
4 Hutchinson to Massachusetts Secretary Edward Rawson
April 2 1662, in Mass Archives, 2: 26.
224
Warwick denied all knowledge of any
charter for these parts [other] than what Mr. Williams
had obtained, and he was sure, that charter which the
Massachusetts Englishmen pretended had never passed that
table .x
Perhaps even more importantly, Edward Winslow did not use
the patent as the basis for his claims against the
Gortonists in 1646/7, despite its giving clear title to
the land occupied by the Shawomet settlers.
The Bay Colony's reluctance to use Weld's patent in
its dealings with the English authorities stems from an
awareness that the document was less than wholly valid,
but the problem is one of chronology rather than
signatures. The territorial clauses of the two patents
offer convincing evidence that Weld's patent was issued
after that of Williams, and not three months before, as
is indicated by the dates on the documents themselves.
Many years after the event, Roger Williams recalled
having drawn up the boundaries which he wished assigned
to his colony:
The bounds for this our first charter I (having
ocular knowledge of persons, places and transactions) did
honestly and conscientiously (as in the holy presence of
God) draw up from Pawcatuk River, which I then believed
and still do is free from all English claims and
conquests.2
Sure enough, Williams' document conveys the title to
the
tract of land in the continent of America aforesaid
called by the name of the Narriganset Bay bordering North
and North East, on the patent of Massachusetts East and
South East on Plymouth patent, South of the ocean and on
the West and North West inhabited by Indians called
Narrogunneucks alias Narrigansets the whole tract
extending about twenty and five English miles unto the
1 Roger Williams recorded this conversation in a letter to
John Mason on 22 June 1670 ; see LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 613.
2 Williams to Mason, 22 June 1670 in LaFantasie,
Correspondence, 612.
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Pequot River and country...1
The corresponding passage in Weld's patent is remarkably
similar. It describes the territory as being the
tract of land lying or being within the Continent of
America called or known by the name of Narragansett Bay
bordering north and north east on the patent or
plantation of Massachusetts, East and south east upon the
patent or plantation of Plymouth, south on the ocean and
on the west and north west inhabited by Indians called
Mahigganeucks, alias Narrogansetts, the whole tract
extending about twenty and five English miles unto the
Pequot River and country...2
Despite the slight variations between the two documents,
it is clear that the territorial boundaries are
identical, and that one patent was designed to conflict
directly with the other. All significant parts of the
description- even the alternative name for the region's
largest Indian tribe- are identical in wording. This,
despite the complete lack of similarity in the rest of
the texts, which use different vocabulary and stress
varying reasons for the settlements.
There are sound reasons for believing Williams'
claim to have devised the boundaries of the patent, and
for concluding that Weld copied Williams' document.3 Weld
never concerned himself with territorial questions prior
to this point, or indeed ever again afterward, and it is
likely that he only became aware of the issue when
Williams secured his patent in 1644. Then, by preparing a
document of his own, carefully worded to contradict
Williams' patent, Weld could attempt to gather signatures
from sympathetic commissioners, back-date the document
and send it to Boston in the hope that it would provide
1 See RI Rec I: 144.
2 See NEHGR, 9 (1857): 42.
3 Both patents could of course have been copied from a
third source, but no description of the Narragansett
region survives in Williams' own previous writings or
correspondence, and nothing comparable exists in any of
the other sources examined for this study.
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the Bay Colony with ammunition against Rhode Island.
Williams left England with his own patent in the late
summer of 1644, and Weld may not even have started his
efforts until then. Williams would have had no knowledge
of Weld's activities until the patent reached
Massachusetts in time to'fquoted in the General Court's
letter to Williams in August 1645.
Further evidence that Weld's patent was irregular
comes from the fact that the list of Commission members
in his document does not include John Pym, although that
issued to Williams does. By omitting Pym's name and
dating his document just two days after Pym's death, Weld
was attempting to construct a direct counter to Williams'
work. As far as the Commission was concerned, Pym's name
remained on the membership roll until he was replaced,
and so Williams' officially sealed document contains the
full list. Weld, of course, had to drop Pym's name in
order that his nine signatures constitute a majority.
Why did Weld have go to such lengths? In large part,
the answer lies with Sir Henry Vane. Vane was
instrumental in securing Williams' patent in the spring
of 1644. In part, Vane's assistance owes much to
religious factors: he was one of the few parliamentarians
who actively espoused religious toleration in the early
1640s, and the lack of any prescribed religious forms in
Williams' patent was subsequently mirrored in Vane's
plans for reform in England.1 Unfortunately for
Massachusetts, Vane had also been one of Anne
Hutchinson's supporters during the Antinomian crisis in
the late 1630s. At around the time Williams' patent was
being prepared, Vane's experiences in Massachusetts were
being aired in public again by the re-publication by Weld
of John Winthrop's Short Story. Vane is clearly alluded
to both in Winthrop's text and Weld's preface. Weld noted
that one of the greatest tragedies of the affair was the
involvement of many leading figures in Boston, while
1 See Rowe, Sir Henry Vane, 195-6.
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Winthrop criticised the role of the then Massachusetts
Governor, who was of course Henry Vane.1
Weld could hardly make an official application to
the Commission having so recently published material
which could only serve to remind one of its leading
members of a painful dispute with the Massachusetts
establishment. Neither Vane nor his close associate
Cornelius Holland signed Weld's patent, and the agent
probably avoided them carefully, concentrating on
Commission members who were unlikely to have strong ties
to the other side. Indeed, five of the men who signed
Weld's document also signed Williams', implying that they
were less than committed to the causes involved.
Far from being a shabby end to a less than
successful agency, Thomas Weld's efforts deserved more
gratitude from his colony than he ever received. It is a
measure of Weld's success that he managed to gather nine
signatures for his patent. Left alone by Hugh Peter to
conduct the mission to which they were both assigned, and
frequently criticised by Massachusetts for failing to
work miracles, Weld persistently tried to make the best
of a difficult situation. Limited as an agent by his
religious activities, he nonetheless provided
Massachusetts with a potential means of interfering in
Rhode Island. The fact that Weld and his colony alike
were aware that the document had no validity as part of
future dealings with England is more a measure of the
complexity of the agent's task than an example of any
failure.
Having established that Henry Vane's presence on the
Commission hindered Weld, it should be stressed that it
was not necessarily enough to guarantee Williams success.
Vane was an influential member of the Commons by 1644,
but the Warwick Commission included men who had rather
more experience and prestige. Not the least of these were
the peers, who remained at the apex of long-standing
1 Winthrop, Short Story, in Hall, ed. The Antinomian
Controversy, 208, 254.
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networks of patronage and kin. It is impossible to
identify with absolute certainty all the factors which
persuaded the Commission to approve Williams' claim, but
there is evidence of three important themes, common to
earlier and later judgements, in the negotiations over
the Narragansett patent.
First, Williams played on the oft-stated wish of
leading Englishmen that the northern colonies would be
able to produce some kind of useful crop or product.
Early commentators had noticed the timber which grew in
America, and particularly in New England, and concluded
that it might be a source of masts and other important
naval supplies.1 Aware that Warwick and various other
Commissioners were intimately concerned with the
operation of Parliament's Navy, Williams took the
opportunity to promote the Narragansett in these terms,
and his patent included a clause recognising the region
as one suited for the building and outfitting of ships.
If Rhode Island might at last provide the long-awaited
economic return from the New England colonies, the
Commission could not let the opportunity pass by.
Secondly, Williams made sure to mention the Indians.
As demonstrated in the last chapter, contact with the
Indians was one measure by which England judged the
colonies, and Rhode Island's record was better than most.
The colony towns, claimed Williams, had begun to "make a
nearer neighbourhood and society with the great body of
the Narragasetts, which may in time by the blessing of
God...lay a sure foundation of happiness to all America."2
The publication of his Key into the Language of America
the previous year had helped to establish Williams'
credentials as an authority on the Indian question, and
doubtless added a ring of truth to what was a fairly
standard point made by New England agents.
1 See, for example, New Englands Plantation, 7-8, in
Force, Tracts,. I; The Planters Plea, 15, in Force,
Tracts, II.
2 RI Rec, I: 143.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Williams
always made it clear that his settlement was far removed
from Massachusetts, and did not infringe on any other
colony's charter rights. Even Weld had made no attempt to
claim charter jurisdiction, defending his own claim on
the grounds that the growing population of Massachusetts
needed more land than had been originally envisaged. If
the refugees who established Providence had stayed closer
to Boston, and petitioned Parliament for the right to
govern a settlement which was clearly within the bounds
of the Bay charter, Williams might not have been
successful in his mission. As will be seen, the Warwick
Commission placed much importance on the rights of
jurisdiction held by colonies within their own
boundaries.
The first encounter with the Warwick Commission was
therefore a victory for Rhode Island. Williams secured
the patent which was to serve as the basis for the
gradual unification of the Narragansett towns, and which
also established a precedent for control over that
particular region. Authority in other parts of New
England was to be a continuing point of contention
throughout the Warwick Commission's tenure, and the next
set of missions brought a range of more complicated
factors to bear.
The last chapter drew attention to the flurry of agency
pamphleteering in 1646/7, and the corresponding activity
before the Warwick Commission marks the busiest period in
that body's history. Against the background of the
increasingly fraught political atmosphere of these years,
the Commission remained conservative and was keen to
follow available precedents where possible. In large
part, this approach was due to the influence of those
Commissioners who sat in the House of Lords, and who had
thoroughly entrenched views about the New England
colonies.
Briefly, the four documents issued by the Commission
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between May 1646 and June 1647 were as follows. On 15 May
1646, Samuel Gorton was issued with a safe-conduct pass
which his fellow agent Randall Holden subsequently
presented to the authorities in Boston; the same day saw
the directive from the Commission to Massachusetts which
stated that the Gortonists were settled outwith the
boundaries of the Bay Colony and were therefore not to be
harassed.1 On 25 May 1647, the Commission, realising that
William Vassall and the Massachusetts Remonstrants were
being encouraged to appeal to England by the success of
the Gortonists, issued a letter stating that internal
matters would be left to the colonial authorities.
Massachusetts should continue to exercise its chartered
authority over those living within its jurisdiction.2
Finally, on July 22, 1647, the Commission's final
decision in favour of the Gortonists was issued: the Bay
Colony had failed to demonstrate why it should exert
control over the Narragansett territory, and should do no
further harm to the Shawomet settlers.3
The wider activities of Commission members during
this period of political upheaval have encouraged
historians to analyse their decisions along factional
lines. In particular, possible links between agents and
groups of Commissioners who shared religious or political
beliefs have been posited as a motive for the
Commission's actions. Robert E. Wall, for example, argues
that members belonging to different Parliamentary
factions exercised a significant influence: in this
interpretation, the failure of the partly-Presbyterian
Remonstrant dissidents from Massachusetts in 1647 owes
much to the role of Commissioners of a more radical
1 Winthrop, Journal, II: 282-3; Winthrop, Journal, II:
292-3, LaFantasie, Correspondence, 454-6.
2 Winthrop, Journal, II: 336-8; Hazard, State Papers, I:
551-2.
3 Winthrop, Journal, II: 335-6; Hazard, State Papers, I:
552-3.
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congregationalist tendency.1 Wall is correct in his
assumption that the Commission's most active year, in
1646/7, demonstrates the range of religious and political
questions faced by the Warwick Commission, and the extent
to which its members were influenced by their wider
political and social allegiances. However, the following
analysis reveals that England's leaders saw colonial
questions in a much wider context than the squabbles of
New England, and were unlikely to pay much regard to
individual groups in the region.2
Any analysis of the Warwick Commission's motives
must rely in part on the signature lists of the documents
issued to petitioners. Of the four items from 1646/7,
three commissioners signed all four, four signed three,
seven signed two, and ten signed one.3 Robert Wall
concludes that the Commission was evenly balanced between
the two main parliamentary factions- Presbyterians and
Independents- when it first heard Gorton's petition in
the spring of 1646, but that it had moved to having a
clear Independent majority in the following year, when it
heard the petition of the Massachusetts Remonstrants. The
22 July 1647 letter which quashed the hopes of the
Remonstrants was signed almost exclusively by
Independents. In Wall's view, this is crucial, with the
Independent majority refusing to accept the appeal of the
1 Wall, Massachusetts Bay: The Crucial Decade, (1972),
215-7.
2 The analysis offered here uses evidence for the
factional allegiance of members of the Warwick Commission
found in general studies of the Long Parliament.
Biographical details of individual figures come either
from the following works or the standard sources listed
at the beginning of Appendix 4. See David Underdown,
Pride's Purge, (1971); D. Brunton and D.H. Pennington,
Members of the Long Parliament, (1954); Mary Keeler, The
Long Parliament, 1640-1641, (1954); and Blair Worden, The
Rump Parliament 1648-1653, (1974) .
3 A table showing which members signed which documents is
in Appendix 2, below.
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Remonstrants, who had some Presbyterians in their ranks.1
As Wall recognises, though, the factional divisions
in the Long Parliament were never in fact as clear-cut as
this summary implies. Neither 'Presbyterian' nor
'Independent' was a clearly defined label in the mid-
16403, and definitions have not become much more useful
since. A major cause of confusion stems from the fact
that the words signify different things when applied to
political and religious matters. Worse still, they
become almost meaningless in the context of New England's
divergent religious development. As a religious term,
Independency was generally equivalent to
Congregationalism, and stressed the autonomy of
individual church gatherings. Politically, it implied a
commitment to increased Parliamentary authority and a
diminution of royal powers. Not all religious
Independents were politically radical, however, and not
all religious Presbyterians wanted a powerful political
executive alongside their more regimented church
policies. By the very end of the 1640s, with some
political Independents favouring religious toleration,
Massachusetts Congregationalists found themselves in the
unlikely position of being complimented by English
Presbyterians. The situation is made no clearer by the
shifting strengths and priorities of Parliamentary
factions as the civil wars progressed.2
Even if the factional division between Presbyterians
and Independents were to be taken at face value, however,
there are ambiguities in the Warwick Commission evidence
which greatly reduce the likelihood of any factional
alignments spanning the Atlantic. Reliance on signature
lists to construct a voting pattern for members of two
opposing groups inevitably has an element of uncertainty.
1 Wall, Massachusetts Bay, 215-217.
2 Some general comments and bibliographical references
regarding this issue are given in Chapter 1 above. The
issue of toleration in the transatlantic context is
further discussed in Chapter 5.
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For example, the two documents issued by the Commission
on 15 May 1646 to Samuel Gorton have an identical purpose
and argument, but different signature lists: seven
members signed both, while ten others signed only one.
Clearly, not all members who supported a particular
measure necessarily signed the relevant paper. If
signatures from both of the 15 May 1646 documents are
considered together, the Commission at that point had a
slight Independent majority, rather than being evenly
balanced as Robert Wall claims.1
When individual Commission members are considered,
the discrepancies grow larger, and it becomes
increasingly difficult to argue that English
Presbyterians supported the Remonstrants. Independent MP
George Fenwick, for example, had promised the elder John
Winthrop that he would try to prevent the Warwick
Commission from interfering in the internal affairs of
Massachusetts. He opposed the Remonstrants, to be sure,
but he also signed the safe conduct pass issued to the
Bay's arch-enemy Gorton.2 The Presbyterian Earl of
Manchester supported Gorton and opposed William Vassall.
William Waller, the Commission's most active
Presbyterian, was one of the Eleven Members purged by the
army in July 1647: this happened after he had signed the
letter blocking the Remonstrants' petition.3
1 Using Wall's factional labels, the signatories are the
six Presbyterians Warwick, Northumberland, Manchester,
Waller, Vassall and Rudyard, and the six Independents
Pembroke, Holland, Purefoy, Bond, Allen and Fenwick. Wall
did not include Independent Alexander Rigby in his
calculations. Given that Warwick was bound to sign all
Commission documents his role transcended factional
considerations. See Wall, Massachusetts Bay, 216.
2 Fenwick to Winthrop, 6 April 1647, in Winthrop Papers V:
141-2.
3 Three other Commission members- Clotworthy, Stapleton
and Glyn- withdrew at the same time as Waller, but they
had never been active in the Commission's deliberations.
See Commons Journal V: 250. Underdown discusses the
circumstances surrounding the case of the Eleven Members
in Pride's Purge, 82-3.
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The key to the Warwick Commission's actions is that
its most influential members saw New England in a wider
context than just the immediate factional issues at stake
in 1646/7. New England agents may have presented more
petitions than any other colonial interest, but leading
Englishmen had already begun to lose interest in the
northern colonies by the time the Commission was
established. As the 1640s progressed, the details of New
England's squabbles were increasingly lost on members of
the Commission, and their reactions to the Gortonists and
the Remonstrants are part of a more general reluctance to
become embroiled in the minute detail of New England
disputes.
Who were the most influential Commission members in
1646/7? One of the assumptions behind the factional
analysis of the Warwick Commission discussed above is
that members of the House of Lords were already in a
declining position in 1647, as part of an inexorable
process leading to the abolition of the Upper House two
years later: in this scenario, the views of the Commoners
automatically take precedence.1 In fact, the peers
maintained their influence numerically and also in terms
of the tone set by Commission documents. The final
decisions of the Commission, which discouraged further
petitioning from dissident groups in New England, are
entirely consistent with the views of leading Lords, and
should have come as no surprise to New Englanders, and to
the Bay leadership in particular.
The very nature of the aristocracy's involvement in
colonisation contributed to a gradually developing gulf
between them and the New England settlers. The great
landed families who formed the upper echelons of English
society provided some of the most prominent potential
supporters of New England agents. Many of the colonising
projects of the early seventeenth century relied on the
patronage of aristocrats and their political clients and
1 Wall sees the prestige of the Lords as having "declined
considerably" by 1647. See Wall, Massachusetts Bay, 216.
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supporters, and some of the most committed colonial
sponsors and planners formed the House of Lords'
contingent on the Warwick Commission. The colonial
companies brought together leading figures who would
eventually work together in the two Houses of Parliament
and on the battlefields of the 1640s.1 In addition, these
commissioners had no hesitation in overlapping their
interests and wearing different 'hats'. Commission
members who had financial interests in a particular
expedition had no qualms about using their official posts
to further that project.2
Unfortunately for New England, there was no direct
correlation between men who supported colonisation in the
1620s and men who were willing to help the northern
colonies two decades later. Few of the leading peers
seriously considered emigration. Instead, they looked on
the colonies as an extension of their landed interests
and patronage. Some Lords and their clients did
contemplate moving to the Caribbean in the late 1630s,
but they were easily diverted when the calling of a
Parliament began to look likely. Had they in fact crossed
the ocean it would have been to establish plantation
colonies in which they would have ruled as feudal lords.
1 J.H. Hexter stresses the importance of such connections,
while warning against a contemporary opinion that the
entire Parliamentary uprising was hatched in the
Providence Company rooms in Grey's Inn Lane. See Hexter,
The Reign of King Pym, (1941), 77. Interest in the role
of the English opposition in colonisation has recently
been revived by Karen Kupperman, "Definitions of Liberty
on the Eve of the Civil War: Lord Say and Sele, Lord
Brooke and the American Puritan Colonies." Historical
Journal (1989): 17-33.
2 For example, four of the signatures on a Warwick
Commission document of 4 November 1645, guaranteeing
liberty of conscience to the Somers Islands in the
Caribbean, belong to men who had recently signed a plea
as directors of the Somers Islands Company urging that
the islanders remain loyal to Parliament. The members
concerned were Warwick, Lord Saye, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd
and Cornelius Holland. See J.H. Lefroy, Memorials of the
Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas, (1877-
79), vol 1, 586-590, 600-603.
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While the piety of the peers should not be
underestimated, their colonial vision was in some
contrast to the theocratic commonwealth of Massachusetts.1
Agents were well aware of the colonial interests of
the peers. They may have addressed their petitions to the
chairman of the Warwick Commission as a matter of
protocol, but they also hoped that he would be personally
sympathetic. Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of Warwick, held the
dual role of Lord Admiral and Governor of all the
Plantations in America, and was well known in New
England.2 Warwick inherited a considerable fortune from
his father, and added another of his own making: both men
were backers and owners of privateering ships. Warwick
caused considerable embarrassment to the East India
Company in 1622, when he almost captured a treasure ship
belonging to the mother of the Mogul Emperor.3 Through the
1620s, and again after 1638, Warwick's privateers were at
the forefront of the harassment of Spanish ships in the
Americas, at times serving as a surrogate navy. Captain
William Jackson led a fleet of seven of the Earl's ships
and 1100 men in an attempt to capture Jamaica in 1642,
while Warwick himself was taking charge of the official
navy and ensuring it obeyed Parliament rather than the
1 Although more concerned with the gentry than the
aristocracy, J.T. Cliffe provides numerous examples of
the links between the gentry and local peers, and of the
prevailing religious concerns of both groups; see Cliffe,
The Puritan Gentry, (1984) and Puritans in Conflict,
(1988). The plans of leading gentry to emigrate are
examined in The Puritan Gentry, 204.
2 There is no full biography of Warwick, although his
maritime career has attracted some attention. See Wesley
Frank Craven, "The Earl of Warwick, A Speculator in
Piracy", Hispanic-American Quarterly Review 10 (1930):
457-479; Nelson P. Bard, ed. "The Earl of Warwick's
Voyage of 1627", Naval Records Society Publications 125
(1984): 15-93.
3 Craven, "The Earl of Warwick", 461.
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king.1
Warwick served as President of the Council for New
England in the 1620s, but also had more personal ties
with the region. He had been a patron and protector of
future Massachusetts minister and agent Hugh Peter.2 One
of Warwick's closest political allies was Sir Thomas
Barrington, sponsor of a number of ministers who
ultimately travelled to New England, including Ezekiel
Rogers. In July 1643, the crew of one of his ships
incurred the displeasure of the Bay authorities by
brawling during a visit to Boston. The normally severe
magistrates decided to reserve the fines imposed to be at
Warwick's disposal, since he "had always been forward to
do good" to Massachusetts.3 The following year a
Parliamentary ship, carrying a commission from Warwick,
seized a Bristol merchant ship in Massachusetts Bay, much
to the consternation of the colony magistrates, who were
nervous about the extension of England's troubles to
their own jurisdiction.4
Warwick never became entangled in the controversies
raised by New England agents, and rather maintained a
detachment which befitted his executive position as
Governor-in-Chief. His actions indicate a commitment to
stability and order which stood well above individual
causes and disputes. There is also evidence that Warwick
1 Warwick's activities with the navy are noted in Stephen
J. Greenberg, "Seizing the Fleet in 1642: Parliament, the
Navy and the Printing Press." Mariner's Mirror 77 (1991):
227-234; see also C.V. Wedgwood, The King's War, (1974),
105.
2 Warwick presented Peter to the curate at Rayleigh,
Essex, in 1623. See Pacy, "Spiritual Combat", 19; for a
wider view of the Earl's patronage see Barbara Donagan,
"The Clerical Patronage of Robert Rich, Second Earl of
Warwick, 1619-1642", Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, 120 (1976): 388-419.
3 Winthrop, Journal, II: 151-152.
4 Bristol was in Royalist hands at the time, and it was
generally held that ships from such ports should be
seized by Parliamentary ships. See George L. Beer, The
Origins of the British Colonial System 1578-1660, 353.
238
held doubts about the viability of the northern colonies,
and that he was uneasy about the Bay Colony's practices
of civil and church government. The elder John Winthrop
responded to a series of questions from Warwick in 1644,
and emphasised the fertility of the region's soil and the
generally healthy climate, as well as painting a rosy
picture of the stability created by the Massachusetts
government.1 Winthrop clearly sensed that Warwick was
troubled about the future of the New England settlements,
and tried to reassure him.
Warwick and some of his colleagues continued to have
doubts about Massachusetts. Two other prominent peers
demonstrate the problems faced by agents approaching
Commission members from the upper house. Viscount Saye
and Sele was a long-standing investor in colonising
schemes and worked closely with reforming MPs until he
became alarmed by the increasing radicalism of the New
Model Army. His fellow peer, the Earl of Manchester, had
similar doubts from an even earlier date: his long
running dispute with his junior officer, Oliver Cromwell,
is symptomatic of the divisions within the Parliamentary
army over the prosecution of the civil war.
There was a social gap between the peers who
financed and sponsored the American expeditions and the
commoners who left England as the Massachusetts Bay
Company in 1630, to say nothing of the similar gap which
existed between those same peers and many of the more
radical parliamentarians and soldiers. Over time, this
contributed to disagreements between the leaders of
Massachusetts and England over the purpose of the
northern colonies. The absence of aristocratic
involvement in the Massachusetts enterprise, and the
reluctance of the settlers to allow the establishment of
such a social system in New England, was a point of
contention between Lord Saye and Bay Colony Governor
Winthrop. In 1640, Saye warned Winthrop of the dangers,
1 See Winthrop to Warwick, ca. September 1644, in Winthrop
Papers IV: 491-493.
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as he saw them, of a society which lacked the balancing
influences of hereditary leadership.1
The perils of excessive democracy, which seemed to
Lord Saye to threaten the stability of the colonies, were
soon to be visited on England as well. The gradually
widening divide between the more radical members of the
House of Commons and the conservative members of both
houses is reflected in the activities of the Warwick
Commission, particularly as the decade reached its
political climax in 1648/9. Such strains, and especially
those involving the Lords, had been visible for some
time, with a vocal minority in the Commons expressing
doubts about the loyalty of the peers to the
Parliamentary cause.
Nonetheless, despite looming difficulties as the
decade drew to a close, the Lords remained active members
of the Warwick Commission from Roger Williams' plea for a
Rhode Island patent in 1644 to the last surviving
Commission decree in June 1648. Numerically, the peers
maintained their proportionate influence in the
Commission, despite the decline in the number of peers
who played an active role in Parliament in 1647 and 1648.2
Comprising just under one-third of the total Commission
membership, peers either maintained or exceeded that
percentage of the signatures on Commission documents
throughout. The last surviving Warwick Commission
document, addressed to New Haven in June 1648, was signed
1 Lord Saye and Sele to John Winthrop, 9 July 1640, in
Winthrop Papers, IV: 263-267.
2 Part of Mark Kishlansky's thesis, mentioned in Chapter 1
above, is that only about a dozen peers were active in
the Parliamentary cause by 1647, and less still by the
following year. However, in colonial affairs at least,
those who remained had influence beyond their numbers.
See Kishlansky, "Saye No More", Journal of British
Studies 30 (1991): 401-2.
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exclusively by members of the Upper House.1 In that summer
of renewed warfare and the final failure of all attempts
to bring Charles I back to some kind of constitutional
rule, it is surprising that anyone found time to issue
declarations about colonial affairs, but also significant
that the Lords saw the colonies as an area in which they
could still act.
The New Haven letter developed further the point
made by the Commission in dealing with the later stages
of the Gorton/Winslow dispute. The Lords emphasised that
they would hear no further petitions from factious
subjects in the New England colonies. This reinforces the
opinions expressed by both Saye and Warwick in previous
years that the New England experiment had singularly
failed to contribute anything to the well-being of the
English nation. The main concern of the Warwick
Commission in rejecting the Remonstrants' petition was
not a theological objection to Presbyterianism, or any
political affinity with factions across the ocean.
Instead, the Commission's stance was decided by the
belief of the leading peers that the New England settlers
should stop wasting time on internecine bickering and
their obsession with the qualifications of church members
and devote more energy to economic development. The Lords
feared that the venture which might have been the
flagship of the English expansion had become an
embarrassing ship of fools.
The Warwick Commission did not survive the revolution of
1648/9, not least because the abolition of the House of
1 It was planned to send this letter to all the New
England colonies, but its receipt was only ever
acknowledged by New Haven, at the General Court on 2
November 1648. See NH Rec I: 414. The text is included in
a document entitled "New Haven's Case Stated", with a
signature list, in NH Rec II: 520. A draft appears with
other Warwick Commission papers in British Library,
Sloane MSS 184: f!23.
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Lords removed its chairman from office and forced a
general reassessment of how colonial questions should be
addressed by the new executive. The Commonwealth years
from 1649-53 saw some innovations in colonial
administration, and also some logical development of
older mechanisms. One continuing factor was the use of
committees to receive agents and hear their petitions,
and it is necessary once again to consider the range of
bodies and individuals faced by agents.
The Commonwealth committees presented agents with
dangerous challenges. Not only were the members sometimes
well informed about the affairs of the colonies, they
were also willing to apply their new-found authority to
colonial affairs while paying less regard to the
constitutional precedents so fondly observed by the
Warwick Commission. Agents had to pay far more attention
to the varying interests of the Commonwealth leaders than
they had to the Parliamentary factions of the 1640s, but
it is also true that the innovative potential of the
Commonwealth had less effect on New England than it might
have. When Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament in
1653, the authority of Massachusetts remained intact, and
Rhode Islanders' missions to the Council of State caused
considerable upheaval without moving the colony beyond
the point reached by the 1644 patent.
The new executive Council of State passed colonial
questions, and indeed much of its other business, to a
range of different committees. Turnover in personnel was
potentially significant: the Council of State changed
half of its membership every year, and rotated its
presidency on a monthly basis in an attempt to avoid the
dominance of any one figure.1 Some committees, in turn,
were very large, with an equally confusing range of
membership. The nomenclature of committees can also lead
to peculiarities. The most extreme example is the
1 The administrative forms of the Commonwealth Council of
State are described in Gerald Aylmer, The State's
Servants, (1973), 17-24.
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Committee for Scotch and Irish Affairs. Between 1651 and
1 653, a number of petitions from Barbados and
Newfoundland were passed to this body, which gradually
developed its remit until it handled far wider questions
of military and fiscal policy than its name suggests.1
Other colonial questions were heard by the Admiralty
Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, a number of
temporary committees, and indeed by the full Council.
Fortunately for agents and historians alike, rival
New England representatives were only involved in two
major clashes in the Commonwealth period, and
considerable evidence survives of the workings of the two
committees concerned. Both cases centred on the legal
status and governmental structure of the Rhode Island
towns. In the spring of 1650, the Admiralty Committee
considered William Coddington's claim to be governor of
the islands of Aquidneck and Conanicut, and the counter¬
claim by Edward Winslow, who argued that the territory in
question belonged to Plymouth colony. Winslow also had
dealings with this committee a few months later when he
petitioned against the Commonwealth's decision to ban
trade with the royalist colonies. Two years later, in May
1652, the Foreign Affairs Committee began hearing the
appeal of Roger Williams and John Clarke against
Coddington's governorship, again receiving arguments from
Winslow.
Surviving records, which include detailed minute
books, make it possible to determine which of the often
numerous committee members actually attended meetings,
and the wide array of possible candidates can therefore
be reduced to a far shorter list of those men who
1 Examples of colonial matters discussed before this
committee are in PRO, Interregnum Entry Book LI: 20, LVI:
68, XCVII: 145. Aylmer describes this body as a "general
military-cum-finance committee". See Aylmer, State's
Servants, 15.
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actually dealt with agents' petitions.1 Such records
provide a more reliable measure of individual involvement
than the signatures of the Warwick Commission members.
Nonetheless, evidence from correspondence indicates that
not all of the committees' work was recorded in the
minutes, and that agents benefited from less public
manoeuvres also.
The Commonwealth committees inherited many members
from the Commons contingent on the Warwick Commission. If
the leading peers had despaired of the antics of the New
England colonists by the end of the 1640s, junior members
of the Commission were more positive. For many of them,
the Long Parliament and its committees represented their
first experience of powerful office. In particular, the
Warwick Commission was the first colonial committee of
any English government which had a major input from
members of the House of Commons. These men were often
closer to the agents, in terms of social background and
experience, than were the Lords. Members of the lower
house were more likely to have personal and family ties
with New England's leaders. Some MPs had been members of
colonising companies, and many of the gentry had
considered emigrating to New England at some point in the
1630s. Two commissioners had actually spent some time in
New England, and were the first members of an English
colonial committee to have done so.2
These commoners came into their own after the
establishment of the Commonwealth and the accompanying
abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords. Members
of the lower house provided the only continuity of
contact for the agencies of the mid-1640s and those of
the Commonwealth period. The on-going presence in high
1 The minutes from both committees for the periods
concerned are held at the PRO, Chancery Lane. Most
minutes relating to colonial affairs are calendared in
CSPC, 1574-1660, but the signatures on individual orders
and the attendance lists are only found in the original
manuscripts. See Appendix 3, below.
2 Sir Henry Vane, jr. and George Fenwick.
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office of the same men was of great significance for
agents whose careers spread over this period, as much for
the maintenance of good contacts as for the problem of
avoiding those of a more hostile nature.
Continuity in office holding is especially notable
in colonial affairs because a much larger proportion of
the Warwick Commission remained in government after 1649
than was the average for the Long Parliament as a whole.
Of the twenty-three commissioners from the House of
Commons still alive at the end of 1648, sixteen stayed on
to sit in the Rump Parliament. This figure (70%) compares
with 42% of the total membership of the House of Commons
which eventually found its way into the Rump.1 If members
are categorised according to the speed with which they
pledged their allegiance to the purged parliament, eight
out of twenty-three (35%) were quick to support the new
order, which is well above the 15% of all MPs who did.2
These men were active in practice as well as being
committed in theory: ten of the sixteen Warwick
Commissioners who served in the Rump were in the top 16%
of attenders.3 While such figures must always be treated
with some measure of caution, the differences here are of
1 Brunton and Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament,
41.
2 These figures follow David Underdown's analysis of the
behaviour of MPs during and immediately after Pride's
Purge. Looking beyond the Purge, it is clear that
positions taken over the King's trial do not necessarily
dictate the thoughts and activities of men in later
years. Sir Henry Vane, Cornelius Holland and Dennis Bond,
for example, all had clear misgivings about the Purge and
the trial of Charles I, but later became some of the most
prominent figures in the new Commonwealth. If anything,
therefore, these statistics are an underestimate. See
Underdown, Pride's Purge, 209-220 and Appendix A.
3 This figure is derived from the calculations in Worden,
The Rump Parliament, Appendix A. Worden assigns six
grades of activity to members of the Rump, and 32 of the
205 Rumpers fall into the top two grades, described as
"almost full-time politicians". The ten former Warwick
Commissioners in this category were Allen, Bond, Corbet,
Haselrig, Holland, Mildmay, Prideaux, Purefoy, Salway and
Vane.
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such magnitude that it is clear that Warwick Commission
members were far more likely than average to remain
active in politics after Pride's Purge.
The importance of individuals is demonstrated by the
two examples of New England agents in conflict before
Commonwealth committees. These cases are different in
character, both from each other and from the Warwick
Commission proceedings. In the first, there is no
evidence of the Admiralty Committee being split between
opposing groups, while in the second external political
questions had a clear influence on the proceedings and
thinking of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In both cases,
committee members supported individual agents who were
their friends or like-thinkers in religious and political
questions, and personal links hold considerable weight in
assessing the relations between agents and the
Commonwealth.
Proceedings before the Admiralty Committee in 1650
exemplify both the continuity and the change faced by
agents in their dealings with the English government.
William Coddington's claim to control over Aquidneck and
the counter-arguments of United Colonies agent Winslow
are mentioned in the minutes of eight committee meetings.
Two members of the committee stand out as being most
involved in the case. Valentine Walton and Sir Henry Vane
each attended seven of these meetings, including the
crucial meeting at which the decision was taken to report
in Coddington's favour to the Council of State. None of
the other committee members managed more than two
appearances in the same period.1
Walton and Vane were therefore the two men who had
most influence in the Coddington/Winslow case. Vane's
continued presence in powerful office offered
encouragement to William Coddington. Both Vane and the
Newport leader had sympathised with Anne Hutchinson
during the Antinomian crisis in Massachusetts, when Vane
1 For membership information, including tabulated
attendance records, see Appendix 3 below.
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was Governor of the Bay Colony.1 Valentine Walton, on the
other hand, was one of the new men to emerge from the
English revolution. Walton was the first and the last of
his family to serve in the House of Commons, gaining
prominence in the 1640s through the army of the Eastern
Association. He took a full part in the trial of Charles
I, going on to sign the royal death warrant. Walton was a
committed republican, and left office with the advent of
the Protectorate.2 He was at the peak of his political
career under the Commonwealth, and served on the
Admiralty Committee as a man dedicated to the advancement
of the English republic, rather than as an expert in
naval or colonial affairs.
Walton and Vane dominated all the dealings of the
Admiralty Committee, and not just the colonial questions.
The Committee was always a small body, having only three
members when originally formed. Between 14 March and 11
April 1650, when Coddington's case was heard, a total of
nine individuals attended at least one meeting, but only
very rarely was the quorum of three exceeded in any given
meeting. When hearing the arguments over Coddington's
petition, Vane could afford to indulge his old
acquaintance, hoping that Coddington's actions would help
to formalise government in the Narragansett region.3
Walton, while not a man to be easily led, had no grounds
for objection to the case. In addition, both men knew
that recognising Coddington placed the latter in debt to
1 Emery Battis divides Hutchinson's supporters and
sympathisers into three groups of varying commitment,
placing both Coddington and Vane in the most involved
'core' group. See Battis, Saints and Sectaries, Appendix
II.
2 Walton also demonstrates the danger of assuming that
personal and family ties are bound to be of primary
importance: he refused to participate in Cromwell's
government despite being married to the Protector's
sister, Margaret.
3 Coddington's contact with Vane in England is revealed in
Coddington to John Winthrop, jr., 19 February 1652, MHS
Collections, 4th series 7: 281.
247
the new regime, and securing the support of as many
branches of English society as possible was as much a
priority for the Commonwealth as for any other
revolutionary government.
Coddington's case may also have been helped by the
appearance of Massachusetts agent Edward Winslow, who
argued that Aquidneck should in fact be part of Plymouth
colony. Exactly what the committee thought of Winslow's
petition is unknown, but Vane was to treat Winslow
unsympathetically in October 1650, and it is reasonable
to assume that a similar attitude had prevailed in the
spring. In the autumn, Winslow was petitioning for leave
to trade with the royalist colonies, and Vane criticised
the United Colonies for not giving full support to the
new English government. Winslow himself believed that
Massachusetts should be more positive toward the
Commonwealth, but Vane naturally enough placed more
weight on the colony's actions than on its agent's
opinions.1
By the time it became clear that not all Rhode
Islanders supported Coddington, England's colonial
administration presented a rather different face to
agents. The Foreign Affairs Committee, which dealt with
the second New England case in 1652, was a far larger
body than the Admiralty Committee, and presented agents
with a wider range of contacts. Many members had
previously heard Edward Winslow during the 1646/7 Warwick
Commission hearings, and some had even dealt with Roger
Williams' petition for a colony patent in 1644. Such
continuity of personnel should not imply a similar
maintenance of alliances and friendships, either between
agents and committee members or within the ranks of the
English leadership. In the summer of 1652, the Foreign
Affairs Committee had clearly identifiable factions,
1 The meeting on 28 October 1650 is minuted in Rawlinson
MSS, A225, f7. For an account of the dispute between
Winslow and Vane, see Thomas Hutchinson, The History of
the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay, ed.
Lawrence S. Mayo (1936), I: 148-150.
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particularly in relation to leading issues such as the
first Anglo-Dutch war. Agents made use of these divisions
to further their claims, and the Rhode Islanders John
Clarke and Roger Williams in particular took pragmatic
advantage of individual leaders' favoured causes.
The seemingly ubiquitous Henry Vane was a member of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Valentine Walton
provided another link with the first round of the
Coddington case. William Purefoy had signed all four of
the 1646/7 Warwick Commission orders and other former
members of the Commission sitting on the Foreign Affairs
Committee included Sir Arthur Haselrig and Vane's close
supporter Cornelius Holland. Sir William Masham, however,
was new to the administration of colonial affairs, as
were Herbert Morley, Thomas Scott, Henry Marten and Henry
Neville. Importantly, though, Masham was no stranger to
Roger Williams, having appointed the young preacher to be
chaplain to his household in 1630.1 While not directly
involved in the colonising companies of the 1620s, Masham
was well connected with those who were. The son of a
London merchant who bought rather than inherited his
estates, Masham married into the Barrington family and
benefited from the political sponsorship of the Earl of
Warwick. As such, he stands out as one of the last of the
older gentry in colonial administration; he would have
fitted the mould rather better as a member of the Warwick
Commission than as a Commonwealth committee-man.
Thomas Scott was, like Valentine Walton, a man who
rose to prominence as a result of the civil war, and
dedicated himself to the new republic, refusing to serve
Cromwell after 1653. A supreme organiser, Scott was one
of five men who nominated the Council of State in 1649,
and is perhaps best known for his work as head of the
1 Masham's opinion of Williams was often ambivalent. When
the preacher fell into dispute with Massachusetts, Masham
wrote of Williams' "integrity and good intentions", but
conceded that he was also "passionate and precipitate".
See Masham to John Winthrop, sr. 29 March 1636, in
Winthrop Papers, III: 241.
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republic's intelligence gathering network. Thomas
Challoner and Henry Marten had been political allies
since the mid-1640s, and both brought a general interest
in trade and commerce to their activities in the Foreign
Affairs committee, as well as a passionate commitment to
the republic. Marten in particular was a vocal republican
early in the 1640s and long before such ideas had any
great following in Parliament.
If Roger Williams could rely on personal links with
individual committee members, so could Edward Winslow,
and various members can be clearly placed in one camp or
the other. More importantly, Winslow's leading supporter
on the committee was Sir Arthur Haselrig, who was
increasingly out of sympathy with his former ally Henry
Vane. Winslow gained Haselrig's support through the
latter's son-in-law, former Connecticut settler George
Fenwick. Worse still for Williams was Vane's absence from
London in the summer of 1652, a time when Rhode Island
badly needed a speedy result.1
In the face of these obstacles, the Rhode Island
agents owed their success in having Coddington's
governorship suspended to two factors. First was the role
of Williams' own friends and supporters. Cornelius
Holland was able to postpone proceedings for most of the
summer until Henry Vane returned to the Committee. Both
Holland and Vane, as well as Sir William Masham, attended
the meeting on 1 October which criticised Coddington and
gave implicit approval for a revival of the 1644 patent.
Holland's role was crucial, and while he lacked Vane's
political weight, he nonetheless emerges as one of
Williams' most reliable supporters in England.2 In 1652,
Holland wrote a letter at Williams' request to the
1 Vane's movements in this period are described in Violet
Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger (1970), 146-7.
2 Holland was a leading signatory to an earlier letter
sent to Massachusetts by twelve Parliamentarians, urging
the Bay to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Rhode
Islanders. Holland et.al. to Massachusetts General Court,
1644, in Winthrop, Journal, II: 198.
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Providence authorities, urging that the colonists carry
on their government "with a peaceable condescending and
unanimous spirit", and warning against factionalism and
feuding in the colony.1 Williams revived the tactic of
having leading Englishmen write letters to his
quarrelsome fellow colonists a year later, when he
persuaded Vane to write a stinging letter to Providence,
berating the settlers for their in-fighting.2
The support of these men alone was not sufficient to
overcome the challenge from Winslow and his supporters,
largely because Henry Vane did not dominate the Foreign
Affairs Committee as he had the Admiralty Committee two
years before. In May 1652, however, just as Williams and
Clarke were presenting their petition to the authorities,
England embarked on a naval war with the Dutch. The
agents took advantage of the fact that some of the most
regularly attending members of the Foreign Affairs
Committee during the late summer and early autumn were
keen supporters of the war, and stressed the Dutch
dimension to Rhode Island's troubles. One of William
Coddington's most serious offences in the eyes of his
neighbours had been to solicit support from Peter
Stuyvesant of New Amsterdam, and the agents emphasised
the vulnerability of a disunited colony in the face of
Dutch intervention.
The opportunity to extend the Dutch war to a new
theatre was not lost on those committee members most
involved in the prosecution of the conflict.3 Neville,
Morley, Scott and Challoner, among the most active
supporters of the conflict, attended the 1 October
meeting. Their recommendation to the Council of State,
which was approved the following day, ordered the
1 Holland to Providence Plantations, 3 October 1652, in
RIHS, Rhode Island Historical Manuscripts, V: 2.
2 Vane to Town of Providence, 8 February 1654, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 389-390.
3 For those members most in favour of the war, see Worden,
The Rump Parliament, 301-303.
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colonists to seize Dutch shipping and generally harass
the settlement at New Amsterdam, in addition to
condemning Coddington.1
The Commonwealth Committees discovered to their cost
that altering the foundations of colonial authority could
have unpredictable results. Coddington's governorship,
far from being a force for order in Rhode Island,
provoked a political storm and even led to sporadic
violence. Although the Foreign Affairs Committee did not
survive to see it, the document which ordered Rhode
Islanders to attack Dutch shipping also caused
controversy and yet another round of inter-colony
disputes. The activities of New England agents in the
early 1650s demonstrate the problems faced by any regime
which attempted to take strong action at transatlantic
distances.
Little New England business was heard in London during
the Protectorate, or during the abortive attempt to
restore the Rump Parliament after the fall of Richard
Cromwell. There were two reasons for this hiatus. First,
the most serious inter- and intra-colonial disputes which
had been so common in the 1640s had been solved (albeit
temporarily) by the first wave of agency missions. The
Rhode Island towns had survived pressure from their
neighbouring colonies and also William Coddington's
abortive coup. Although colony agents had yet to secure
confirmation of the 1644 patent obtained from the Warwick
Commission, they had at least forced the overthrow of
Coddington's Governorship and fought off a challenge from
New Plymouth. Even before this, in the late 1640s, most
of the people in the first generation of Massachusetts
settlers who disliked that colony's government had either
left or been banished. The next, and bloodiest, phase of
1 The Council of State's order is printed in Richard LeB.
Bowen, The Providence Oath of Allegiance, (1643), 40.
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persecution in the Bay would come later in the 1650s with
the arrival of Quaker agitators: until then,
Massachusetts was relatively free from criticism. There
was therefore a down-turn in agency activity immediately
prior to the coming of the Protectorate, regardless of
the changing government in England.1
In addition, the reduction in the number of New
England agents working in England coincided with another
period during which England's leaders lost interest in
the northern colonies. Oliver Cromwell believed that New
Englanders would serve the English nation better by
moving south to the Caribbean, and emphasised the point
by offering Massachusetts agent John Leveret the
governorship of Hispaniola.2 New administrative structures
focussed on the island colonies, with the formation, on
15 July 1656, of a committee to oversee the affairs of
Jamaica and the West Indies. The island colonies offered
potentially lucrative cash-crop revenues, and Cromwell
himself saw the region in terms of a wider conflict with
Catholic Spain.3 The plantations committee also considered
issues relating to the southern mainland colonies and to
New England on occasion, but it was primarily concerned
with the islands. Historians have identified two leading
1 John Leveret was the only agent to be commissioned
during Cromwell's Protectorate. Rhode Island's John
Clarke continued to represent the Rhode Island towns
throughout the decade but was largely inactive between
1655 and the Restoration.
2 Leveret turned down the offer. His career demonstrates
that he was rarely afraid of a challenge, but in this
case he probably shared the general view of New
Englanders that the Caribbean was a disease-ridden
graveyard for the English. See M. Halsey Thomas, ed., The
Diary of Samuel Sewell 1674-1729, 2 vols, (1973), vol 1,
259.
3 The bias toward the Caribbean in Cromwellian colonial
policy is discussed in Bliss, Revolution and Empire, ch.
3; John F. Battick, "A New Interpretation of Cromwell's
Western Design." Journal of the Barbados Museum and
Historical Society 34 (1972): 76-84; Karen 0. Kupperman,
"Errand to the Indies: Puritan Colonisation from
Providence Island through the Western Design." WMQ
(1988): 70-99.
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merchants, Martin Noell and Thomas Povey, as the most
influential members of the committee. From the point of
view of the present study it is sufficient to stress that
the New England colonies played only a minor role in what
was a major alteration in the personnel and priorities of
colonial administration.1
The Protectorate's tardiness when dealing with New
England delayed confirmation of Rhode Island's authority
until 1655, when John Clarke finally secured an explicit
order to revive the 1644 patent. In 1653 Roger Williams,
anticipating the end of the Rump Parliament, had hoped
for a sympathetic hearing from whatever body replaced it.
He also noted, however, that despite the Council of
State's positive decision in October 1652, opposing agent
Winslow and his supporters were still agitating for the
dismemberment of Rhode Island. Williams, by his own
account keen to return to his family, may have
exaggerated the strength of the forces standing against
him: Winslow, Arthur Hesilrig and George Fenwick had
gathered "all the friends they can make in parliament and
council, and all the priests both Presbyterian and
Independent."2
Williams' hope that a new government would take the
initiative in ordering Rhode Island's authority was soon
dashed. Cromwell's regime had even less inclination to
alter the affairs of the northern colonies than had the
Warwick Commission. Williams himself returned to America
leaving Clarke to continue to press for action. Williams
may have left England in part because his friend Henry
Vane fell from office at the beginning of the
Protectorate: for the first time in a decade, Rhode
Island's closest English ally was in no position to help
the colony. In 1653, and again two years later, Cromwell
postponed decisions about Rhode Island's constitutional
1 Andrews, British Committees, 46-7. Povey's work is
reassessed in Bliss, Revolution and Empire, 66-72.
2 Williams to towns of Providence and Warwick [Shawomet],
1 April 1653 in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 386.
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position, noting that other "great and weighty affairs"
had a higher priority.1
There is no evidence of any lobbying of committees
by John Clarke, and Rhode Island's campaign for a final
confirmation of the 1644 patent was conducted directly
between agent and colony on one hand, and Cromwell on the
other. Exactly what arguments were used is a matter for
speculation, but the decisions themselves imply that
Clarke and his colony won their case by a policy of
regular petitioning and complaining. In 1655, Cromwell
took the easiest option available and formalised the 1644
patent until further notice. Upon receipt of this
instruction, the colonists celebrated by sending a young
New England deer as a personal gift to the Protector.
This gesture may appear somewhat trivial, but it was
entirely in keeping with Rhode Island's general approach
to English governments. The Narragansett communities were
always careful to maintain ties with helpful individuals,
and express the appropriate gratitude when the situation
demanded.2
The other New England colonies were able to ignore
the Protectorate. Massachusetts realised that Cromwell
was not about to invest time and effort in interfering
with Bay Colony affairs. The Bay was in confident mood in
the later 1650s with regard to England, and its selection
of John Leveret as agent in 1655 was a symptom of that
feeling. Boston's contact with the English government
during Leveret's agency never touched upon constitutional
matters, and the agent's most serious task was to promote
New England as a supplier of naval provisions for the
Caribbean expeditions.
1 Order of the Protector, in Thurloe State Papers, II: 1-
2; Cromwell to Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
29 March 1655, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 437.
2 The deer incident is described in Roy Sherwood, The
Court of Oliver Cromwell, (1989), 55; also CSPD, 1655:
553, 556, 567.
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The story of agents' contact with colonial administrators
during the interregnum is one of differing perceptions
and priorities. Agents who wanted radical action from the
English authorities had to compete against their
opponents and also against the precedent-bound inertia of
successive regimes, which were in turn unsure of their
own status. England's leaders repeatedly took the least
painful option when faced with competing agents. They
approved petitions which seemed to offer little threat to
the existing situation, rather than devote time and
effort to in-depth assessments of colonial questions
which were in any case happening in an increasingly
irrelevant corner of the English Atlantic.
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Restoration Missions: The Consolidation of Authority
This chapter considers the impact of the various New
England voices to be heard in England in the early
sixteen-sixties, and contrasts the successes and failures
of the region's interests. The Restoration court
attracted a wide range of people who hoped to profit in
some way from declaring their support for the new regime,
and Charles II was never so secure on his throne that he
could spurn declarations of allegiance. In the colonies,
as in England, there were old scores to settle, and
plenty of men willing to take the places of those who
failed to make the transition to life under the restored
monarchy. Colony agents had to deal with such dangerous
third parties as well as perform their more predictable
duties. The work of the Restoration agents demonstrates
further the problems facing the first colonial
generation, and also reveals the gradual way in which the
agency matured and adapted to changing circumstances.
The first priority of the restored monarchy was the
consolidation of its authority, first in England, but
also in the overseas plantations. The Royalist settlers
of the Chesapeake offered Charles an obvious first step
on the road to securing all his father's dominions, but
it also emerged, doubtless to the surprise of the new
king, that this aim was shared by the smaller New England
colonies. Rhode Island and Connecticut agents took
advantage of Charles' need for recognition and gained a
mutually beneficial strengthening of their colonial
charters. At the same time, the tougher problem of
Massachusetts was forced onto the English agenda by the
complaints of dissidents and critics, as well as agents
from the smaller colonies.
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Massachusetts tried to hold on to the past in its
dealings with the restored monarchy, believing that the
assistance of old colonial sponsors and the well-proven
use of delaying tactics might dissuade Charles from
interfering. In particular, Massachusetts sought to avoid
sending agents, and began a long process of directing
respectful but vague letters to senior officials and to
the king himself. Rhode Island and Connecticut were much
bolder in securing their objectives, and also, however
inadvertently, persuaded the English government that
Massachusetts could be isolated even within New England.
It was to push home this advantage that England took the
initiative in the middle of the decade and dispatched a
group of investigating commissioners to the region.
The major events of the 1660s as far as New England
is concerned fall therefore into three acts, and this
chapter treats them in turn. First, the success of
various forces in bringing the northern colonies to the
attention of an English government which had other
priorities, and the initial efforts of Massachusetts to
avoid such attention. Second, the often complicated means
by which Rhode Island and Connecticut agents secured
their new charters. Finally, the arrival of the king's
commissioners, while it did not open a new chapter in
transatlantic relations, certainly increased the stakes
in some older disagreements. Taken together, the
Restoration agencies demonstrate that 1660 was not a
dramatic turning point in colonial affairs, but rather
the latest in a series of moments at which agents,
colonies and English leaders had to take stock of their
relative positions and make adjustments accordingly.
The new royal government which took power in England in
1660 was different from the successive regimes of the
interregnum in that the basis of its authority was
instantly recognisable, and was not questioned by any
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major political or social group. While Parliament,
Commonwealth and Protectorate had faced doubts about the
legitimacy of their government without a king, Charles II
claimed his right to rule by virtue of long-established
precedent: hereditary monarchy was not exactly unfamiliar
to the English.
This is not to say that Charles could afford to be
complacent about establishing his authority. Much effort
was expended in the early months and years of the
Restoration on consolidating the king's power throughout
his extended dominions. While England itself was
inevitably the first priority, the American colonies were
never far from mind, and offered important political and
economic prizes to the new regime.
Charles and his court were already taking steps to
re-establish royal authority in America by the summer of
1660, within weeks of his triumphant return to London. It
is indicative of the priorities of the king's advisers in
colonial matters that initial attention was devoted
entirely to the southern and Caribbean colonies. In part,
this move was due to administrative expediency, in that
precedent existed for the appointment of governors to
these colonies. In the case of Virginia, William Berkeley
had already been Governor for almost two decades at the
time of the Restoration. He was originally commissioned
by Charles I in 1641 and sought a second commission
from the exiled 'Charles II' in 1650: it was therefore no
great radical act for the formally crowned Charles II to
re-commission the loyal Berkeley once more in July 1660.1
The authority of Lord Willoughby of Parham, originally
ordered by Charles to take over the government of
Barbadoes in 1650, was similarly revived.2 In Jamaica,
Charles did not have any obvious individual to appoint,
but the island had been governed by military officers
1 See CSPC, 1574-1660, 485.
2 See Cambridge History of the British Empire, I: 212;
CSPC, 1574-1660, 483.
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chosen by Cromwell from the time of the English
occupation in 1655, and the new king simply made his own
appointments in the same manner from the ranks of the
Royalist military.1
Royal government was not universally welcomed in the
southern and island settlements, and these simple
administrative actions of Charles II could not ensure
that control was established immediately and without any
difficulty. Nonetheless, the new regime was able to draw
on recent cases in which central authority had been
applied to these colonies. The priority of any new
government which takes power after a period of unrest is
to attain stability and legitimacy as quickly as
possible, and Charles was able to exert influence across
a large part of his colonial possessions by following
available precedents.
New England posed different problems. The new regime
in London had good reason to believe that the region had
collaborated with successive Parliamentary regimes. While
Charles might have been surprised to discover just how
little practical support had in fact been forthcoming, it
is also true that there was never a Royalist party in New
England of the kind found in, for example, Virginia. In
addition, two individuals with Massachusetts connections-
Hugh Peter and Sir Henry Vane- were among the few
interregnum leaders considered guilty enough to be
executed after the Restoration. Neither man could by any
reasonable measure be seen as representative of the
colonial leadership, but it has already been demonstrated
that English critics were never slow to stereotype the
northern settlements.
Despite this generally negative image, Massachusetts
did have some cards to play which gave the new regime
reason to hesitate. Most importantly, the colony had a
valid charter issued by Charles I. While London could
instigate court proceedings for the recall of that
1 See Colonel Edward D'Oyley's commission as Governor of
Jamaica, February 8 1661, in CSPC, 1661-1668, 7-8.
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charter, the failure of the previous attempt to do that
in the sixteen-thirties indicated that such a course
might be expensive in time and effort. Massachusetts had
shown itself quite willing to ignore royal instructions
during the incident, assuming that the English government
lacked both the will and the naval capability to enforce
orders at transatlantic distances. Charles II was
therefore faced with the problem of what he would do if
Massachusetts refused to cooperate in any attempt to
recall or revise the colony charter. A monarch trying to
secure his rule could ill afford to provoke a
confrontation which he was not certain of winning easily.
As well as political constraints, there were sound
economic reasons for giving New England a low priority.
If Charles was to increase and exploit income from the
colonies, it made sense for him to concentrate on those
settlements which had proven value in their cash crops.
Leading members of the committees set up by the new
regime to examine colonial affairs shared this
assumption, and paid little attention to New England.
Early in 1661, the Council for Foreign Plantations
ordered a sub-committee to "inform themselves of the true
state" of Jamaica and New England. Perhaps
understandably, the group reported (after only three
weeks) that it had been unable to gain enough information
about the latter region, but that it could nonetheless
comment on affairs in Jamaica.1 The Jamaica report was
compiled and submitted by Thomas Povey, whose name is
already familiar due to his work in managing colonial
trade under the Protectorate. Povey, in common with many
who had developed colonial interests during the previous
decade, was primarily concerned with the lucrative cash
crops of the southern and island colonies.
In short, New England, and Massachusetts in
particular, had few promoters left. It did, however, have
no shortage of critics, both in England and among
1 See CSPCr 1661-1668, 1-2.
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disaffected colonists and former settlers. These voices
did much to force the region back on to the agenda. They
also helped provide an opportunity for the restored
monarchy, once it had become more established, to try to
bring the last remaining part of England's dominions into
line with the rest. While Charles II was in exile, it was
easy to write off the northern colonies as enemies and
concentrate on wooing possibly more accommodating groups
and factions in England and elsewhere in America. Voices
raised after the Restoration soon made it clear that New
England was far from being a homogeneous region, and that
the Stuarts might find friends there if they looked.
Perhaps more important, various interests which fell
short of outright support were at least happy to come to
a mutually beneficial arrangement with the monarchy if
the result was a diminution of the power of
Massachusetts.
Some of the critics responsible for the background
hum of criticism which surrounded all mention of
Massachusetts in the early sixteen-sixties have already
been mentioned. The Quakers began their onslaught in the
last years of the Protectorate and continued into the
following decade. Leaders of failed plantations in
northern New England, who had suffered economically at
the hands of Massachusetts during the years of relative
neglect by England, saw the restored monarchy as a
possible saviour. Perhaps most importantly, agents from
Rhode Island and Connecticut competed with each other and
with other interested colonial parties for charters,
demonstrating once and for all that Charles and his
advisers had scope for rule by division and favouritism,
and therefore a means of isolating Massachusetts.
Finally, Massachusetts itself was revealed to be divided,
offering the king his most dangerous weapon.
As had been the case throughout the interregnum,
therefore, New Englanders pushed their region into the
view of English administrators who were inclined to look
elsewhere. Before examining the Restoration missions in
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detail, a brief survey of the administrative changes
brought about by the new regime is necessary. Agents and
other colonials once again had to identify important
individuals in a changed political and administrative
climate, and one in which the continuity of personnel
visible in earlier transfers of power was less
pronounced.
At first glance, the task facing agents and their
colonies in the 1660s seems similar to that of Williams,
Gorton and Winslow before the committees of previous
decades. Indeed, Charles II continued the practice of his
father and the interregnum regimes in his appointment of
committees specifically to deal with colonial questions.
In the last two months of 1660 both a Council of Trade
and a Council for Foreign Plantations were established.
The membership lists of these bodies make impressive
reading: the latter had forty-nine members, many of whom
had a long standing involvement in colonial affairs.
Thirteen came from the revived House of Lords, including
some former members of the Warwick Commission, Viscount
Saye and Sele, the Earl of Manchester, and Lords Roberts
and Dacre. As will be seen, the presence of these men on
the Council kindled some hope among New Englanders. Other
members were senior officials in the new royal
administration, such as Secretaries of State Morrice and
Nicholas. Younger men like Thomas Povey and Martin Noell
were also included to give the benefit of their work with
colonial trade during the Protectorate.1
If all the assembled merchants, aristocrats,
officials and lawyers had really had a say in policy, the
Restoration would have been a period of unprecedented
egalitarianism in government. These royal committee-men
were certainly diligent in pursuing the issues placed
1 Membership lists for Charles' new Councils of
Plantations and Trade are printed in J.C. Saint y,
Officials of the Boards of Trade 1660-1870 (1974), 18-21.
Proceedings of the former are minuted in PRO, COl/15.
263
before them, and prepared detailed reports based on
evidence from petitioners and witnesses. The experiences
of colonial agents in Restoration England reveal,
however, that such committees did not have executive
powers to match their information gathering role.
The extensive membership list of the Council for
Foreign Plantations is just one example of the shrewdness
with which Charles II used his patronage. He recognised
that it was quite possible to appoint men with a wide
range of political and religious inclinations to
apparently prestigious government positions, while
keeping real power in the hands of a much smaller elite.1
The Restoration colonial committees exerted minimal
influence on colonial affairs. Even the reinstated Privy
Council, which had its own plantations committee, rarely
took major decisions of government policy.
Instead, the governance of England's colonies (and
much else besides) fell to the new Lord Chancellor,
Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon. Clarendon dominated the
royal government in the early years of the Restoration.
He had been invaluable to the exiled Charles Stuart,
ultimately composing the documents which eased England's
return to monarchy. The Declaration of Breda came from
Clarendon's pen, as did the series of letters which
persuaded leading figures in Parliament and the military
to accept the Restoration without a fight in the spring
of 1660.2 Once established in London, Charles allowed
Clarendon to arrange the sprawling committees appointed
in the first months of the Restoration in such a way as
to keep power closely at hand. Clarendon used the Foreign
Affairs Committee as an executive council dominated by
himself, a handful of peers and Charles' two Secretaries
1 The nature of the Restoration settlement with reference
to the New England colonies is examined in Sosin, English
America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II, 27-
28, ch. 5; Bliss, Revolution and Empire, ch. 5.
2 R.W. Harris, Clarendon and the English Revolution,
(1983), 275.
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of State, who translated policy into legislation.1
Clarendon's primary concern during his
administration was the consolidation of the restored
monarchy. He had no particular interest in the colonies,
and his prominence in colonial administration is simply a
reflection of his central role in all branches of
government in the early 1660s. Unlike the leading members
of the Warwick Commission or the Council of State
committees, Clarendon had no investments in the colonies,
nor had he any ideological and theological concerns of
the kind previously trumpeted by Archbishop Laud.
Clarendon's power in the early sixteen-sixties made
him readily identifiable by agents, but it also made him
hard to approach: it was one thing for an agent to have
regular contact with members of Parliament, but quite
another to establish a rapport with Charles' most
powerful counsellor. Agents had to try to find ways of
reaching Clarendon through lesser officials and in this
sense their task was perhaps even more complex than when
they faced numerous parliamentarians and committees.
Many leading New Englanders recognised familiar
faces from the past among the members of the new
committees, and Massachusetts and Connecticut tried to
revive some of these older contacts in an effort to gain
a hearing. Perhaps predictably, though, few of those who
had been influential in the sponsorship of colonies in
previous decades made a full return to the political
establishment after the Restoration. In any case, age was
creeping up on those opposition leaders of the 1630s and
1640s who were still alive when agents arrived to
petition the new king. Even men who had come to an
accommodation with the Stuarts and been nominally
welcomed back into the royal fold were often to be found
in retirement in their country seats, far separated from
the centre of power.
Nevertheless, Massachusetts and Connecticut alike
1 Percy L. Kaye, English Colonial Administration Under
Lord Clarendon 1660-1667, (1905), 10.
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considered the old aristocrats to be worth soliciting for
help. While the Warwick Commission had refused to allow
the Bay to take over Gorton's Shawomet settlement, and
individual peers had been less than complimentary about
the Bay's religious and social order, there had at least
been none of the attempts at interference practised
previously by Laud and subsequently by the Commonwealth.
Thus, the political survival of the Earl of Manchester
and Lord Saye, and their appointment to the Council for
Foreign Plantations ensured that they headed the Bay
Colony's list of potential contacts for its agents in
1661.
John Leveret, in the final months of his agency for
Massachusetts, had taken the unauthorised step of
contacting Saye and Manchester in September 1660. Saye
promised to do his best to protect the colony's
interests.1 Massachusetts followed up this initial contact
with a letter to Lord Saye which was full of biblical
allusion and condemnation of the Quakers: the latter,
according to the Bay leadership, had been "commissionated
from hell to ruin the poor churches and people of God
here. "2
Most attempts to revive old contacts were quickly
revealed to be hopeless. Connecticut agent John Winthrop
also tried to approach Lord Saye, but the old man,
courteous as he was, could remember little of his days as
a sponsor of colonies. In particular, Saye had no
recollection of the constitutional history of the region,
which Winthrop was trying to reconstruct prior to
applying for a new charter. Winthrop's associate John
Richards reported to the agent that Saye could only give
a few names of men likely to have been involved in the
original New England expeditions: "this is all (upon much
1 Leveret to Governor Endecott, in Hutchinson Papers, II:
41.
2 Massachusetts to Viscount Saye, in Hutchinson Papers II:
78.
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discourse) we could any way gather from him."1 More
importantly, agents were mistaken if they believed that
members of the new colonial committees could have the
sort of influence wielded by such bodies in the past.
Even if Lord Saye had retained the energy and commitment
which he demonstrated in the 1640s, his position on the
Restoration committees would have been a mere shadow of
his powers as a Warwick commissioner.
Massachusetts probably recognised early that
attempts to gain the support of the old colonial
promoters was at best a side issue, and that real efforts
needed to be directed more centrally. Governor Endecott's
first contact with the new regime could hardly have been
more direct: by-passing all the councils and committees
established in the summer of 1660, Endecott wrote
directly to Charles II later that year. The letter was
respectful, yet firm in its defence of the original
migration from England. It also anticipated a range of
complaints from other parties with interests in the
region, and asked that the king should not make up his
mind against Massachusetts until the colony had a chance
to answer.2
Although the difference is subtle, this last request
does mark a change in the Bay Colony's stance since the
1640s. Endecott's words were similar to the plea made by
Edward Winslow in 1647 that colonial governments should
not be forced to answer complaints against them in
England. By 1660, however, the explicit claims to self-
government under the charter contained in Winslow's
petition had been pushed into the background. Such open
belligerence might not have been tolerated by the new
regime, but Endecott's restrained tone was calculated to
have the same effect in the longer term.
Endecott's letter continues a much older trend in
1 Richards to Winthrop, 18 December 1661, in Winthrop MSS,
reel 7. See also Lord Saye to Winthrop, 14 December 1661,
in Winthrop MSS, reel 7.
2 CSPC, 1661-1668, 8-10.
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the way a section of the Massachusetts leadership liked
to deal with England. The elder Winthrop's correspondence
with the Earl of Warwick and Lord Saye, it will be
recalled, was an attempt to persuade leading English
figures of the continued viability of the Bay Colony
despite the economic problems of the early sixteen-
forties. Even at the time of the Bay's first mission,
John Endecott had believed that such delicate diplomatic
tasks should not be entrusted to agents, and when he
himself served as Governor two decades later he had not
changed his views.
If Endecott hoped to keep transatlantic relations at
the level of occasional correspondence, he was soon
thwarted by the volume of petitions against Massachusetts
reaching London. It was in acting as a focus for
petitioners that Charles' Council for Foreign Plantations
began to perform a useful information gathering role,
even if it could not itself respond to agents' petitions.
Complaints against Massachusetts reached the English
authorities regularly in the early years of the
Restoration. The Bay Colony's excursions into the
Narragansett region, a major source of tension in
previous decades, were now only part of the picture, and
various aggrieved settlers from elsewhere in the region
hoped to gain some redress by petitioning Charles II. The
allegations were wide ranging and often did not restrict
themselves to territorial questions. Given the English
administration's self-confessed lack of information about
New England, such petitions inevitably added to a growing
conviction that the region needed to be investigated.
It is worth examining a few of the complaints
directed against Massachusetts, because they form part of
the background against which more formal agency petitions
were delivered. One of the earliest petitioners was
Edward Godfrey, who styled himself "sometime Governor of
the Province of Maine". His criticism of Massachusetts,
delivered in February 1661, was couched in terms of an
attack on the Corporation for the Propagation of the
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Gospel, which he saw as a 'front' for a much more
invidious endeavour. The Corporation, alleged Godfrey,
was a hugely wealthy body able to indulge in large land
purchases in New England which had more to do with
establishing a powerful and independent state in America
than converting the Indians.1 Others pounced on the
colonies' conversion record, and in particular at the
work of Hugh Peter, who was of course an easy target.
According to John Giffard, who wanted to establish mines
in the region, England had contributed £900 per annum "to
Christianise the Indians in New England, which money
found its way into private men's purses, and was a cheat
of Hugh Peters."2
In March 1661 more condemnation was heaped on
Massachusetts by Captain Thomas Breedon, one of the most
vocal members of Boston's merchant community.3 Breedon
made the increasingly familiar allegation about the Bay's
operation as a de facto free state, and backed it up with
detailed comment about the colonial leadership's attitude
toward Charles II. Most damaging was Breedon's revelation
that Endecott's letter, to which the king had responded
magnanimously only a month before, had been hotly debated
in the colony: the General Court had argued over it for a
whole week, "there being so many against owning the king
or having any dependence on England." The other major
issue raised by Breedon was of personal concern to the
king, who had been understandably disturbed by news that
two of the judges who signed his father's death warrant
were being sheltered in New England. Breedon was able to
provide further information, and testified that his own
attempts to arrest the regicides Whalley and Goffe had
been frustrated by Bay Colony officials.''
1 CSPCr 1661-1668, 12.
2 CSPCr 1661-1668, 26.
3 For Breedon, see Bailyn, New England Merchants, 110-111.
4 See Breedon's testimony to the Council for Foreign
Plantations, 11 March 1661, in CSPC, 1661-1668, 15.
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News of the growing clamour in England for something
to be done about Massachusetts increased the internal
tensions of the colony as 1661 progressed. Governor
Endecott's control over the Bay's dealings with England
declined as vocal groups of settlers feared the possible
consequences of intransigence. Importantly, though, while
factions and interest groups were able to insist on the
dispatch of agents late in 1661, the colonial authorities
retained tight control over what the agents actually did.
The agents' petitions were drafted for them before they
sailed, and letters of contact with English leaders also
provided. The means of delivering the Bay Colony's
opinions may have changed by 1661, but there was no doubt
that it was Governor Endecott and his close supporters,
and not the agents, who had the dominant voice.
The documents carried by Simon Bradstreet and John
Norton represent a realisation on the part of the colony
that new stars were in the ascendant in England. As well
as delivering the letters to Lord Saye and the Earl of
Manchester mentioned above, the agents carried a letter
to Lord Chancellor Clarendon. Clarendon's letter was
markedly different from the other two. It made no mention
of the Quakers, but rather tried to appeal to Clarendon
on the grounds that he, like the colonists, had
experienced being exiled from home. This parallel does
not stand up to much scrutiny, of course, but
Massachusetts had to avoid the Quaker issue when
appealing to Clarendon. Comments like those appearing in
the Saye and Manchester letters might seem to be a
criticism of the recent royal order forbidding further
persecution of the sect.1
England's response to the Bay agents was measured,
and raised various issues while maintaining a reasonable
tone. The agents had presented a case which proved "very
acceptable" to the king, who was impressed by their
"loyalty, duty and good affection." Charles also
1 Massachusetts to Earl of Clarendon, Hutchinson Papers
II: 80.
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expressed understanding of the strains and temptations of
recent times, and was willing to forgive the colony's
deviation from English norms. Behind the conciliatory
manner, however, there was no doubt that the Bay Colony
was being served notice on a number of points of future
contention. Liberty of conscience to those observing
Church of England practices was necessary, as was an
extension of the electorate to include all those of good
estate. The latter point was of course an attack on the
Bay's policy of restricting the franchise to church
members.1
Charles and Clarendon left their options open
regarding Massachusetts, giving the colony an opportunity
to concede voluntarily but avoiding threats which might
have been hard to follow up. Already, there was evidence
that other New England colonies were interested in
securing royal authority for their settlements. Just as
the southern and Caribbean colonies had been easier to
deal with than New England in 1660, it became apparent in
1661 that the smaller New England settlements were ready
to accept royal charters far more readily than
Massachusetts. Once more, the complex problem posed by
the Bay Colony was allowed to rest for a while and
attention turned to the Rhode Island and Connecticut.
This case was by no means simple, but at least what
conflict there was tended to be between and among the
agents, rather than between agents and colonial
administrators. The wider significance of the Rhode
Island/Connecticut dispute was that even before the
Massachusetts agents arrived in London, England's leaders
had been offered, albeit indirectly, a means of
undermining the Bay Colony and defeating Endecott's
attempts to delay and misinform.
1 See Charles II to Massachusetts, 28 June 1662, PRO
COl/16 ff168-9.
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The southern New England question in the early 1660s was
rather more complex than it had been two decades before.
In the 1640s, Massachusetts was the main external threat
faced by Rhode Island agents Williams and Gorton, and
while Plymouth had claims to territory around
Narragansett Bay, the most important disputes centred on
the actions of the Bay Colony. Between them, Williams and
Gorton secured papers from England which made overt
military action by Massachusetts less likely.
By the Restoration, however, Rhode Island faced more
subtle threats. The potentially lucrative Narragansett
Country had been subject to increasing infiltration by
members of the Atherton Company in the later 1650s. The
Atherton planters bought land from local Indians and
offered support to junior Indian leaders who hoped to
overthrow the generation which had cooperated with Gorton
and Williams in the 1640s. The second, but related,
challenge to Rhode Island came from Connecticut, which
avoided any direct conflict in America in favour of
securing a new royal charter which would quietly
incorporate the Narragansett Bay settlements into
Hartford's jurisdiction.1
Rhode Islanders believed that both these threats
were simply new verses to an old and familiar song. In
particular, they argued with some justification that the
Atherton Company's activities were thinly disguised
aggression by the leaders of the United Colonies. After
all, most of the company's members came from
Massachusetts, and Boston was also perceived to be
seeking a new approach to the Narragansett territory. The
Bay had recently distanced itself from the Arnold faction
in Providence, its traditional allies. William Arnold was
gradually reconciled with his Rhode Island neighbours
1 Detailed accounts of Connecticut's expansionism are
found in the work of the younger Winthrop's biographers.
See Dunn, "John Winthrop Jr. and the Narragansett
Country." WMQ 13 (1956): 68-86; Dunn, Puritans and
Yankees, 117-142; Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 219-
245.
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during the later 1650s, but an important milestone was
the Bay Colony's refusal to support him in 1659 when he
appealed for help against the Gortonists. Arnold had
bought some of the cattle seized by Massachusetts from
the Gortonists in 1643, and was being sued by the
Shawomet men for compensation. The Bay authorities
refused to help, arguing- surprisingly but significantly-
that Arnold's dispute was with "his own people".1
Roger Williams voiced the fears of his fellow
settlers about the Atherton Company early in 1660. The
Company's claims to the Narragansett Country had provoked
a belief that "the Bay (by this purchase) designed some
prejudice to the liberty of conscience amongst us."2 The
younger John Winthrop's place at the head of the list of
planters quietened some of Williams' concerns, but
Williams always had a peculiar faith in the motives and
intentions of the Winthrop family.3 Most Rhode Islanders
saw the Connecticut Governor's involvement as increasing
rather than mitigating the threat.
While many senior Atherton Company members came from
Massachusetts, other investors were recruited from across
New England. Second to Winthrop in political rank was
magistrate Simon Bradstreet of Massachusetts. Humphrey
Atherton himself was a Massachusetts deputy who had been
interested in Block Island, just off the southern New
England coast, since the later 1640s; John Alcock was a
1 Arnold's petition of 18 October 1659 and the Bay's
response are in Mass Archives, 2: 17, 18.
2 Williams to John Winthrop, jr., 6 February 1660, in
LaFantasie, Correspondence, 495.
3 Williams' relationships with both the elder and younger
Winthrops reveal the deferential streak in his character
when dealing with his social superiors. Williams
vehemently disagreed with the Winthrops in many things,
and particularly the elder's attitude to religious
toleration, but he always maintained a formal and
subservient tone. Similar evidence from his relations
with English gentry families in earlier years has led
Sidney James to conclude that Williams was something of a
social climber. See James, "The Worlds of Roger
Williams." Rhode Island History, 37 (1978): 99-109.
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merchant in Roxbury, Massachusetts; Richard Lord was a
militia captain and merchant from Hartford, Connecticut.
Ironically, the member of the company with the strongest
connection to the Narragansett Country bought his first
land there from Roger Williams. Richard Smith had taken
over Williams' trading post at Cocumscussoc in 1651, just
before the latter's second mission to England.1
The Atherton Company posed a particularly serious
threat to Rhode Island because it adopted that colony's
own tactics. The purchase of land from Indians had been
the key element of Rhode Island's territorial claims
since Roger Williams established Providence in 1636. Now,
the Atherton Company claimed that it had more right to
the Narragansett Country than had the Rhode Islanders,
because the colony had no specific deeds for much of the
disputed territory and only had title to it by virtue of
Williams' 1644 patent.
Initially, the Atherton planters did not make a
separate approach to England, preferring to attach their
colours to John Winthrop's Connecticut agency. The
Company believed that it would be allowed to retain its
purchases and expand them further if Connecticut could
claim jurisdiction over the Narragansett Country.
Winthrop was duly furnished with every piece of evidence
the planters could find which bolstered their case. Amos
Richenson sent copies of all the relevant land deeds to
Winthrop, and the Company even resurrected Thomas Weld's
patent, which had lain forgotten in Massachusetts for
1 These men, along with fourteen others, are listed in the
record of 'Assistants' of the Company in October 1660.
See James Arnold, ed. The Records of the Proprietors of
the Narragansett otherwise called The Fones Record,
(1894), 12-13. For Atherton's designs on Block Island,
see Roger Williams to John Winthrop, jr.. 7 November
1648, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 256-7.
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fifteen years.1 Leading Company member Edward Hutchinson
wrote to Samuel Maverick- persistent critic of the United
Colonies- urging him not to voice opposition to
Connecticut's charter efforts. Hutchinson was "contented
with being under the government of Mr. Winthrop."2
The Atherton Company was not the only group to rely
on the younger Winthrop in the early years of the
Restoration. The Company's faith in Winthrop is
understandable, given the coincidence of interest between
the planters and Connecticut over the exploitation of the
Narragansett Country. Much less explicable is the trust
placed in Winthrop by the authorities in New Haven. That
colony assumed that Winthrop would smooth over its lack
of any English authority and come up with a workable
arrangement whereby it could continue to operate as an
independent settlement in cooperation with the other
United Colonies. Instead, as will be seen, Winthrop
negotiated the annexation of New Haven by Connecticut,
thus demonstrating the harshest consequences of a failure
to appreciate the seriousness of the transatlantic ties
between England and the colonies, and the effect- for
good or ill- of agents upon them.
The New Haven colonists were divided over their
attitudes to England in the 1660s, and in particular to
the restored monarchy. While they were never as factious
as the Rhode Island towns, the latter could at least
agree that their best hope of defence lay in appealing to
England: New Haven instead tried to maintain its
isolation from the home country. More seriously, even
when the colony's leaders decided that the king must be
1 See two letters from Richenson to Winthrop, 24 January
1662 and 17 September 1662, in Winthrop MSS, reel 7. The
former letter records that Massachusetts General Court
Secretary Edward Rawson "looking over some records of the
court found a patent of the Narragansett Country... which
is granted as an addition to the Bay patent and bears
date five months before Rhode Island patent."
2 Hutchinson to Maverick, 29 September 1662, in Winthrop
MSS, reel 7.
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proclaimed and a petition sent to London, they asked John
Winthrop to present their regards to the court rather
than hiring an agent of their own.1
Winthrop made no attempt to distinguish Hew Haven
from Connecticut in his dealings with the English
authorities. New Haven Governor William Leete had hoped
that Winthrop would acquire a charter which recognised
the smaller settlement as an autonomous unit within the
larger colony, while minister John Davenport rejected any
official connection with Connecticut at all. Winthrop
pleased neither of them, petitioning for a charter which
made no mention of New Haven but which clearly included
that colony's land within Connecticut's new territorial
limits.
Even then, New Haven's leaders failed to make a
decisive break with Winthrop. They authorised three men-
John Scott, Robert Thomson and Henry Halsell- to speak on
their behalf in London, but ordered them not to appeal
directly to the king without first approaching Winthrop.2
The Connecticut agent was well able to deal with such a
delegation. Winthrop persuaded New Haven's
representatives that he had never intended to "meddle in
already settled plantations", and that he would take all
possible steps to solve any continuing disputes as soon
as he returned to America.3 In return, Winthrop secured a
promise from Scott and his colleagues that they would
"forbear giving [Winthrop] any trouble" on behalf of New
Haven.4
Winthrop knew that Connecticut would retain an
1 Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 124.
2 For the instruction to the representatives, see John
Davenport to John Winthrop, jr., 22 June 1663, in
Winthrop MSS, reel 7.
3 Winthrop's copy of the letter given to the
representatives is dated 3 March 1663, in MHS Collections
5th series, 8: 80-81.
4 Scott et.al. to Winthrop, 3 March 1662[-3] , in Winthrop
MSS, reel 7.
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advantage over New Haven as long as the issue did not
come to the attention of the English authorities, and he
worked hard to persuade New Haven that he could be
trusted. New Haven's only hope of avoiding annexation was
to appeal directly to the king, and request the recall of
the new Connecticut charter. Its failure to do so stems
from a false sense of security after twenty years of
being part of the decision-making process in New England.
As a member of the United Colonies, New Haven had a forum
for solving grievances, and was used to being allied with
Connecticut. New Haven was reluctant to appeal to England
for a number of reasons: its attitude to the restored
Stuarts is demonstrated by its granting of sanctuary to
two of the men who had signed Charles I's death warrant.1
Still, despite repeated evidence to the contrary, New
Haven continued to believe that New England's old order
would provide it with eventual redress against
Connecticut.
Others had a clearer idea of the realities of
transatlantic politics. With the New Haven question no
longer relevant, the debate among New Englanders in
Restoration London became a three-cornered affair. John
Winthrop had to defend Connecticut's charter against the
counter-claims of Rhode Island's John Clarke. In
addition, he had to deal with the continuing presence in
England of John Scott, who had learned some lessons from
his attempt to represent New Haven. Scott had made a
lasting impression on members of the Atherton Company
during a short visit to New England early in 1662, and
1 The story of the regicides (Edward Wlwdley and William
Goffe) in New England during the early 1660s is
summarised in Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 201-4.
The affair took on semi-mythica1 turn when Goffe
apparently appeared in his old Parliamentary Army uniform
to rally panicky townsfolk during Metacom's War. For the
most recent thorough examination, see Douglas C. Wilson,
"Web of Secrecy: Goffe, Whalley, and the Legend of
Hadley." NEQ 60 (1987): 515-548.
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was asked by them to help Winthrop in his mission.1
However, Scott was also afraid that Winthrop, weary as he
was of his stay in England, might compromise with Clarke
and leave the Narragansett planters in an ambiguous legal
position.
Scott's fears were well-founded. The negotiations
between Winthrop and Clarke over their respective land
claims encompass many of the features of agency work.
Between them, the two agents took full advantage of the
general ignorance among England's rulers of New England
geography, and ultimately acquired charters under a
compromise which both knew could be interpreted by either
colony to its own advantage. Crucially for Rhode Island,
though, the discussions between the agents came after
Clarke had petitioned the crown for a colony charter. The
Rhode Island agent was happy to hold talks with Winthrop,
but they were primarily aimed at delaying the adoption of
the Connecticut charter for as long as possible. When the
agents finally compromised, their agreement hinged upon
the renaming of rivers and the granting to settlers in
the Narragansett Country the right to choose which colony
they would join. Clearly, either colony could interpret
the geographical labels as it saw fit, and try to flood
the region itself with sympathetic new tenants.
John Scott believed this compromise might make life
difficult for his new friends in the Atherton Company,
and did what neither he nor anyone else had tried to do
for New Haven the previous year. Waiting until Winthrop
sailed for New England, Scott petitioned the king
directly on behalf of the Atherton investors, claiming
that they wished to found a new colony.2 There is no
evidence that the Atherton planters ever contemplated
1 See Edward Hutchinson to John Winthrop, jr., 25 December
1662, in Winthrop MSS, reel 7.
2 Scott was disarmingly frank about his activities, which
included the smoothing of his petition's progress with
some 'presents' to officials. See Scott to Edward
Hutchinson, 29 April 1663, in Winthrop MSS, reel 7.
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anything of the sort but Scott's tactics were nonetheless
sound. He was granted a royal letter which instructed the
United Colonies to protect Atherton and his associates
from the "unreasonable and turbulent spirits of
Providence Colony."1 This letter did not establish the
Atherton Company as an independent colony, but Scott's
work did ensure that the planters had the sort of useful
documentary authority which the much older entity of New
Haven fatally lacked.
New Haven's failure to take charge of its own
affairs in England is placed in even greater relief by
the success of Rhode Island. Agent John Clarke had some
difficulties early in his revived mission, and his
hurried petitioning early in 1661 in the wake of Venner's
rebellion has already been considered. Clarke's work may
have been clumsy, and he certainly lacked the network of
friends and contacts built up by Winthrop, but he
succeeding in getting across the only message which
mattered: Rhode Island was an established colony in a
strategically useful location, which had suffered at the
hands of Massachusetts.
By granting Clarke a charter, Clarendon added Rhode
Island to the list of American colonies which openly
proclaimed their allegiance to Charles II. This was
Clarendon's primary goal, and while the details are
unknown, there is evidence that he personally eased the
passage of the Rhode Island charter through the English
bureaucracy. The Rhode Island General Court later thanked
Clarendon for assisting with the payment of costs
incurred in procuring the charter.2 It was of little
consequence that the charters of Rhode Island and
1 Charles II to Governors and Assistants of Massachusetts,
Plymouth, New Haven and Connecticut, 21 June 1663, in MHS
Collections, 5th series 9: 54-55.
2 See RI Rec I: 510. Unfortunately, the Gortonists used
Clarendon's action as yet another excuse for not raising
money for Clarke. See Chapter 4 above, and Town of
Warwick [Shawomet] to Roger Williams, 20 February 1666,
(Enclosure), in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 546.
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Connecticut contained territorial boundaries liable to
lead to conflict, because the fundamental aim of
Clarendon's colonial policy had been achieved.
By the end of 1663, the restored English monarchy could
afford to be pleased with much of its New England policy.
The king had been proclaimed in most of the region, and,
more importantly, had granted charters to the
strategically important colonies of Rhode Island and
Connecticut. Various other interests, from the Atherton
Company to the dispossessed settlers of Maine, had reason
to hope that they would reap some reward for their
continued loyalty to the crown before too long. If
Charles and his court had seen New England as a potential
source of subversion in 1660, they could now see the
region more clearly and recognise that only Massachusetts
remained as an intractable problem.
The final section of this study considers the
mission dispatched by the English crown to investigate
the affairs of New England in 1664, and will look at the
activities of the commissioners, and especially their
dealings with Massachusetts, in some detail. The work of
the four commissioners1 is important in its own right, in
that it represents the first serious attempt by an
English government to gain first-hand information about
the region, and exert direct influence on colonies rather
than issue decrees from London. Equally important here,
though, is the light cast by these first agents to New
England on the successes and failures of the first
generation of agents from New England.
The royal commission had two major aims. Charles II
wanted to capture New Netherland for his brother, the
Duke of York, and also to eliminate the competition the
Dutch offered in sea-going trade. This venture offered an
1 Richard Nicolls, George Cartwright, Robert Carr and
Samuel Maverick.
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opportunity for the activities, laws and boundaries of
the nearby New England colonies to be investigated. While
one half of the mission was clearly rather more
belligerent than the other, they were both part of the
wider goal of securing Charles' authority in Europe and
the Americas. Equally important, some sections of the
Massachusetts leadership were sufficiently nervous about
the new king's intentions to wonder if the naval power
directed against the Dutch might ultimately be turned on
Boston.
Neither Charles nor Clarendon ever planned using
force against Massachusetts, although the commissioners
themselves were happy to let the more paranoid colonists
think the worst in an elaborate game of bluff. There were
various reasons for not threatening the Bay colony
explicitly, among the most important being that it would
almost certainly serve to unite the settlers behind their
leadership. If the opposite was to be achieved, and the
Bay authorities were revealed to be isolated not only
from the rest of the region but from their own people,
Clarendon's policy would be successful.
In planning the mission, Clarendon ordered the
commissioners to avoid a serious clash with
Massachusetts, at least until some victories had been won
elsewhere. The proprietors of New Hampshire and Maine
were known to be willing to renegotiate their patents,
and success there would establish some solid gains for
the commissioners before they faced the more difficult
proposition presented by the Bay Colony. Later, the
commissioners could seek the support of Rhode Island,
which was likely to be friendly: Clarendon had written to
the colony assuring the settlers that one of the
mission's major aims was to secure the new charter
boundaries in the Narragansett Country.1 Finally,
Massachusetts would have to be dealt with, but even then
Clarendon advised that the approach to the Bay Colony
1 See Clarendon to Rhode Island, in RIHS Rhode Island
Historical Manuscripts, X: 97.
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should be careful and diplomatic. If no criticism was
aimed at the colony's religious or political activities,
argued Clarendon, "the stiff and factious party will want
[i.e. lack] pretensions for stirring up the people."1
Contact between the commissioners and the Bay
leadership was intermittent and characterised by hedging,
delaying tactics, thinly veiled threats and
misunderstandings (many quite deliberate). Taken
together, the actions of the Bay leaders demonstrate that
they had learned much from previous transatlantic
conflicts, but that the lessons they chose to follow were
often very selectively chosen. In particular, attempts by
agents such as Peter and Winslow to encourage
Massachusetts to place more faith in English governments
had no impact, while the stalling of John Leveret
immediately after the Restoration was endorsed as a model
for dealing with the English authorities.
The commissioners arrived in Boston late in July
1664. In line with their instructions, they fired a
preliminary threat across the colony's bows without
making any attempt to investigate matters in
Massachusetts. Cleverly, they offered Massachusetts a
chance to prove its loyalty without having to change its
internal practices, by asking that the Bay arrange for
troops to be gathered to help with the forthcoming
assault on New Amsterdam. The commissioners probably
expected Massachusetts to refuse, but they knew that it
would be harder for the colony to devise an excuse than
if the challenge had been made to, say, cherished
principles of church government.
The colony's response set the tone for much of the
subsequent contact, in that it was scrupulously polite
while being careful to promise nothing concrete. All the
Bay leadership would do was call a General Court to
discuss the matter the following week. Unimpressed, but
hardly surprised, the commissioners dropped the first in
1 CSPC, 1661-68, 198-9.
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a series of hints which were to become progressively more
explicit as time went on and frustration grew.
Massachusetts should pay attention to certain matters
raised in previous contact with England, which would be
considered by the commissioners upon their return from
making the Dutch colony part of King Charles' dominions.1
This hint of the military capabilities of the
commissioners was never far below the surface in such
exchanges: later, the commissioners none too subtly
mentioned that any who doubted their authority should
recall that they had arrived in New England in "three of
the king's frigates."2
During the commission's absence in New Netherland,
Massachusetts embarked on a damage control exercise. The
colonial leadership addressed some of the issues raised
in correspondence between colony and crown, and one good
example of the tactics employed is in their consideration
of the freemanship question. English opinion was firmly
opposed to the limiting of freemanship to church members,
not so much because the practice discriminated against
members of other faiths but because it upset the social
order. In theory a poor man, a servant even, could be a
freeman in Massachusetts and have more political
influence than a wealthy and respectable landowner who
did not belong to the church.
The Bay's solution was complex, and the colony was
keen to give the impression that it was offering as many
ways as possible for a man to qualify for freemanship.
There would be a new measure of orthodoxy which would
require certificates from a recognised- but not
necessarily Massachusetts- congregation. Property
qualifications were also introduced, but there was still
no absolute right to freemanship. The new rules would
gain the applicant a hearing, but not necessarily
1 Mass Rec, IV part 2, 164.
2 Mass Rec, IV part 2, 184.
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election.1
The new freemanship regulations were intended to
satisfy the casual observer, and in earlier decades might
have sufficed. Unfortunately for Massachusetts the
commissioners were determined to take a closer interest.
Once the annexation of New Netherland was complete,
sparring with the Bay Colony began in earnest.
Commissioner Cartwright investigated the probable effects
of the new rules and found that they were calculated to
exclude virtually everyone who had been excluded before,
albeit for different reasons.2
The commissioners consistently tried to isolate the
Massachusetts leadership, by securing the support of the
other New England colonies, and also- more damaging- by
turning parts of Bay society against those in authority.
Their first action upon return from New Amsterdam was to
insist that Massachusetts call a general assembly of the
settlers. Whether they were serious about this is
unclear, because it was a rather unreasonable request.
The Governor sensibly enough responded that to require
attendance might leave outlying settlements undefended.
Nonetheless, the commissioners spread word of a general
meeting to coincide with the next court of election by
writing letters to local leaders. They then turned their
attention to Rhode Island.3
The commissioners' tactics were subtle. On the one
hand they knew that there were elements within the Bay
Colony which felt that a more cooperative approach to
England would pay dividends for the colony's economic
prospects, quite apart from any wish to avoid having
direct rule from home forced upon them. The debate over
the dispatch of agents Bradstreet and Norton had made
these divisions clear, and a number of complainants
1 Mass Rec, IV part 2, 167.
2 See Cartwright's "Account of Massachusetts" in NYHS
Collections, II (1869): 83.
3 Mass Rec, IV part 2: 173-4.
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against Massachusetts in the early 1660s claimed that the
king had many loyal subjects in New England who objected
to the antics of the Boston elite. If the commissioners
could reach and influence such people, it was possible
that the Bay leadership would find their position
undermined by dissidents in their own ranks.
Even if this failed, continuous sniping at the
colony might force the leadership to make a mistake. The
nature of that error did not really matter to the
commissioners. If the colony were to give up and
cooperate fully with the commission and the English
crown, all well and good: if not, it might at least be
goaded into outright defiance, which would give the
commissioners a chance to brand Endecott and his
colleagues traitors. The Bay's greatest weapon was polite
obstruction in the form of endless correspondence and
debate which deliberately missed the point, and its
greatest ally was time. Indeed, observed Cartwright,
they hope to tire the King, the Lord Chancellor and the
Secretary too with writing- they can easily spin 7 years
out with writing at that distance and before that be
ended a change might come. Nay, some have even dared to
say, who knows what the event of this Dutch War may be."1
The commissioners and the Bay authorities conducted
their most extensive negotiations in May 1665, and that
summer saw a series of attempts by the colony to delay
proceedings and create confusion in England. The most
traditional tactic was one familiar to anti-Stuart
elements for several decades. The Bay expressed doubts
about the authority of the commissioners and suggested
that they were acting without the knowledge and approval
of the king, in a colonial version of the old fiction of
viewing the monarch as a good man surrounded by evil
counsellors. The result was that both the Bay leaders and
the commissioners invoked the king's name to threaten
each other, and thus created a time-consuming impasse. To
1 See Cartwright's "Account of Massachusetts" in NYHS
Collections, II (1869): 85-6.
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the commissioners, the Bay's answers were "so far from
being probable to satisfy the king's expectation, that we
fear they will highly offend him." Massachusetts
continued to reject the legitimacy of the commissioners'
mission, and informed them that they would "not lose more
of our labours upon you, but refer it to His Majesty's
wisdom.1,1
Governor Endecott continued on this theme in a
letter to Charles II after the commissioners had
concluded their examination of the Bay's affairs.
Endecott's tactics demonstrate an awareness of the
fragility of the colony's position, but also a shrewd
assessment of England's attitudes to the colonies. It had
not escaped Endecott's attention that commissioner
Richard Nicholls had remained in the newly annexed New
York, while the other three members of the party returned
to Massachusetts. Given that one of those three was
Samuel Maverick, it was not too far-fetched for Endecott
to claim that the mission had been misled about the
colony and influenced by its opponents. This was
particularly likely, claimed Endecott, because the leader
of the mission had been diverted to dealing with the
Dutch. Massachusetts would not be
placed upon the sandy foundations of a blind obedience
unto that arbitrary, absolute and unlimited power which
these gentlemen would impose upon us... contrary to Your
Majesty's gracious expressions, and the liberties of
Englishmen.2
As their agents had consistently portrayed resistance to
English intervention as a defence of the charter, so the
Bay leadership invoked the rights implicit in that
charter in its direct dealings with Charles II.
Perhaps the true source of encouragement which
Massachusetts took from Nicolls' absence was that it
reflected the relatively low priority attached to the Bay
1 Mass Rec, IV part 2: 205, 210-11.
2 Mass Rec, IV part 2: 275.
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Colony by the commissioners, and by England. Samuel
Maverick was interested in Massachusetts, and continued
to observe divisions in the colony with satisfaction, but
there is evidence that those commissioners who had less
personal ties to the colony rapidly found more rewarding
activities. Nicholls in particular relished his posting
in New York, and had a keen interest in further
settlement of New Jersey and the southern colonies. A
good example of his thinking is found in a letter to
Clarendon which noted the one New England issue to remain
important- whether the populace at large might unseat the
Bay leadership- before giving much more space to wider
colonial issues.1
At the end of their mission the commissioners played
their final card. Leading figures from the Bay, including
Richard Bellingham, William Hathorne and two others
chosen by the colony, should come to London to state
their case and answer charges against them. This was not
a new idea, of course, and mirrored the effort of
Archbishop Laud's Council three decades before to recall
the Bay Company charter. Nonetheless, circumstances made
the prospect even less palatable for the colony
leadership of the 1660s, a point of which the
commissioners were well aware.
Again, the situation was one in which the
Massachusetts elite could hardly win. If they refused to
travel, they risked encouraging further intervention from
England, and also added to the alienation of sections of
their own constituency. On the other hand, if they did
leave Massachusetts, they would face the prospect of
suffering personally in England, while quite possibly
being removed from office by those same disaffected
elements in their absence. Once again the colony refused
give a firm answer, and while no agents travelled to
England, neither did the Bay explicitly refuse to send
them.
1 See Nicolls to Clarendon, 17 April 1666, in NYHS
Collections, II (1869): 113-120.
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The passage of time, long accepted as the greatest
ally of Massachusetts, came to the colony's aid.
England's priorities once more shifted away from New
England, and Commissioner Cartwright's complaint that
Massachusetts would "easily spin out 7 years with
writing" proved accurate. The fall of Clarendon in 1667
left England struggling to maintain coherent policies,
and, as had happened before, the New England question
moved into the background.
This is not the place for a detailed examination of
colonial administration in the final twenty years of
Stuart rule, but it must be noted that Massachusetts
society in the later 1660s had a different view of the
transatlantic relationship from that held three decades
before. Important elements in Massachusetts recognised
the potential of the colony as a trading centre, and
gradually forced the Bay into the mainstream of the
English Atlantic economy. In so doing, they demonstrated
to the older leadership what had long been clear to
settlers in Rhode Island. England required relatively
little from the colonies beyond formal assurances of
their loyalty, and such commitments would not inevitably
lead to interference in colonial affairs. England could
even be of considerable help to a colony, if that was in
the interests of stability in general.
This shift in outlook was not, however, entirely due
to the seven years of Clarendon's administration. The
royal commission did not create divisions in colonial
society, but rather helped to polarise disagreements
which had already existed for some time. Commissioner
Maverick was much heartened by the 1665 petition, signed
by more than one hundred Bay colonists, which urged full
obedience to the crown.1 Much of the support for this move
came from towns outside Boston, most notably Salem and
Hingham, and Maverick knew better than anyone that the
1 See Maverick to Clarendon, [n.d. 1665?], in NYHS
Collections, II (1869): 126-129; also the petition itself
in the same volume, 132-134.
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emergence of a legitimate opposition, especially with
strong localist roots, could rapidly undermine the older
elite. The commission could not persuade the Bay
authorities to declare their unconditional subjection to
Charles II, but it did help to encourage a climate in
which compromise seemed pragmatic rather than
treacherous.
Clarendon's central colonial policy was a calculated
effort to consolidate London's authority in the region,
not so that day-to-day matters could be dealt with in
England, but so that colonial resources, whether counted
in economic or political terms, could be included in the
calculations of English governments. Clarendon had
learned from experience to secure support from as wide a
range of sources as possible in case of future crises.
Rhode Island and Connecticut recognised that they could
benefit from supporting this policy, and the success of
their agents in the early 1660s was an important step in




Conclusions: Lessons from the First Generation
The political landscape of southern New England in the
mid-1660s owes much of its form to colonial agents. Their
activities in London in the first years of the
Restoration were the culmination of two decades of
lobbying which gave diverse settlements a common
constitutional basis from which to defend their interests
against external threats. Agents' successes also provided
colonial leaders with the authority and legitimacy needed
to create administrative structures within which
religious, political and local factions could coexist.
Less directly, the dispatch of agents forced colonies to
reassess their attitudes toward England from time to
time, and develop their fiscal and administrative
mechanisms in order that their concerns might be aired in
London. Agency missions were not the sole reason for the
forma1isation of colonial government, but in some
instances-particularly in Rhode Island-the needs of an
agent gave a clear impetus for reform.
By far the most important legacy of New England's
first agents is the survival of Rhode Island. Roger
Williams established the claims of the Narragansett Bay
settlers in his 1644 patent and successive agents
defended them through the 1640s and 1650s, before having
them confirmed by John Clarke's charter in 1663. The
United Colonies continued to resent the presence of their
unorthodox neighbours, but were forced to recognise the
authority behind the new charter. As early as the autumn
of 1663, Massachusetts was sending emissaries to deal
with Rhode Island's General Court almost on equal terms;
290
two decades previously the Bay would have been more
likely to send troops.1 After the charter was acquired,
noted Roger Williams, "the country about us was more
friendly and wrote to us and treated us as an authorised
colony".2
Rhode Island's territory was never fundamentally
altered after the grant of the charter, although
squabbles over the region's boundaries continued into the
eighteenth century, and minor adjustments were still
being negotiated almost two hundred years after 1663.
Indeed, part of the reason for the 1862 debate in the
Massachusetts Historical Society over the Narragansett
patents, which was considered in Chapter 6, was that the
issue had some topicality. 1862 saw the final exchange of
territory between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, when
boundaries were redrawn in the Fall River area.
If Rhode Island is the success story of the first
generation, its achievements stand in marked contrast to
the failure of New Haven to resist annexation by
Connecticut. There are a number of factors common to both
cases, not least of which was the involvement of
Connecticut agent John Winthrop, jr. Winthrop's action
against New Haven was part of a more ambitious attempt to
incorporate much of southern New England into a greater
Connecticut. A large part of the reason for Winthrop's
success with New Haven and failure with Rhode Island
stems from the latter colony's recognition, many years
before, of the value of agents in London. New Haven,
lacking experience of the benefits of a close link to
English authority, suffered accordingly.
The first generation agents encountered considerable
change in the attitudes of colonial administrators, but
1 On 20 October 1663, the Massachusetts General Court
ordered Eleazer Lusher and John Leveret to Rhode Island
to discuss territorial questions. See Mass Archives 2:
42.
2 Williams to Major John Mason and Governor Thomas Prince,
22 June 1670, in LaFantasie, Correspondence, 612.
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also a surprising degree of continuity. One theme which
runs throughout is that England's leaders, even when
sitting on colonial committees, always put domestic
concerns before those of the colonies. This is hardly
surprising, but it is noteworthy that even those
individuals who had personal interests in the New England
colonies refrained from indulging them when there were
wider issues at stake. The Warwick Commission of the
1640s might have tried to force a more aristocratic
leadership on Massachusetts following failed attempts at
persuasion in the previous decade, but rather followed
the more general tendency of the Long Parliament to
follow available precedents and interfere as little as
possible in long-standing legal entities like the
colonial companies.
The two regimes which showed an inclination to
intervene in New England also did so for sound reasons of
domestic policy rather than from a desire to control the
routine governance of the colonies. It is no coincidence
that the Commonwealth of 1649-53 and the restored
monarchy were the two administrations in this period with
the most urgent need to establish their authority in
England. Securing pledges of allegiance from different
factions in Rhode Island offered the republican Council
of State some measure of security in the northern
settlements, and was certainly a far cheaper option than
the naval expedition which had to be sent to persuade the
southern and island colonies to recognise the new regime.
A decade later, Charles II and Clarendon managed to
secure the support of most of the American colonies
without much effort, and successfully isolated
Massachusetts by the judicious granting of favours to the
smaller New England colonies. While the loyalty of any
number of colonies would not have saved a regime facing
serious opposition in England, the image of a government
receiving the allegiance of far-flung dominions was a
powerful one, and contributed to the much needed aura of
authority.
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The most pronounced element of continuity
experienced by agents was the relative unimportance of
New England as a region. This should have come as no
surprise to the colonial leadership, but agents found a
strange inconsistency in English attitudes. Religious
controversies in the 1640s often had a New England
element, with agents playing a full part in debates and
with the region's practices being dissected by opponents
and supporters alike. Such interest did not extend to the
majority of colonial administrators, though, and the
Warwick Commission refused to become entangled in
sectarian squabbles between Gortonists, Remonstrants and
the authorities in Massachusetts. Large issues, such as
charter rights and colonial boundaries were readily
considered by England's leaders, but the minute religious
controversies so dear to New Englanders were of little
consequence to those in office.
The reception accorded to agents in England reveals
one further lesson. Massachusetts survived a severe
crisis of confidence, both economic and spiritual, in the
early 1640s, and survived in part by devising a mission
for itself. Conversion of the Indians was an important
part of the Bay's effort to persuade England and itself
that it had a good reason for remaining in America, but
in reality the existence of the colony became its own
justification. The first generation invested considerable
time, effort and resources to establishing the colony,
and took itself very seriously as a result. England
failed to give the Bay leadership the respect it sought,
and what might have been considered reasonable
involvement in any other situation was seen as
unwarranted interference by Massachusetts.
Agents like Edward Winslow recognised this gap in
perceptions, and it is perhaps the greatest failure of
the Massachusetts agents that they were unable to reduce
the paranoia of their colonial masters. That failure was
hardly their fault, however, and Peter, Winslow,
Bradstreet and Norton all deserve some credit for their
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efforts to smooth some obstacles to transatlantic
understanding.
It was in the longer term unfortunate that England
gave the northern colonies such a low priority during the
1640s and 1650s. The Massachusetts leaders misinterpreted
England's attitude during this period as a successful
result of their policy of non-cooperation, rather than as
a lack of interest on the part of England. On the
occasions when England did intervene, during the
Commonwealth and early restoration, it came as a surprise
to the Bay, which proceeded to blame its agents for
attracting unwelcome attention. If Massachusetts had not
overestimated its own importance, relations with England
would have been smoother. England was happy with
recognition and formal allegiance, and had neither the
resources nor the inclination to interfere in a group of
colonies which offered little economic benefit.
New England's first generation agents played a vital
role in the formative decades of the English Atlantic.
They established precedents for transatlantic
communication which remained in place throughout the
colonial period, and scored some notable successes
through their persistence and pragmatism. They also
demonstrated that having an agent in London was no
panacea: agents could not fundamentally alter the
perceptions held by colonies and colonial administrators.
It was this gulf in understanding, symbolised but not
caused by the separating ocean, which led to a gradual
alienation.
294
Appendix 1: Settlements Around Narragansett Bay, c.1650.
Phcde Island Boundaries 1636-1936, Providence, P.I 1936
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Appendix 2: The Warwick Commission, 1643-1648.
Membership.
Appointed by original ordinance, 2 November 1643:
Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick; Philip Herbert, Earl of
Pembroke and Montgomery; Edward Montague, Earl of
Manchester; William Fiennes, Viscount Saye and Sele;
Phillip Lord Wharton; John Lord Roberts; Sir Gilbert
Gerard; Sir Arthur Haselrig; Sir Henry Vane, jr.; Sir
Benjamin Rudyard; John Pym; Oliver Cromwell; Denis Bond;
Miles Corbet; Cornelius Holland; Samuel Vassall; John
Rolles; William Spurstowe. (See Lords Journals VI: 291-
2) .
Oliver St. John (replaced John Pym, who died 8 December
1643) appointed August 26 1644. (See Commons Journals
III: 607) .
Extension of Commission, 14 March 1646:
Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland; Charles Howard,
Earl of Nottingham; Basil Fielding, Earl of Denbigh;
Francis Lennard, Baron Dacre; Lord Bruce, Lord Sarum;
Alexander Rigby (replaced William Spurstowe, who died
January 1646), Sir John Clotworthy, George Fenwick,
Richard Salway, William Purefoy, Francis Allen, John Ash,
Edmund Prideaux, Sir Henry Mildmay, John Glyn, George
Snelling, Sir Phillip Stapleton, Sir William Waller. (See
Commons Journals IV: 476; Lords Journals VIII: 209).
New England documents issued by the Warwick Commission.
See table overleaf.
a) Thomas Weld's Narragansett Patent, 10 December 1643.
(New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 9
(1857) : 41-3) .
b) Roger Williams' Narragansett Patent, 14 March 1644.
(RI Rec I: 143-6).
c) Safe-conduct pass to Samuel Gorton, 15 May 1646.
(Winthrop, Journal II: 282-3).
d) Letter issued to Samuel Gorton, 15 May 1646.
(Winthrop, Journal II: 292-3).
e) Letter issued to Edward Winslow, 25 May 1647.
(Winthrop, Journal II: 336-8).
f) Final judgement in Gorton/Winslow case, 22 July 1647.
(Winthrop, Journal II: 335-6).
g) Letter to New Haven Colony, June 1648. (NH Rec II:
520) .
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Holland • • * • • •
Vassall • • • •
Pembroke • • t •
Rudyard • •
Bond • t
Manchester • • • • •
Saye • • •
Heselrig • • • •











Purefoy • • • •













• Signature appears on the document of the given date
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Appendix 3: Council of State Committees, 1650-1652.
Members involved in New England petitions.
Admiralty Committee (figure i).
Denis Bond; Thomas Challoner; Thomas, Lord Grey; John
Lisle; William Purefoy; William Cecil, Earl of Salisbury;
Anthony Stapely; Sir Henry Vane, jr; Valentine Walton.
Minute-books for the Committee are in PRO, SP25/123
Foreign Affairs Committee (figure ii).
Denis Bond; John Bradshaw; Abraham Burrell; Thomas
Challoner; Sir William Constable; Charles Fleetwood; John
Gurdon; Sir James Harrington; William Hay; Sir Arthur
Haselrig; Cornelius Holland; John Lisle; Nicholas Love;
Henry Marten; Sir William Masham; Herbert Morley; Henry
Neville; Isaac Pennington; Willi am Purefoy; Richard
Salway; Thomas Scott; Sir Henry Vane, jr.; Valentine
Walton; Bulstrode Whitelock.
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Appendix 4: The Agents.
The biographical notes which follow are arranged in a
common format:
Agent's name.
Dates of active agency and community/colony represented.
Date and place of birth.
Date and place of death.
Education; occupation.
Contact with New England colonisation enterprises before
migration.
Date and place of initial arrival in New England; age at
migration.
Office-holding and other activities in colonies, before
and after mission.
Date of agency commission; date and place of departure
from New England; date of arrival in England; date of
departure from England; date of return to New England.
Sources; entries in standard biographical dictionaries,
individual biographies.
Abbreviations used in this section are:
b. born
BDBR Richard L. Greaves, ed., Biographical
Dictionary of British Radicals in the
Seventeenth Century, 3 vols, Brighton, England
1982 .
d. died
DAB Dictionary of American Biography
DNB Dictionary of National Biography
Simon Bradstreet.
Agent for Massachusetts, 1662.
b. March 1603. Horbing, Lincolnshire, England,
d. 27 March 1697. Ipswich, Massachusetts.
Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Steward to Earl of Lincoln,
and later to Countess of Warwick.
Married daughter of Thomas Dudley, went to Cambridge
University as Governor to son of Earl of Warwick.
Sailed to New England with Winthrop in 1630; aged 27.
Assistant in Massachusetts Bay Company, 1629. Founding
Commissioner of United Colonies; held that office for 33
years. Leading figure in Essex County, Massachusetts.
House of Deputies' choice as agent in 1661.
Member of Atherton Company, speculated in land in
Narragansett region.
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Commissioned early 1662; sailed 11 February 1662; at
London 24 March 1662; returned to Massachusetts, 3
September 1662.
DAB; DNB (Brief note under Bradstreet, Anne).
John Clarke.
Agent for Aquidneck 1651-1660, re-commissioned agent for
Rhode Island Colony 1660.
b. 8 October 1609. Westhorpe, Suffolk, England,
d. 20 April 1676. Newport, Rhode Island.
Physician/Baptist preacher.
Possibly studied medicine at University of Leyden.
Arrived Boston November 1637; aged 28.
Played no active part in Antinomian dispute but left
Massachusetts with members of that group, going first to
Exeter, New Hampshire, then arriving in Portsmouth,
Aquidneck by spring 1638. Signed Aquidneck Compact 7
March 1638. Moved south to Newport as part of Coddington
faction April 1639. Founder of and preacher to First
Baptist Church, Newport 1644. Assistant at first Rhode
Island General Assembly; Treasurer 1649, 1650.
Arrested while preaching in Massachusetts, 20 July 1651;
fined. Agent for the anti-Coddington faction in the
towns of Newport and Portsmouth, November 1651; stayed
in England as agent for whole colony until acquisition
of charter in July 1663.
After 1663, regularly elected to colonial assembly;
deputy governor in 1671.
Commissioned 15 Oct 1651, sailed November.
Second Commission dated 18 Oct 1660 while still in
England, returned to Rhode Island summer 1664.
DAB; BDBR; Thomas W. Bicknell, The Story of John Clarke,
the Founder of the First Free Commonwealth in the
History of the World on the Basis of "Full Liberty in
Religious Concernments." Providence, RI 1915; Richard
Greaves, "A Colonial Fifth Monarchist? John Clarke of
Rhode Island." Rhode Island History 40 (1981): 40-47;
Henry M. King, Early Baptists Defended. Boston 1880.
Samuel Gorton.
Agent for settlement of Shawomet, 1644-1648.
b. 1592. Gorton, Lancashire,
d. 1677. Shawomet, Rhode Island.
Clothier/radical preacher.
Arrived Boston March 1637; aged 45.
Moved almost immediately to Plymouth. Jailed after
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challenging authority of minister, Ralph Smith. Moved to
Portsmouth, Aquidneck; publicly whipped for refusing to
recognise government of William Coddington. At centre of
November 1641 dispute between Providence and Pawtuxet;
purchased Shawomet (later Warwick) from Indians, January
1642. Along with followers, kidnapped, tried, imprisoned
and ultimately banished by Massachusetts.
After receiving guarantees from England about safety of
settlement, returned to Shawomet and spent his remaining
years representing the settlement in the General Court
of Rhode Island Colony and leading his religious sect.
Sailed from New Amsterdam in summer of 1644; returned to
Rhode Island by summer 1648.
DAB; DNB; Kenneth W. Porter, "Samuell Gorton: New
England Firebrand." NEQ 7 (1934): 405-444; Philip F.
Gura, "The Radical Ideology of Samuel Gorton: New Light
on the Relation of English to American Puritanism." WMQ
(1979): 78-100; Gura, A Glimpse of Sionfs Glory: Puritan
Radicalism in New England, 1620-1660, (1984), Chapter
10.
John Greene.
Agent for settlement of Shawomet, 1644-1648.
b. 1597. Salisbury, England,
d. 1658. Shawomet, Rhode Island.
Surgeon.
Arrived Salem, Massachusetts June 1635; aged 38.
Moved in summer 1636 to Providence, then to Shawomet in
1643 as follower of Gorton. Avoided capture by
Massachusetts in 1642, keeping Gortonists together until
return of leaders from imprisonment.
Mission dates as for Samuel Gorton.
William Hibbins.
Agent for Massachusetts, 1641-42.
b. Unknown.
d. 23 July 1654. Boston, Massachusetts.
Merchant, owner of leatherworks.
Arrived in Boston 1638.
Boston Selectman December 1639, colony freeman May 1640.
Messenger from Boston church to Aquidneck,
February/March 1639.
Left Massachusetts 3 August 1641, returned in September
1642.
DAB (brief note under Hibbins, Ann)
303
Randall Holden.
Agent for the settlement of Shawomet, 1645-6.
b. 1612. Salisbury, England.
d. 23 August 1692. Shawomet, Rhode Island.
Arrived Boston 1637; aged 25.
In Portsmouth, Aquidneck by 1638, where he joined Gorton
faction. Imprisoned with Gorton by Massachusetts in
1642.
Mission dates as for Samuel Gorton, but returned in
September 1646, presenting safe conduct pass to
Massachusetts authorities.
John Leveret.
Agent for Massachusetts, 1655-61.
b. 1616 (baptised 7 July). Boston, Lincolnshire, England
d. 16 March 1679. Boston, Massachusetts.
Merchant/soldier.
Arrived in Massachusetts in 1633, aged 17.
Freeman in 1640. Involved in Indian fighting in early
1640s before returning to England to take a commission
in Rainsborough's Regiment, Parliamentary Army. Returned
to New England 1648, elected to the General Court 1651-
53.
Part of fact-finding mission to the Dutch, May 1653.
Joint leader of mission planned to attack New Amsterdam
in 1653-54.
Returned to NE in 1662 with free transit pass and royal
pardon. Elected to General Court 1663-5, Member of
Council 1665-70, Deputy Governor 1671-3, Governor 1673-
9. Major General of Massachusetts militia 1663-73.
Commissioned 23 November 1655, sailed beginning
December; arrived back in Massachusetts 19 July 1662.
DAB; Charles E. Leverett, A Memoir, Biographical and
Genealogical, of Sir John Leverett, Knt. , Governor of
Massachusetts 1673-9. Boston, 1856.
John Norton.
Agent for Massachusetts 1662.
b. 6 May 1606. Bishop's Stortford, Hertfordshire,
England.
d. 5 April 1663. Boston, Massachusetts.
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Peterhouse College, Cambridge. Minister.
Succeeded Roger Williams as chaplain to Sir William
Masham in 1620s.
Came to New England with Edward Winslow, who hoped to
recruit him for Plymouth, in 1635; aged 29.
Ordained Ipswich 1636. Considered as agent along with
John Winthrop 1646. Active part in drawing up Cambridge
Platform 1648. Planned to return to England in the
1650s, but instead moved to the Boston church in 1656.
Overseer of Harvard College 1654. Prominent in the
persecution of Quakers in Massachusetts in the 1650s.
Mission dates as for Simon Bradstreet.
DNB; Arthur B. Ellis, History of the First Church in
Boston, 1630-1680. Boston 1881.
Hugh Peter.
Agent for Massachusetts 1641-45.
b. 27 April 1598. Fowey, Cornwall,
d. 16 October 1660. London, England.
Trinity College, Cambridge. Minister.
Travelled widely to preach in early years in England
before going to Holland, 1628. Minister to English
Reformed Church, Rotterdam, 1629-35.
Arrived Salem, Massachusetts in 1635, aged 37.
Army chaplain in Ireland 1642, agent to raise funds for
Parliament in Holland 1643. Prominent clerical supporter
of political actions of Cromwell and the New Model Army;
executed after Restoration for his part in the trial and
execution of Charles I.
Left Massachusetts 3 August 1641, did not return to New
England
DAB; DNB (Under Peters); BDBR; Raymond P. Stearns, The
Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter 1598-1660. Urbana, IL
1954; Ronald W. Pacy, "Spiritual Combat: The Life and
Personality of Hugh Peters, a Puritan Minister." PhD
thesis, State University of New York, Buffalo 1978.
William Vassall.
Agent for Massachusetts Remonstrant faction, 1647.
b. c. 1593.
d. 1655. Barbados.
Sailed to New England June 1635, aged 42.
Assistant to Massachusetts Bay Company 1629. Settled
Roxbury, then moved to Scituate, Plymouth Colony.
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Sailed to England November 1646; after unsuccessful
appeal to authorities went to West Indies.
DAB (note under Vassal, John); DNB (under Vassal, John).
Thomas Weld.
Agent for Massachusetts, 1641-45.
b. 1595. Sudbury, Suffolk, England,
d. 1661. Gateshead, England.
Trinity College, Cambridge. Minister.
Minister to congregations at Haverhill, Suffolk, and
Terling, Essex, before being deprived in November 1631
for nonconformity.
Arrived Boston, Massachusetts, 5 June 1632, aged 37.
Minister at Roxbury from July 1632. Served as Anne
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